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Abstract. The primary goal of the -study is to assess quantitatively the efficiency of 
production control programs applied in milk production in Finland. In addition, an 
attempt is made to identify qualitatively the central principles of and decisions inherent 
in control policy through e.g. political economy analysis. 
Econometric and ARIMA supply functions for milk were estimated from the 
uncontrolled period prior to 1981 and simulated to the control period of 1981-89. The 
difference between the actual controlled production and the free production provided by 
the composite forecast of the two modeIs was considered the control effect. Economic 
efficiency analysis in the form of cost-benefit calculations was based on the production 
quantity examination. The analyses indicate that the low efficiency of dairy control 
programs in the beginning of the 1980s has improved considerably when approaching 
the 1990s. Surplus transformation analysis showed that the applied quota system is 
more efficient in income redistribution than price reduction. According to the results of 
the qualitative and quantitative analyses, adjustment of agriculture to control programs 
was assessed and alternatives to present control practices were explored. 
Index words: agricultural policy, production control, milk supply, surplus transformation, 
income redistribution, political economy 
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1. Introduction 
Overproduction of agricultural products is a common problem in industrialized westem 
world countries. There are many reasons for it. Technological development and produc-
tivity growth have accelerated agricultural production. Simultaneously, consumption of 
basic food stuffs has stagnated in industrialized countries. 
One reason for overproduction is agricultural policy. In most countries, central goals 
of agricultural policy have been self-sufficiency in food and adequate income for fann-
ers. In order to achieve the goals, prices of agricultural products have been set above the 
equilibrium price determined by demand and supply. The high price level has been safe-
guarded through border protection and trade restrictions. 
Overproduction is a many-sided problem. There has been no willingness to sladken 
technological development or to abandon price support, and it is difficult to increase 
consumption. Instead, the heavy imbalance between domestic demand and supply has 
been taken care of by storage and export operations. Stocks are expensive to maintain. 
Expanding subsidized exports have dropped the world market prices of farm products. 
Consequently, the nee,d for export subsidies has increased as the gap between national 
and international prices has widened. 
Overproduction has led to ever-increasing budgetary costs. As a result, it has been 
necessary to introduce numerous production control and restriction measures. In the 
course of time, expanded production regulation has evolved into a special control policy 
within agricultural policy. 
1.1. Definition of control policy 
To start with, it is expedient to define agricultural policy in general terms and within the 
framework of representative governmental decision making. According to HALCROW & 
SPITZE (1989, chp. 1), "public agricultural and food policy is a decision and a subsequent 
action by a representative govemment about a problem centered in or related to the 
production, distribution, and consumption of food and fiber". Furthermore, the determi-
nants of policy can be expressed in an equation as follows: 
(1.1) 	AP, = f (Pr _i ,VB,_i , ES,_i , K , I ,_,); i = 0,1,2,... 
Thus, public agricultural policy (AP) is a function of past and current (not only 
agricultural) policies (Pt. i ), values and beliefs (VB), economic and social conditions 
(ES), knowledge of alternative policies and their consequences (K), and influence levels 
of private interest groups (I) affecte,d by the alternative policies. Evidently, it is difficult 
to measure or quantify some of these variables empirically. 
From the general concept of agricultural policy it is necessary to move to a more 
specific definition of control policy. In a limited sense, production control is a means of 
production policy. In a broader sense, dealing with production control as policy is 
justified because, while pursuing policy, we are looking for and applying appropriate 








policy, agricultural policy and national economy require an abundant assortment of 
means when pursuing control policy. The means of production policy can be divided 
into three broad groups (Figure 1.1). 
There is no unambiguous definition for production control or, in the broader sense, 
for control policy. According to AANESLAND (1987, p. 77), production control is govern-
ment action which can directly affect production volume. In its purest form, production 
is controlled by quotas, through which maximum limits can be determined either for 
production or for use of inputs. The restrictive factor in quota application is profitability 
because it is usually unprofitable to exceed individual or collective quotas. On the other 
hand, the number of producers, inter alia, can also be affected directly by control 
measures. Then, instead of profitability aspects, the decisive factor is the importance of 
rural population and development in agricultural and social policy. 
Because of its relation to production policy, control policy can be approached and 
defined through the definitions of production policy. IHAMUOTILA (1981, p. 43) states 
that "agricultural production policy, as a sub-section of science, examines determinants 
of production and consumption, predicts production and consumption, defines norma-
tively a production objective, analyzes effects of policy measures, and studies new 
means". Studies on production control concentrate on the analysis of factors affecting 
production and effects of applied means. 
As a sub-section of agricultural policy in practice, production policy is, according to 
IHAMUOTILA (1981, p. 42), "considered operations to define the production objective and 
to apply such measures as effectively as possible, which contribute to the realization of 
other policy objectives, or, at least, prevent their realization as little as possible". Con-
trol policy is or has to be pursued when the production objective or target is exceeded. It 
is problematic to apply control programs so that they would not impede the pursuit to 
achieve the other objectives of agricultural policy. 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
STRUCTURAL POLICY PRODUCTION POLICY INCOME POLICY 
Directing supply 
- price ratios 
- support allocation 
Figure 1.1. Position of production control in the classification of agricultural policy. 
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1.2. Background of control policy 
Control policy often arises from the problem of surplus production. Countries have not 
aimed at restricting production, they have been forced to do so. As a result, control is 
not an objective in the same sense as the objectives of self-sufficiency, income level, 
and farm size set for the central areas of agricultural policy, i.e. production, income and 
structural policy. 
Prevention of surpluses is the basic objective of production control. On the other 
hand, there would be no need to take immediate actions due to surpluses if they were 
not a source for undesired consequences. The nature of market competition and price 
formation determine the background according to which the objects of control policy 
can be divided into two broad categories: 1) price and income problems due to surpluses 
in free price formation, and 2) a cost problem due to surpluses in an administered price 
system. 
Competitive markets and free price formation are central elements of a theoretical 
analysis of production control. Markets should automatically seek a balanced stage, but 
disturbance can be caused by e.g. accelerating growth of productivity and immobility of 
resources (e.g. TWEETEN 1979, chp. 6). Consequently, control measures aim at increas-
ing agricultural prices and income, which have fallen due to overproduction. Need and 
support for administrative control have been obvious because free price formation has 
not worked satisfactorily in agriculture (COCHRANE 1958). A just market price level with 
respect to farmers' income development has been set as the goal of control. It should be 
achieved by consciously adjusting supply to demand, product by product, year by year. 
This requires adequate awareness of and ability to affect the determinants of supply and 
demand. 
In practice, control policy most often aims at cutting government expenditure due to 
high overproduction. This applies especially to the administered price system, of which 
Finland is a typical example. In this case, agricultural products usually have a price and 
sales guarantee independent of production volume. Surpluses grow easily, and taking 
care of them by, for example, exports is expensive. The effect of overproduction on 
agricultural income depends on the division of marketing responsibility between the 
state and producers. 
In Finland overproduction of agricultural products has been a problem since the 
1950s. However, control policy has been pursued extensively only during the past two 
decades. Production control has been the central issue of agricultural policy, with some 
modifications: a shift from directing production to restrictions on production volume 
and curtailment of production capacity has occurred. 
The growth of government expenditure due to expensive marketing of surpluses is 
the most essential reason for the use of control programs. Because the self-sufficiency 
target has been set higher than 100% due to e.g. seasonal variation, the need for exports 
of surpluses, especially from animal husbandry, has been permanent. II creates a cost 
burden, which has been widely accepted, however. Unprofitability of exports follows 
from the low world market prices, which cover only part of production costs. In addi- 
tion, the change of the international market situation (trade liberalization, GATT Uru-
guay round) may require considerable cuts in subsidized surplus exports in Finland, too. 
Finland has applied numerous and versatile means to control production. Neverthe- 
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less, overproduction has remained at a high level. The voluntary basis of control pro-
grams is one reason for their inefficiency. Steady price development, technological im-
provements and investment support in agriculture have increased production: the coun-
tereffect deteriorates the efficiency of the control programs. The cost burden of overpro-
duction and surplus disposal has persisted. 
1.3. Objective of the study 
The control of agricultural production has dominated agricultural policy for the past few 
decades in Finland as well as in other western countries. In Finland, however, the 
scientific research concerning control policy and programs has been quite limited. This 
is especially true in the case of quantitative examination. The lack of research in this 
field is caused by the difficulty to carry it out e.g. for the following reasons: 
great variation in duration and form of control programs 
- cumbersome measurement of real effects of programs 
- limited availability of data 
insufficient follow-up of programs. 
Overproduction is the basic reason for production control. The pursued agricultural 
policy leads to overproduction. Administered interventions have displaced market forces. 
Several questions can be posed: 1) why have we come to the present situation; 2) what 
are the best forms of production control, if necessary; 3) are production restrictions ef-
fective; 4) why have we not changed the pursued policy, if it leads, as often argued, to 
macro- and microeconomic problems? 
In a search for answers to the questions, this study makes an attempt to 
identify the principles and background of production control policy in 
agriculture, and 
assess the quantitative efficiency in terms of production volume, as well as 
evaluate the economic efficiency in terms of costs and income redistribution 
of the dairy control programs. 
The first part is a qualitative general examination of control policy. The latter parts 
aim at quantifying the effects of control policy in Finland. The quantitative analyses are 
confined to milk production, which is the maun line of production in Finnish agriculture. 
1.4. Pian of the study 
The study concentrates on providing additional quantitative evidence of the effects and 
effectiveness of control programs in milk production. To complete this task, the most 
suitable quantitative methods are explored. Qualitatively, further understanding of agri-
cultural policy and background of control policy is enhanced through political economic 
examination of the decision malcing process. 
The framework of the causal chain, which leads to control policy, is formulated in 
Chapter 2. The decision malcing process and the factors affecting it play a key role in 
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the examination of the resolutions made between price and supply management and 
between voluntary and mandatory control programs. Then the framework of the causal 
chain is modified to fit the Finnish situation. The historical background of Finnish 
agricultural policy and the fundamental goals detennined through it tie production con-
trol policy to a wider context. In addition to agriculture, social policy is concerned. 
This is emphasized when the division of marketing responsibility of surpluses or the 
principles behind the nature of control programs are examined. 
Control policy has diverse consequences. Directly, it affects the volume and struc-
ture of production. Farm income, production costs, budget outlays for agriculture, agricul-
tural population, processing and input manufacturing industries, foreign trade, and na-
tional economy as a whole are indirect objects of control policy. Ali of these cannot be 
examined simultaneously in one analysis. Hence, the study is restricted to assessing the 
effects of control policy on production volume and sectoral costs of the Finnish milk 
market. Alternative theories, methods and applications to examine impacts of control 
policy are presented in Chapter 3. The methods have been evaluated especially with 
respect to their applicability to a quantitative analysis. 
In order to be able to examine the quantitative effect of control programs, the 
realized, controlled development in production has to be compared with the hypotheti-
cal development without control measures. Hence, the estimation of the supply function 
for milk, made in Chapter 4, is the crucial part of the study. It forms the basis for the 
actual analysis of effectiveness of control programs. It is necessary to know the factors 
which have affected production decisions prior to control programs, and which would 
still affect them, if production were not administratively controlled. 
The estimated supply function for milk forms the basis for the analysis of the effects 
of dairy restrictions. In the examination of quantitative efficiency in Chapter 5, realized 
milk production in the control period is compared with the production which is simu-
lated according to the estimated supply function. The hypothesis is that the actual 
controlled milk production has been lower than the predicted uncontrolled production. 
The difference between the actual production quantity and the predicted quantity is 
regarded as the impact of dairy restrictions applied during the control period. 
The first part of the economic efficiency examination in Chapter 6 depends directly 
on the results of the production quantity examination. Profitability is evaluated through 
the comparison of costs generated by control programs and marketing of dairy products 
in surplus of domestic consumption. The examination is carried out for an individual 
control measure as well as entire control policy. In Chapter 7, relative efficacy of alter-
native programs to cut surpluses and redistribute income is assessed. In this section, the 
welfare economics analysis in the form of surplus transformation approach is employed. 
Chapter 8 presents the results and conclusions of the study along with the implica-
tions for future research. Finally, a brief summary of the entire study is included. 
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2. Determinants of control policy 
Prevention of overproduction is the usual objective of production control. Decrease in 
government costs or increase in prices are among the reasons in the desire to eliminate 
surpluses. There are many reasons for overproduction. Similarly, there are many ways 
to curtail surpluses. This study examines the principles and realization of production 
control, i.e., in the broader sense, control policy. 
Dealing with the subject as policy is justified because of the extensive effects of and 
the various alternatives available for control programs. When introduction of control 
measures is planned and their possible impacts evaluated, the examination has to be 
extended over the object proper to accumulative effects in other sectors as well. 
There is no straightforward solution that would determine the one and only means to 
a certain surplus problem. On the contrary, the special characteristics of each situation 
determine the choice and application of means. The solution is a result of a decision 
making process operating in dynamic conditions. Various interest groups and participants, 
according to their power status, affect or make an attempt to influence the process. 
Therefore, political economic analysis contributes to evaluating the determinants of 
control policy. 
The policy aspect is stressed by the phenomenon that production control has evolved 
into an adjustment mechanism. Production control is intended to correct the consequen-
ces caused by the measures taken to achieve the primary objectives of agricultural 
policy. However, at the same time, control policy often aims at safeguarding the conti-
nuity of the policy pursued earlier, i.e. status quo is preferred to changes in policy. 
2.1. The causality between farm programs and overproduction 
Rapid technological development and saturation of demand have been presented as the 
general reasons for the surpluses of agricultural products. In addition, safeguarding of 
the primary goals of agricultural policy, i.e. self-sufficiency and farm income, by high 
producer prices have partly resulted in overproduction. 
Especially countries that do not have a comparative advantage in agricultural pro-
duction but strive for a high self-sufficiency have to use strong price support for produc-
ers. While applying a high price system, agriculture has to be protected from foreign 
competition through border protection. Domestic markets are separated from the world 
market. The price level in the world market does not affect the price level in domestic 
markets. The price level above the equilibrium slackens demand and accelerates supply. 
It results in an imbalance between supply and demand, i.e. production exceeds domestic 
consumption. 
If the income goal, and, accordingly, price support, are maintained, there are two 
ways to approach the surplus problem: 1) creation of surpluses is prevented in the first 
place, or 2) surpluses are allowed, but the best solution is sought for their management. 
Provided that there is no ability or willingness to lower the producer price, surpluses 
have to be prevented by quantitative production control measures. This applies to the 
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first alternative. For the second altemative, there are various choices. One way to deal 
with the overproduction is to increase either traditional food consumption or altemative 
uses of farm products. Other forms of surplus management are stocks and exports. 
It is difficult to increase consumption. This is especially true in the countries bur-
dened with surpluses, in which demand elasticities for basic food stuffs are low and 
demand is close to the saturation point. Alternative uses, e.g. energy, are still rare, often 
because of an unfavorable price ratio. Storing is not suitable for ali surplus products. 
Moreover, it is only a short-term solution, and expensive even as such. After a certain 
period, a necessary disposal of stocks easily causes downward pressure on prices. Stra-
tegic storing with respect to food security is an independent solution of a different 
nature. However, it has also been utilized for a short-run alleviation of the surplus 
problem. An extreme choice of destroying food is ethically, but also technically, diffi-
cult to cope with. 
The most common decision is the export of surpluses. It is expensive, given the low 
level of world market prices and the subsequent high level of export subsidies. More-
over, its justification can be questioned. First, is it just to subsidize foreign consumers 
instead of domestic ones? Secondly, if the channel is food aid programs, who is the 
intended beneficiary? Instead of the recipient country, primary benefits may accrue to 
the supplying country disposing surplus stocks. Food aid has also been used as a 
political tool (e.g. SPERO 1990, chp. 5). 
Present agricultural policy, characterized by overproduction and its control meas-
ures, has led to paradoxes (e.g. NIELSEN 1988). One of the most crucial paradoxes 
prevails between the food surplus problem in industrialized countries and food shortage 
in less developed countries (LDCs). At the same time, opportunities for export revenues 
of LDCs have deteriorated due to low world market prices. Poverty and misallocation of 
food (production) cannot be solved, but may be alleviated by changes and coordination 
in global agricultural policies. 
The more commonly the present kind of agricultural policy, which loads world mar-
kets with surpluses, is practiced, the lower the world market prices and the higher the 
export subsidies become. The amount of export costs naturally depens on the domestic 
level of production costs and prices. 
The direction and effects of export costs vary in different countries, mainly depend-
ing on the division of marketing responsibility between the government and producers. 
In practice, however, it is a rule of procedure that the higher the export costs are, the 
stronger the pressure is to cut costs. Usually, this results in production restrictions. 
2.2. Effects of price support 
The fundamental dilemma between objectives and results of agricultural policy can be 
presented as follows: high producer prices, raised due to the income goal, inevitably 
lead to larger production volume, which, consequently, requires an ever-increasing num-
ber of government interventions in farm product markets (e.g. KNUTSON, PENN & 
BOEHM 1983, p. 208). Figure 2.1 illustrates the chain reaction. 
According to the economic theory, price support distorts market equilibrium. Equi-
librium exists at the point where the demand and supply curves intersect. At that point, 
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GOAL 	> MEANS 	> RESULT 	> ADJUSTMENT 
income 	 price 	 over- 	 production 
level support production 	control 
Figure 2.1. Causal chain leading to production control. 
the price equals Pe and the quantity equals Qe (Figure 2.2). When the price is raised 
through an administratively set support to Pg, producers' response increases accordingly 
the production quantity to Q5. Due to the higher price, consumption drops to the level of 
Qd. Hence, price support leads to the surplus of Qg-Qd. New administrative operations 
are needed to deal with the surplus. If the objective is to remove surpluses and maintain 
the same level of price support, the original purpose of control is to shift the supply 
curve as a whole so that it intersects the demand curve prevailing at the price level. In 
the figure, the supply quantity declines from Qg to Q, when the new supply curve is S2. 
In theory, this is quite clear. But in practice, the shift of the supply curve is a rather 
complicated task. Usually it means restrictions on production. There is also a goal 
conflict connected with production restrictions, because they, in turn, may deteriorate 
income development. 
II is also worth pondering whether the widely applied price support mechanism has 
really improved farmers' income level as intended. II is commonly argued that price 
support policies lead to increases in the prices of production factors, e.g. land and cattle. 
In Finland, the very Farm Income Act has exacerbated this lcind of development of input 
prices in general as cost increases are fully compensated to farmers in the form of 
Qd Qe Qg 
Figure 2.2. Effect of price support on market equilibrium. 
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higher target prices for farm products. Hence, higher production costs may absorb any 
potential increase in farm income. Again, the distinction between short and long term 
effects is necessary. The wealth of current farmers, provided that they are also owners 
of production factors, e.g. land, is increased by price support policies capitalized in pro-
duction factors. Future farmers, however, suffer from the capitalization process, when 
they have to buy highly priced farms. 
In a perfectly competitive market (e.g. KREPS 1990, chp. 8), price formation takes 
place and market equilibrium is achieved according to the laws of demand and supply. 
There are many sellers and buyers, homogenous products, full information, and free 
entry and exit in markets. Perfect competition is seldom observed in the price formation 
of farm products. In a contestable market (e.g. BAUMOL 1982), which is perhaps more 
likely to exist, the market equilibrium conditions are enforced by the threat of potential 
new entrants into the industry. Evidently, in the heavy regulation of Finnish agriculture, 
neither of these conditions prevails. 
In terms of differences between agricultural policies, Australia and New Zealand 
seem to rely on the free market mechanism to the largest extent. This holds, if the 
criterion is based on the examinations of agricultural support in the context of producer 
subsidy equivalent (PSE) calculations (OECD 1988). 
The PSE-figures are the lowest in Australia and New Zealand. These countries have 
seldom applied supply management by the government. According to the conclusions of 
the causal chain drawn earlier, this is a result of a low level of price support, which is 
possible because of low production costs in these countries. However, low production 
costs do not provide a full explanation. As an interesting example, the percentage PSEs 
for milk have been higher in the U.S. and Canada than in Finland in 1985-86 (OECD 
1988). 
Although perfect competition is rare in real life, its assumptions are still important in 
research work. DoLL & ORAZEM (1978, p. 16) pay attention to the fact that perfect com- 
petition, in terms of the economic theory, is closer to the market conditions of agricul-
ture than any other type of market mechanism. Applicability of the theory is under-
pinned by the feature that profit in agriculture is derived more from natural scarcity of 
resources than from planned scarcity. No producer alone owns so much production 
resources, e.g. arable land, that he could artificially create scarcity. 
However, production control measures particularly represent artificial means. In a 
quota system, only farms with the originally granted permit are allowed to produce. 
Production rights are capitalized in a quota. This is especially evident with freely trans-
ferable quotas, e.g. in Canada. In jargon, the scarcity of production possibilities gener-
ates additional, extra profits for producers with production permits. The phenomenon is 
also observed in empirical studies, e.g. in Canada (USDA 1987a) and in the FRG 
(BRAATz & SCHRÖRS 1988). 
Government regulation and control policy is widely practiced in agriculture because 
it has been perceived that farmers' income level cannot be secured by market forces 
(e.g. COCHRANE 1958). However, the question of great relevance is whether administra-
tive control is really needed, and if it is needed, in which form. In the search for 
solutions to excess supply problems in agriculture, in Chapter 2.3, a pairwise evaluation 
of supply management by price mechanism or quantitative restrictions and compulsory 
or voluntary control programs is made. 
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2.3. Realization of control policy 
The principles of the solutions made between price mechanism and quantitative supply 
regulation and between mandatory and voluntary control policy are examined in the 
following. Because control policy is often a consequence from the achievement of the 
primary goals of agricultural policy, the decision making process and its participants, 
alternative solutions, effects, and match of objectives are underlined. 
2.3.1. Price mechanism or quantitative restrictions 
Farmers' income level has been secured by price support, as illustrated in the causal 
chain (Figure 2.1). It causes expenses, the quantity and payers (consumers, taxpayers) 
of which vary depending on the way of realization. Price support may widen the gap 
between consumption and production as it accelerates supply and slackens demand due 
to higher prices. 
Instead of dealing with the consequence, i.e. surplus production, it would be pos-
sible to affect the reason, i.e. price formation, directly. The quantitative means affecting 
production and supply, e.g. restrictions on production, are most often used to balance 
domestic supply and demand. A price, or a market mechanism, is seldom used, although 
the economic theory strongly supports it. 
The decision making process, as a political process, supplies resolutions, which may 
depart from solutions based on the economic theory. A result may be an agricultural 
policy which is expensive and lies on non-economic grounds rather than economic 
principles (THOMSON 1985; WINTERS 1987; PETIT et al. 1987). Evidently, and by experi-
ence, it can be stated that the reasons behind the chosen farm policies are wider in scope 
than economic principles as such. Consequently, understanding of farm policies can be 
enhanced by political economic ånalysis (Chapter 2.4). 
Criticism of quantitative restrictions is often based on the economic and interna-
tional trade theory. This criticism takes place in international fora, e.g. GATT and 
OECD, when the proposed plans for an agricultural and trade policy reform are evalu-
ated in a global perspective. Supply management via quantitative restrictions in combi-
nation with price support is opposed by the following general arguments: 
- comparative advantage is rejected and international trade is distorted 
planned market orientation and workability of a price mechanism is depressed 
demand is often totally ignored 
- ineffectiveness of control measures can result in worse market disequilibria 
price support is maintained by quantitative restrictions 
The advantage of a price mechanism over quantitative restrictions can be high-
lighted by the following drawbacks of supply management by quantitative restrictions 
(e.g. RABINOWICZ & BOLIN 1986; Finnish examples in parentheses): 
- only the existing farmers benefit; successors have to pay a high price for 
their production rights (purchase of a farm in a change of generation) 
- production technology and structure freeze (establishment permits) 
increased and unpredictable bureaucratic power (allocation of milk bonus 
agreements and additional quotas) 
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increased risks for black markets, if the price gap between the two prices in a 
two-price (quota) system enlarges (farm-gate selling of eggs) 
increased surpluses in other markets not subject to supply management (restric-
tions on animal husbandry increase feed grain surpluses) 
abolition of a control system is difficult (quotas) 
Inefficacy of quantitative restrictions, independent of whether they are voluntary or 
mandatory, can transparently be shown by using widely applied acreage restrictions in 
terms of fallowing schemes as an example (e.g. MÄKINEN 1990, pp. 157-160). Experi-
ence with the U.S. set-aside program in the 1970s exemplifies the so called slippage 
phenomenon: a 15 percent reduction (set-aside) in the cultivated area resulted only in a 
3 percent drop in production (KNuTsoN et al. 1983, p. 219). Common flaws of fallowing 
schemes are: 
- increased intensity in the area remaining in cultivation 
- the least productive fields are fallowed 
productivity improvements are made during temporary fallowing contracts 
land values rise due to limitation on supply and capitalization of fallowing 
contract premiums or compensations 
The aforementioned criticism and drawbacks are mainly based on economic argu-
ments. Following the criticism, the common perception and recommendation is that if 
quantitative restrictions are applied they should be limited to 1) temporary, short-term 
solutions, which 2) affect output instead of inputs, and 3) are voluntary, not compulsory 
(OECD 1990a). In general,flexibility is favored. 
Despite the criticism, various supply management measures from price support pro-
grams to mandatory restrictions on production have often been applied, and in an 
increasing amount when approaching the present time. In some countries, in spite of 
extensive application of control programs, the price formation has been quite free, e.g. 
in the United States. The objective has mainly been to prevent prices from dropping due 
to overproduction. 
Altemative solutions for the price problem have been analyzed extensively in the 
course of time (e.g. SHEPHERD 1964; KNUTSON et al. 1983). The main conclusion has 
been that the price support programs have not succeeded in raising the price (and 
income) level in the long run, but they may alleviate the symptoms, i.e. low prices, of 
the causative problem of supply and demand in the short run. But the disease itself, i.e. 
market imbalance, only worsens. Evidently, output restrictions would have a better cure 
for the "disease" itself than price support programs. 
The diagnosis of farm problem went wrong in the very beginning, e.g. in the 1920s 
in the United States (KNursoN et al. 1983, pp. 202-238). Weak demand was considered 
a reason for the low prices and income in agriculture. The correct object would have 
been the excess resources in agriculture. For a firm verbal statement, one cannot do 
better than quote SHEPHERD (1964, p. 211):" ... the basic farm problem is not a price 
problem resulting from a chronic oversupply of farm products; it is an income-per-
farmer problem resulting from a chronic oversupply of farmers." Yet, instead of re-
source cuts, price support programs have dominated. 
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Unfair and unstable prices in the world market, but also in domestic markets, have 
been the usual reason for the need for administrative supply management instead of a 
market mechanism. One source of instability is weather variation, to which agricultural 
output is very sensitive. Drastic changes in market conditions, e.g. the energy crisis in 
the mid-1970s, support the application of supply management instead of the price 
mechanism. Government intervention has also acted as an alleviation means for the (re-
source) adjustment process in terms of regional and structural development, inter alia. 
Already the famous treadmill theory (COCHRANE 1958) preferred control measures to 
a price equipment. The theory suggested that new technology enables output to grow 
continuously, which results in ever-decreasing prices. Consequently, only the fastest 
adaptors can succeed. This applies both in national and international perspective: wealth 
and success accumulate to few. Cochrane's opinion was that a price mechanism cannot 
function well because farm product markets are too volatile and their participants too 
slow to adjust themselves. The permanent overcapacity problem of agriculture can only 
be solved by effective government interventions controlling production. Furthermore, 
Cochrane preferred mandatory control-s to voluntary ones. 
2.3.2. Compulsory or voluntary restrictions 
Compulsory control measures must have been considered and applied widely, especially 
because of increasing budget outlays. Recent examples are the EC realization of milk 
quotas (PETIT et al. 1987) and the discussion on the need for mandatory programs in 
connection with the U.S. 1985 and 1990 farm legislature (SprrzE 1987, 1990). In Fin-
land, the last application of mandatory restrictions is the semi-obligatory fallow scheme 
introduced in 1991 (KErruNEN 1991, p. 37). 
Production or market quotas are the most common means of mandatory control pro-
grams. However, quotas are not binding because it is not forbidden to exceed them. But 
it is usually unprofitable. In the case of processed products, e.g. milk, it works, but in 
the case of eggs or feed grain excesses can be marketed through other channels. Hence, 
a sanction system cannot cover ali production. 
Quotas have been widely applied in milk production. The characteristics of quota 
systems, e.g. mobility and sanctions, vary considerably in different countries (OECD 
1990b). Canada introduced milk quotas in 1965, Switzerland in 1977, Austria in 1978, 
Norway in 1983, the EC in 1984, and Finland in 1985. Sweden had an exceptional 
voluntary quota system since 1985 until its as exceptional abolition in 1989. Even 
Australia, the strong supporter of market forces, has applied milk quotas. Instead, the 
United States, the third largest producer of milk after the Soviet Union and the EC, has 
not applied milk quotas. However, milk quotas have been dealt with in conjunction with 
the last two farm acts (SPrrzE 1987; HAMM 1990). 
Oversupply problems have the longest history in the United States. Therefore, it is 
worth examining the American control program choices. The compulsou control of 
agricultural production gained support in the United States in the beginning of the 
1960s. It was mainly a result of an effort made by W.W. Cochrane, the agricultural 
chief advisor in the J.F. Kennedy administration. 
The congress passed an extensive control program based on mandatory measures, 
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but its wider use collapsed to the strong opposition of farmers in 1963 (KNursoN et al. 
1983, p. 218). Thereafter, voluntary programs have been favored. 
COCHRANE'S (1958) support for mandatory control partly included a worry of cen-
tralization of agriculture and destruction of the family farm structure. In the 1970s, 
RAUP (1978) repeated the same kind of thinking in the concept of "economic cannibal-
ism". A few large factory-type farms, taking advantage of the scale of size, have the ca-
pability to gradually swallow smaller farms. 
The discussion on the need for mandatory control measures was renewed in connec-
tion with the 1985 Food Security Act. The important impulse, contrary to the 1960s, 
was the expansion of farm program costs. It was considered that mandatory programs 
can cut the costs (USDA 1987b). On the other hand, advantages of mandatory control 
are ambiguous (THomPsoN 1986), even if it will result in increased income through 
higher prices in the short run. 
Gradually, however, higher prices will capitalize on land values. In practice, capi-
talization will prevent new farmers from entering the industry. Exports and some joint 
groups of agriculture will suffer from the price rise, too. Consumers experience higher 
prices as a regressive tax because those pay the most whose food expenditure is rela-
tively the highest. As voluntary programs have been financed by a progressive income 
taxation, compulsory programs shift the burden from taxpayers to consumers. 
Low budgetary cost is the biggest advantage of mandatory measures like quotas. 
Consumers usually pay the expenses in higher prices as supply falls. However, adminis- 
trative costs may grow due to the difficulty to enforce and supervise these programs. 
Good efficiency in curtailing production is the other important benefit. Mandatory pro-
grams contribute to an equalized division of cons and pros betwCen producers, because 
the possibility of enlarged output by non-participants in voluntary programs is elimi-
nated. 
Finally, there is an interesting possibility in the free price formation that farmers 
may gain from mandatory controls if the increase in price they receive is relatively 
larger than the amount they are required to cut down production. Ali this is directly de-
pendent on the price elasticities of demand and supply. However, per unit cost of output 
obviously increases as the farmer is forced to move to diseconomies of scale. 
According to productivity aspects, compulsory measures should not be used. Aver-
age production costs increase because the most efficient producers have to cut their 
production relatively as much as inefficient farmers. Measures like quotas stagnate pro- 
duction structure and prevent low-cost, efficient production from spreading. Instead, a 
price drop would eliminate the most expensive production. Drawbacks are particularly 
serious if inputs are controlled, i.e. optimal use of inputs is prohibited. Should manda-
tory programs be applied, they should affect output instead of inputs (OECD 1990a; 
WALLACE 1962, p. 585). 
Typical drawbacks in compulsory programs are that they limit farmers' decision 
sphere and farmers are often faced with inadequate time to adjust to the changes 
necessary due to compulsory restrictions. 
The effects of mandatory programs on trade are negative because the market share 
may be reduced due to implied price increase, not only temporarily but perhaps perma-
nently, when other exporters of the restricted product expand their sales. 









516; KNUTSON et al. 1983, p. 218; SUOJANEN 1977 and 1983) have often affected decision 
making, resulting in wider application of voluntary programs. 
In conditions of a free market, the success of voluntary control =sures requires 
suitable circumstances. First, demand for the controlled product has to be relatively 
inelastic. The restricted product must not have a close demand substitute. The above 
conditions maintain the level of demand for the product. Otherwise, without price 
regulation, restrictions on output increase prices, which would lead to lower consump-
tion. Secondly, inelastic supply is required to prevent supply of non-participants from 
increasing when prices go up due to restrictions. No supply substitute is allowed, either. 
Most farm products meet the requirements. 
The principle prevails in voluntary control programs that it pays for a farmer to cut 
production, if the compensation he receives equals the difference between return and 
variable costs, i.e. it covers fixed costs. According to the neoclassical economic theory, 
it is profitable to continue production as long as variable costs can be covered by returns 
of the enterprise. In Figure 2.3 this functioning area is located above the intersection 
point A (shutdown point) of marginal costs (MC) and average variable costs (AVC). 
Then, production losses equal average fixed costs (AFC) up to the intersection point B 
(breakeven point) of average total costs (ATC). 
It is difficult to determine the correct level of compensation in voluntary programs 
because relative shares of variable and fixed costs vary a great deal between farms ac-
cording to production Iines and, partly, farmers' subje,ctive points of view. Applicability 
of programs providing compensations to cover fixed costs, e.g. the agreements for de-
creasing animal production, so called bonus agreements, depends on the farmer' s evalu-
ation whether the compensation guarante,es a satisfactory livelihood in comparison with 
Figure 2.3. Profitability of a firm in the short run. 
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livelihood earned from active production. In Finland, inefficiency of small farms, old 
farmers, and programs of a short duration have encouraged farmers to make control 
agreements. In addition, sometimes the contract period may have been used for renewal 
of production facilities. 
Flexibility and freedom in decision making are the essential benefits of voluntary 
control programs compared with mandatory restrictions. Moreover, if voluntary pro-
grams are intentionally directed to older farmers with small, inefficient farms, structural 
development can be enhanced remarkably. 
But the government costs rise higher than those of compulsory programs as volun-
tary programs usually involve compensations to participating farmers. Costs increase 
also due to inefficiency, a typical disadvantage of voluntary programs. The net effect 
may remain low, if farmers had also given up production without the incentive based 
programs. Programs may be designed on social rather than efficiency grounds. Often 
the result is that production shifts from a restricted product to an unrestricted one. A 
typical example is the growing surplus of feed grain as a consequence of the restrictions 
on animal husbandry. 
The criterion for a comparison between various voluntary programs is their cost 
burden in terms of government expenditure at the macro level and their effect on 
profitability of production at the micro level. Flexibility in introducing, using and quit-
ting programs is important, both for the object (producer) and the executor (administra-
tion). Special attention has to be paid to other extensive effects of control measures on 
e.g. rural population and environment when evaluating control policy. 
2.4. Decision making process 
In the previous chapters, the choices of alternative means with respect to agricultural 
policy in general and control policy in particular were dealt with. Decisions are made 
through a joint effect of various factors, and, accordingly, they affect many objects. 
Extensive control of agricultural production has dominated the pursued policy, and it 
has eliminated market forces. The objectives of the national food security and adequate 
income for farmers have directed agricultural policy. These choices in agricultural pol-
icy are political decisions made by elected officials in the political arena. 
Hence, decision making and factors affecting it have to be evaluated according to 
principles and concepts wider in scope than those solely and traditionally attached to 
economics. Models which include economic variables only do not acknowledge the 
political setting. Consequently, alternative theories and models are needed to examine 
the agricultural policy process as part of the overall public policy formation. 
Political economy theory offers a suitable framework to incorporate both the eco-
nomic and political aspects involved in agricultural policy fonnation. Political economy 
theory is defined as the economic study of non-market decision making (MUELLER 1979, 
p. 1). In its most basic form, political economy theory analyzes the interactions among 
special interest groups, elected legislative officials (parliament) and administrative bu-
reaucrats (executive branch). Basic references are DOWNS (1957), TuLLocx (1959), 
OLSON (1965), BUCHANAN (1968), MUELLER (1976). 
In general, a political economy model is intended to identify variables which may 
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influence policymakers' decisions, and by doing so, to endogenize government behav-
ior. Instead of focusing on evaluating the welfare consequences of given, say, agricul-
tural policy scenarios, political economic analysis examines how policy responds to the 
welfare of market participants. The political economy model considers preferential po-
litical policies as public goods, which are supplied by politicians and bureaucrats, and 
demanded by special interest groups. Both qualitative and quantitative approaches apply 
to political economic analysis. 
The importance of political influence of special interest groups in the political deci-
sion making process is emphasized by the public choice theory. It is one approach in the 
framework of political economy theory to examine the versatile decision making proc-
ess and its elements such as the participants of the process, interest groups, rules and 
bureaucracy of the process, general economic development, and parliamentary situation. 
BECKER (1983) states in his theory of competition among pressure groups for politi-
cal influence that governments correct market failures with the view that they favor the 
politically powerful, who are not necessarily the most numerous in the society. Political 
power is affected by the size, political efficiency and political expenditures of the 
group. Becker's model is set in a Cournot-Nash noncooperative game (see KREPS 1990, 
chp. 12) in political expenditures. The agents aim at maximizing their income. 
The qualitative approach is employed in the study of the EC milk quotas by PETIT et 
al. (1987). They call their approach as one of new political economy, which heavily 
overlaps the public choice theory. The entire decision making process has been ana-
lyzed through four stages: 
identification of the most important participants and their institutional 
background and goals 
determination of limitations for operation of the participants 
listing of the effective means and channels available for the participants 
comparison of the participants' behavior in the different phases of the process 
The claims for restrictions on milk production in the EC strengthened parallel to the 
expansion of the agricultural budget. The original positions of selected EC-countries are 
illustrated in Table 2.1, which is combined from PETIT et al. (1987, pp. 135, 160). 
Table 2.1. The goal preferences with respect to the alternative dairy restrictions in the 
European Community in 1983. 
Goal 	 France FRG Italy 	Netherl. 	UK Denmark 
Farm income 	++ 	++ 	++ 	+ 	+ 	+ 
Price reduction 0 0 + 	++ 	0 
Quotas 	 + 	 0 
++ very important, + important, 0 neutral, - against, 	strongly against 
Source: PETIT et al. 1987, pp. 135, 160. 
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Finally, there were only two alternatives to curtail overwoduction, either a price 
drop or production quotas. The final decision was supply management in the form of 
milk quotas. As a summary it can be stated that the choice between the two difficult al-
ternatives was evaluated and made by the motive of loss minimization, in terms of both 
politics and economics. There was not much to gain for anyone, either for the member 
states or their internal participants of the decision making process. 
The abundance of the factors in the EC process is illustrated by the fact that only 
within one participant, i.e. agriculture, there were several interest groups with their 
different goaLs: many farm unions, product groups, marketing organizations, and re-
gional federations in each member country. 
In the quantitative approach, in addition to identification, the magnitude and direc-
tion of effects of variables affecting the decision making process are examined. The 
main interest is to analyze the policy result and to fmd out how policy changes whed the 
variables change to enhance understanding of agricultural policy choices. In order to do 
so, i.e. to endogenize govemment behavior, political decisions have to be quantitatively 
incorporated into economic models. The studies by DE GORTER (1983), GARDNER (1987a), 
LOPEZ (1989) and MARCHANT (1989) represent this approach. 
Empirical govemment behavioral models can be categorized into two groups (RAUSSER, 
LICITTENBERG & LarrudoRE 1982): 1) analytical derivation followed by estimation of 
policy instruments from policy preference or criterion function: criterion function mod-
els, and 2) direct estimation of policy instrument behavioral equations: behavioral mod-
els. 
Purely economic principles often do not support the use of administrative production 
control compared with the alternative of market forces. Admitting the interdependencies 
between economic and political factors, it can be stated that popularity of control is 
based on political economic factors, rather than so called non-economic factors alone. 
EHRENHEIM (1984), applying public choice, has suggested that in Sweden the decision 
making in agricultural policy has shifted to the responsibility (or privilege) of fewer and 
fewer people. This implies that democracy does not work. A certain group can pursue 
agricultural policy as it desires, as long as others receive corresponding benefits in the 
sectors they consider important for themselves. 
Contrary to the concentration evolution, it has also been thought that agricultural 
policy has become so important for ali sectors of the society that it cannot be left to 
agriculture or narrow administration to take care of. In addition to food production, 
agricultural policy affects various other matters. At the moment, rural development and 
environmental management, representing economic as well as ecologic issues, are cen- 
tral objectives of agricultural policy. More and more groups with different interests try 
to affect the decision making process. The traditional "triangle of power", i.e. the 
congress - administration - producer organization, has fallen under the weight of con-
flicting interests of the greatly increased number of actors (BoNNEN 1977). 
De,cision making in agricultural policy has be,come more difficult because of hetero-
genous national factors, but also due to increasing internationalization. In the 1970s, 
energy crisis changed the foundations of agricultural policy, both nationally and glob-
ally. In the 1980s, assumed advantages of trade liberalization have increased criticism 
on protectionism in agricultural policy, which has been practiced widely and designated 
to a special privileged position. International agreements, e.g. the GATT and EES 
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decisions, regulate national policies of the member countries. Formation and integration 
of the free market area of the European Community affects also non-member countries' 
agriculture and food industry. 
Furthermore, tendency to use food, and accordingly agricultural policy, as a means 
to achieve local and global political influence ("food as a weapon", "supplier of the 
last resort", food aid programs) extends the sphere of decision making analysis beyond 
the traditional economic factors. Finally, the basic global question whether the world 
can feed its population will play an important role when national agricultural policies 
are formulated. Predicted climatic changes may alter production capabilities. 
The political and economic characteristics of Finnish control policy are examined in 
the following chapter. National factors, strongly influenced by the political setting, have 
mainly directed decisions. Dependence on international development, however, will 
have greater influence on agricultural policy decisions also in Finland. 
2.5. Finnish control policy 
The fundamental causal relationships of Finnish control policy can be derived from 
World War II and the first post-war decade. At that time, decisions were made under 
extremely exceptional conditions and lack of altematives. However, overproduction, 
which started soon and grew rapidly, could have been taken care of by price policy 
instead of the chosen control policy. But wider goals of agricultural and social policy 
determined a different direction. In the following, the phases and principles of agricultural 
policy and decision making in Finland are examined. The causal chain leading to control 
policy, presented earlier in a general form (Figure 2.1), is modified to better illustrate 
the Finnish situation (Figure 2.4). 
2.5.1. The central objectives of agricultural policy in relation to control policy 
Self-sufficiency is the central goal of agricultural policy in Finland, as well as in many 
other countries. Hence, it must be added to the general form of the causal chain (Figure 
2.1) in the goal section parallel to the farmers' income level (Figure 2.4). Self-suffi-
ciency has a special meaning in Finland, .because extraordinary efforts have been re-
quired to achieve it in comparison with countries enjoying more favorable natural 
conditions and steady historical and social development. Another reason of great impor-
tance for food security has been the political neutrality of Finland. In crisis situations, 
we do not have political or military allies. Hence, self-sufficiency as such guarantees 
independence to some extent. 
In Finland, however, the focus has been on self-sufficiency of output. Accordingly, 
self-sufficiency of production inputs has received less attention, or it has not been 
achieved, in spite of the objectives. In the case of fuel and lubricants of farm machines 
and important pesticides, Finland relies on imports to a large extent. On the average, 
self-sufficiency of production inputs is 74 percent (IHAmu0mA1985). 
According to TWEETEN (1979, p. 518), the principal purposes of production control 
are to stabilize production and to create an orderly economic environment for agricul- 
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Figure 2.4. Causal chain leading to control policy in Finland. 
ture, in which a strategic reserve of production capacity can be maintained. A reserve of 
production capacity has not been considered sufficient in Finland, but the goal has been 
continuous self-sufficiency in basic food stuffs. 
The 100 percent self-sufficiency target in basic food stuffs set in the 1950s by the 
agricultural committee (ANoN. 1962) has later been modified, mainly upwards (Table 
2.2), by several committees (ANON. 1969; ANON. 1980a; ANON. 1983). In principle, the 
Agriculture 2000 committee (ANON. 1987) reintroduced the targets set a quarter of a 
century ago. The objective is the best possible balance between domestic production 
and consumption, taking seasonal variation into account. 
Parallel to food security, the other important goal has been to secure the level and 
development of farmers' income, and to equalize income disparities within agriculture. 
The income goal has indirectly the same effect as the self-sufficiency goal, because they 
involve the same primary means, price support, which results in overproduction. In 
principle, the goals of self-sufficiency and income can be achieved together without 
major conflicts between them. In practice, their realization has also proved successful to 
a satisfactory extent. 
Maintaining rural employment and population has been the third goal of great im-
portance, although its background has varied in the course of time. It reflects the strong 
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Table 2.2. Self-sufficiency targets (%) as presented in various agricultural committees. 
Product 1962 1969 	1980 1983 1987 
Milk 100 105 	115 115 115 
Beef 100 105 	100 100 100 
Pork 100 105 	105 105 105 
Eggs 100 105 	110 110 105 
Bread grain 75-100 100 	105-110 100 100 
Feed grain 100 100 - 
Sugar 25 20 	60 60 60 
Oil seeds 20 20 	100 85 85 
influence of regional policy in Finland. In addition to the goals of labor and social 
policy, national security in terms of utilization of resources in the whole country has 
been taken care of by regional policy. In the 1980s, wider adoption and underlining of 
rural policy underpins the position of regional policy among the central goals of agricul-
tural policy. Agriculture is still the central, but not the only factor in the comprehensive 
development of the countryside. 
The common feature of the three central goals is the assortment of means used in 
our agricultural policy, which has been dominated by price and support policy as well 
as border protection (see Figure 2.4). They have secured the price and sales guarantee 
for the entire farm output in the whole country, independent of the domestic consump-
tion level. 
Instead, the efforts to achieve the other objectives, e.g. structural development, rea-
sonable prices and high quality of food stuffs and environmental sustainability, are 
more complicated to outline. Their efficiency may even be hampered by the strong 
priority of the central goals. 
It is quite self-evident that when an attempt is made to achieve several, and quite 
different, goals by using mainly one and only means, price support, problems will arise 
(e.g. SOHLMAN 1990). Because of the evident goal conflicts, it has usually been possible 
to concentrate only on the three central goals: 1) self-sufficiency, 2) income, and 3) 
rural population. 
Control policy has been introduced to correct distortions brought about by the pri-
mary means in achieving the central goals. Control policy hampers structural develop-
ment (MÄKINEN 1990), when it prevents farms from growing. On the other hand, natural 
or administered direction of control measures to old farmers with small farms has pro-
moted structural development. Moreover, in some cases, control programs have been 
aimed at securing the livelihood of family farms by preventing industrial-type produc-
tion (establishment permit system; KOLA 1987). 
In principle, the effect of production restrictions on income development corre-
sponds to that on structural development above. Inevitably, restrictions have impeded 
income development in many cases. However, control policy is also a condition for 
maintaining the high price system and the income level in agriculture. In addition, it can 
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reduce surplus-marketing costs, which affect farm income negatively, given the market-
ing responsibility system (see Chapter 2.5.2). 
Why have the three central goals been on the forefront? Why have such means to 
achieve the central 'goals been used that create surplus problems? Why have surpluses 
not been cut via reductions in support prices? To answer the questions, the conceptual 
fråmework of the causal chain is followed (Figure 2.4). However, the interesting ques-. 
tion 	Policies have not been altered as problems (surpiuses) åccumulated can better 
be examined in the political economic analysis (see Chapter 2.5.4). 
The background for Finnish agricultural policy can be derived from World War II 
and from the necessary arrangements of the post-wat period. Especially the effects of 
the resettlement process (1945 Act on Land Acquisition) are reflected to the present-day 
situation (Figure 2.4). Food shortage required increases and improvement in domestic 
farm prodwtion: Possibilities to live had to be established for the refugees of the ceded 
areas, half of whom were agricultural population. Aanording -to HAATAJA (1987), the 
resettlement process was social policy of the agrarian society. One aim was alscy to 
prevent unrest in the society. Expansion of agriculture supported the goals set for 
agricultural production and resettlement. These operations also supported the security 
strategy in terms of maintaining inhabitation in the remote areas. Agriculture, at the cost 
of its internal development, acted as the society's buffer necessary for the adjustments 
in the difficult situation. 
As a result, agricultural structure became unfavorable in Finland. More resources, 
especially land and labor force, were tied to agriculture. The rapid structural develop- 
ment and rationalization of agricultur-e, which started immediately after the war in other 
Western European countries, could not take place in Finland. On the -contrary, the 
average farm size decreased and the number of farms increased. 
In 1966, when the Resettlement Fund was replaced by the Agricultural Development 
Fund, the focus of policy shifted from enlargement of production capacity to improve- 
ment of livelihood on the existing farms. However, a new obstacle for structural devel- 
opment was already under formation, i.e. increasing production control with e.g. restric-
tions on the unit size of enterprises. Unfavorable structural development, combined with 
the northern location, easily explains high production costs. Consequently, profitability 
of individual farms has been secured by high product prices, corresponding to high 
costs. 
Income policy, managed by price and support policy, has been a major factor in the 
realization of the three central goals. To increase output and create- willingness to 
cultivate, reasonable conditions had to be provided in agriculture compared to other 
industries. The income goal has been taken care of by the farm income system, which 
has been directed by income settlements and laws since the 1950s (KETTUNEN 1972, 
1981; IHAMUOTILA 1979; SAULI 1987). 
The system. secured the production goal as early as in the late 1950s, and led to 
growing excesses in the 1960s. The (levelopment was fostered as production became 
more effective and productivity regained the "normal" pre-war pace of growth at the 
same time when consumption growth started to slacken. In spite of the threat of gradu-
ally emerging overproduction, the income goal of farmers did not allow prian reduc- 
tions. Moreover, the parity principle between farmer and wage-earner incomes, espe-
cially in conditions of a rapidly rising wage rate, required the continuation of the high 
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price system adopted earlier in the farm income system. 
As a summary of the events in the post-war decades it can be concluded that farmers 
were provided conditions to live and produce in their industry by the state. It was 
necessary because of the extensive objectives of food security, employment and social 
development. It was widely accepted in the society of the post-war era. Consequently, 
abundant resources were allocated to agriculture. Instead, their adjustment to the quicldy 
changing circumstances has not been as successful as the achievement of self-suffi-
ciency in agricultural production in the difficult conditions after World War II. As the 
surpluses accumulated, the division of the surplus marketing responsibility between 
agriculture and the state became the key issue. 
2.5.2. Marketing responsibility of surpluses 
In free price formation, surplus production results in a farmer's income problem as 
prices tend to drop. But in the administered price system, surpluses create an export 
support problem. Expansion of government expenses due to surplus disposal has been 
the essential reason to the restrictions on production in Finland. 
Since the 1950s, marketing responsibility of farm products has been included in the 
legislative price system. Methods and division of the cost burden between producers 
and the state have varied (SILTANEN 1988). In the beginning, producers' responsibility 
was realized through lowering the prices to the world market level for that part of output 
which exceeded the output of a certain year used in the comparison. In the 1970s, in 
addition to the price reductions, temporary marketing charges from producers were 
used. 
Since the 1977 Farm Income Act, marketing responsibility has been based on the 
production and export ceilings for each individual farm product. The share which agri-
culture is responsible for is collected solely as export cost charges consisting of market-
ing fees and taxes on inputs, especially to finance surplus exports. As such, the produc-
tion and export ceilings are not control means but a basis for the division of marketing 
costs. 
As the ceilings have been lowered annually, the state's share of costs decreases, at 
least in terms of quantity. Changes in value depend on the ratio between the world 
market and domestic prices, i.e. on the amount of required export subsidies. The 1982 
Farm Income Act determined that an allowance, equalling 20 percent of the appropria-
tion granted for export costs of farm products in the state budget, has to he reserved for 
production control measures. Moreover, the marketing share of agriculture must not ex-
ceed the threshold of 10 percent calculated from farm income of the pricing year. 
Surpassing the threshold was prevented by raising the ceilings higher in 1983. For 
1988-89, the threshold was raised to 13 percent. 
Instead of a clear designation to the products with the heaviest cost burden, export 
cost charges have been collected co-responsibly from whole agriculture, e.g. tax on fer-
tilizers and industrial feed. As producers' responsibility is divided to the total volume 
sold, it has little effect on individual farms, and the expected incentive to reduce pro-
duction disappears (AALTONEN, SILTANEN & KETTUNEN 1982, p. 31). 
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Table 2.3. Excesses and shoralls of production and export ceilings and the share of 
agriculture of the export costs in 1980-89. 
Product 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Milk, 	mill. 1. 274 193 183 153 175 78 93 -6 -130 -78 
Pork, 	mill.kg 12.5 26.7 23.1 8.6 4.8 3.4 -3.8 4.1 -2.8 3.0 
Beef, 2.7 7.2 8.9 8.3 6.4 0.5 -4.0 
Eggs, 13.8 15.5 18.1 15.2 20.4 20.1 12.5 10.7 8.6 10.0 
Bread grain, -100 -100 
Feed grain, 170 -230 -510 -70 
Export costs, FIM mill. 329 229 206 380 510 482 602 274 0 0 
% of farm income 8.5 5.0 4.4 8.8 9.8 8.3 8.7 4.6 0 0 
% of total export costs 27.1 13.5 13.6 22.8 21.1 17.9 21.2 11.3 0 0 
Source: Agricultural Economics Research Institute; Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
In the 1980s, the costs due to the increases in overproduction mainly devolved upon 
agriculture because animal husbandry clearly exceeded the ceilings, except in the recent 
years (Table 2.3). Although the share of agriculture declined to zero in 1988-89, the 
marketing responsibility of agriculture reduced farm income by 4.4-9.8 percent in 1980-
87. At the same time, agriculture covered 11.3-27.1 percent of the total export costs of 
farm products. About 2/3 of agriculture's marketing responsibility has been collected as 
taxes on fertilizers and industrial feed (SILTANEN 1988). As the cost burden has in-
creased, the need for production restrictions has become more obvious among farmers, 
too. Chapter 2.5.3 is a review of applied control measures. 
2.5.3. Review of applied control programs 
In Finland, very versatile production control measures have been applied. Both compul-
sory and voluntary measures have been used. In addition to restrictions proper, farmers' 
pension systems have partly contributed to control efforts. 
The voluntary system has been directed in the 1980s by the Act on Regulating and 
Balancing Agricultural Production (81/83, earlier 446/77, new 1261/89). The act has 
allowed the government to decide annually on the various measures to restrict produc-
tion. The major means have been the contracts to reduce agricultural, livestock, milk, 
pork or egg production as well as withdrawal of arable land through fallow contracts 
and support of afforestation. The central compulsory means have been quotas for milk 
(since 1985) and egg (since 1986) production and the regulation of the establishment of 
large production units. Control measures can be classified according to their direction 
in the following way (ANON. 1986a, p. 17) with some Finnish examples: 
- 	a short term or a long term abolition of productive resources from 
agriculture: soil bank, afforestation of fields, fallowing, slaughtering 
of cows and hens 
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- shift of resources from one production line to another: contracts 
to change the production line 
- direct reduction of production: contracts to reduce milk, pork and egg 
production 
- quotas or dual price systems: quotas for milk and egg production 
These measures apply to the existing production and producers. Potential new en-
trants are affected by entry barriers, e.g. in the form of the establishment permit system 
and quotas. In the following, the control measures are illustrated by production Iines in 
addition to restrictions on arable land. Earlier references are e.g. AALTONEN et al. (1982), 
ANON. (1985a) and SEREN (1986). Appendix 1 lists the control measures used in Finland 
in 1969-90. 
In 1969, milk production was first affected by the slaughter system connected with 
the soil bank system and its purpose to curtail production capacity. The premium of 
FIM l/meat-kg was paid provided that ali animals were sold for slaughtering. Next year, 
the slaughter system was extended to ali farms, and the premium was changed to FIM 
500 per dairy cow. In order to get the premium, a farm had to have at least two cows 
and make a commitment to quit milk production for three years. Slaughter premiums 
were also paid in 1980 to eliminate cows with udder diseases. In these systems, alto-
gether 108,000 cows were slaughtered. However, the net effect of the slaughter systems 
on milk production is difficult to estimate. A direct consequence was the increase in 
milk yield per cow because cows with low productivity were removed (AALTONEN et al. 
1982, p. 8). 
The beef production contracts have partly served the purpose of dairy control. A 
farmer keeps .the minimum of two cows only for the fiquid milk feeding of slaughter 
calves. Contracts were made in 1980-83 and they were continued in 1985 and 1987, 
when new contracts were also made. 
The contracts to reduce lin& production (so called milk bonuses), were first made in 
1981-83. They required that a producer cuts his dairy deliveries by 25 percent, at least 
10,000 liters, from the basis period. In the 1984 contracts made for three years, the 
limits were lowered to -15 percent and to 5,000 liters, and a compensation was raised 
from the original 50 p/1 to 75-90 p/1 (ANON. 1985a, p. 3). In the 1988 contracts there 
were two altemative ways of giving up milk production. A farmer could stop producing 
either for five years or completely. The latter choice means giving up a quota. The 
compensation, paid for five years in both cases, was 90 p/1 in the former type, and 120 
p/1 in the latter. In practice, only the latter type of contracts were made. They reduced 
milk production by 120 million liters, or 4.5 percent. 
In the end of 1990, new 5-year contracts were introduced to withdraw 300 million 
liters of milk in 1991. A new characteristic was the compensation grading according to 
the production volume given up: up to 50,000 liters 100 p/1, 50,001-90,000 liters 70 p/1 
and onwards 40 p/1. The aim is thus to include small-scale producers in the system 
(KETTUNEN 1991, p. 36). 
The regulation of the establishment and enlargement of animal production units, in 
force 1979 through 1984, was the first compulsory control measure applied in milk pro-
duction. It mainly aimed at securing the family farm structure, but tumed later to a 
restriction means as well (KoLA 1987). According to the system, establishing a produc- 
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tion unit with more than, first, 30 cows, then 20 in 1982, and finally 8 cows in 1984, 
was subject to license. 
The investment regulation system ended when the quota system was introduced in 
1985. A quota was set for each farm on the basis of the level of milk production in 
either 1981/82 or 1982/83. Free quotas, originally 30,000 liters for the existing milk 
producers, were raised to 40,000 at the beginning of 1990. If the amount of milk 
delivered to dairies exceeds the quota, a quota charge, which in 1988 and 1989 was 205 
p/1, is collected for the excess (note: the producer price was 293 and 313 p/1). 
Fundamentally, the quota system modifies the marketing co-responsibility, which 
has often been criticized, to a farm- and producer-based responsibility. Thus, the quota 
system does not immediately curb production, but it makes quota excesses unprofitable 
for a farmer. Expansion of production is discouraged. 
The quota system for dairies was introduced in 1988 to complement the farm quotas 
and to prevent the dairies from talcing advantage of the free quotas. In fact, milk 
production is supervised through a threefold quota system: farm quotas, quotas for the 
dairies, and the ceiling for the whole milk production (KETTUNEN 1991, p. 40). 
The first contracts to reduce pork production were made in 1983 and 1984. Large 
pork farms which had paid additional marketing fees and sow piggeries were eligible to 
make contracts, provided that they gave up production for four years. The compensation 
equalled 15-20 percent of earlier annual returns from pig husbandry. The last contracts 
expired in 1987, and no new contracts have been made due to reasonably good market 
balance in the late 1980s. 
The regulation of the establishment and enlargement of animal production units, 
since 1975, has been the only mandatory measure affecting pig husbandry. Only in the 
early 1980s the purpose of the system shifted from structure policy to production policy 
as the law was made stricter in terms of the allowed unit sizes (KoLA 1987). 
The contracts to reduce egg production, made in 1976 and 1981, also included a 
slaughter premium system. The compensation was FIM 20-25 per laying hen, if a 
farmer had the minimum of 100 hens, gave up egg production for 18 months and sold 
ali hens for slaughter. In the 1984 contracts, the compensation was raised to FIM 50 per 
hen, and the contract term was extended to four years. In the 1987 contracts, the 
compensation was FIM 60-70/hen, if production was ceded for five years, and FIM 100, 
if egg production was ended for good. New contracts were made again in 1989 and 
1990. The 1984 contracts to reduce animal production included egg production. 
The regulation of the establishment and enlargement of animal production units has 
affected egg production, like pork production, since 1975. Since 1977, additional com-
pulsory measures in poultry husbandry have been restrictions on hatching and regula-
tion on new or enlarged hatcheries. Because of a difficult overproduction problem, a 
mandatory quota system was introduced in 1986. The decisive factor in the quota 
system is the additional price paid according to production quantity and region. The 
fundamental idea is the same as in milk quotas, i.e. to make quota excesses unprofitable 
for producers. 
The contracts to change the production line have made it possible for a farmer, in 
return for a compensation from the state, to shift from a surplus product to non-surplus 
production (the Act on Directing Agricultural Production 446/1977). In the contracts (of 
4§) made in 1977-82, a condition for joining this system was that a farmer gave up ali 
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agricultural production, with certain exceptions, for five years. Contracts were made 
mainly with old farmers, and they could have been continued until a farmer is 65 years 
of age. According to the 1980 revision of the law, a farmer could give up only animal 
production, but cultivate plants without limitations. These agreements (of 4a§) made in 
1980-82, as well as the similar contracts to reduce animal production made in 1984, 
provided a compensation of 20-35 per cent of the earlier retum from the particular 
production line. In 1983-84 and 1986-90 contracts to reduce agricultural production 
have also been made. In 1989 and 1990, priority was given to farmers under 55 of age 
who had the chance to shift to forestry or small-scale industrial activity. 
Arable land area grew until the late 1960s as several incentives for land clearing 
were offered. In the 1960s, the first restricting measure was the abolition of state 
supported land clearance (ANoN. 1969, p. 6). As the intemational market situation 
deteriorated and national overproduction grew, the soil bank system was introduced in 
1969. Its primary purpose was to curtail the cultivated land area. It also introduced a 
shift from direction of production to restrictions on production capacity. Old and dis-
abled farmers were the primary receivers of soil bank contracts. Farmers committed 
themselves, in retum for compensations, not to use contracted farm land for agricultural 
purposes. Until 1974, altogether 36,050 contracts were made, and they covered 239,800 
hectares arable land. Since 1974, no new contracts have been made. The system expired 
in 1989. The effect of the soil bank system on production has been quite limited, 
because the system concentrated on the fields of low productivity in Eastern and North- 
ern Finland. 
Along with the soil bank system, afforestation premiums have been paid to afforest 
marginal land. In the 1970s, 80,000 ha, of which 30,000 ha were land under the soil 
bank system, were afforested, and in the 1980s, 3,000-4,000 ha annually. The retirement 
pension system also aims at final abolition of marginal farm land. It has been in force 
since 1974. It is, in a sense, a continuation for the soil bank system, although it includes 
social and structural objectives wider in scope than only production policy. The 1986 
revision of the system increased its popularity remarkably. Instead of selling or affores-
tation of arable land required earlier, farmers could now commit themselves only to 
leaving their land uncultivated for six years. 
The premium fallow scheme was first applied in 1977. Farmers who made a contract 
to fallow their fields for a year at a time received compensation from the state funds. In 
1977-80, fallow area had to be at least 1/3 of the total hectarage. In 1977-80 fallowing 
was the most common on crop farms in Southern Finland, which contributed to reasona-
bly good results in terms of reduced production. On the other hand, fallowing conflicted 
with the simultaneous effort to enlarge bread grain cultivation (AALTONEN et al. 1982, p. 
6). 
In 1984 the minimum limit was lowered to 1/4, the duration was lengthened to three 
years, and the premium was doubled, equalling FIM 1,000-1,200/ha according to the 
region. Since 1986 the scheme has been continued annually and conditions to partici-
pate have varied. In 1989 the fallow under contract, 189,100 hectares, was 89 percent of 
the total fallow area and 8 peitent of the total arable land area. The premium, or com-
pensation, was scaled regionally, being the highest in Southern and lowest in Northem 
Finland, FIM 2,200 and 1,100 per hectare, respectively. In 1991 a semi-mandatory 
fallow system (KETTUNEN 1991, p. 37) is introduced, through which the fallow area 
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should rise to 350,000-400,000 hectares. At the moment, fallowing is central in produc-
tion control policy, especially in terms of restricting production capacity. 
Arable land arca declined steadily since the late 1960s, but increased in the late 
1980s. This was a result of the vast land clearing just before it became subject to 
license and a charge of FIM 30,000/ha in 1987. Cultivated arca, however, has continued 
its downward trend. 
Finally, some conclusions on Finnish production control programs can be drawn. 
Control measures have been very versatile. Nevertheless, overproduction has not de-
creased very much. One reason for the inefficiency of control measures is probably the 
lack of a long term consistent policy. Another reason is the voluntary basis dominating 
in Finnish control policy. Voluntary measures have mainly concentrated on small-scale 
old farmers, according to their initial purpose. Evidently, they have supported the goals 
of social policy more than those of production policy (e.g. ANON. 1985a, p. 41). 
The most essential effect of voluntary contracts has probably been that the decisions 
to quit or reduce production have been made sooner. Efficiency has depended on the 
willingness of farmers to participate in the programs. Furthermore, a net effect may 
have remained low, if participating farmers have been those who would have given up 
farming in any case due to, for instance, old age, disability or lack of successors. 
Compulsory measures have not curtailed production directly, either, but they have pre-
vented expansion of production. 
For the purpose of this study, it is useful to examine qualitatively the preconditions 
of political decisions related to chosen control policy (Chapter 2.5.4). 
2.5.4. Political economy of decision making 
In principle, Finland had the opportunity to direct the growing surplus costs steeper to 
agriculture or to apply strict production restrictions when the production goals with 
respect to self-sufficiency were achieved already in the early 1960s. The cancellation of 
the income and price commitment clause and the shifts in the farm income system in 
1968 to a partial and in 1977 to a complete negotiatory basis between the producer 
organizations and the state (e.g. SAULI 1987) created opportune conditions for decisive 
changes. These conditions were further strengthened because, at the same time, agricul-
tural population and its social and political weight decreased rapidly. 
In practice, however, the potential changes did not materialize. The new farm in-
come system strengthened the position of the producer organization as the economic 
union which aims at securing the livelihood of its members. As farm income decisions 
have been tied to wage resolutions of other sectors or to overall income settlements, the 
benefits gained from income development must have been comparable. Wage raises 
have led to income increases for farmers, mainly through raises in target prices. After 
the expansion in the negotiation content, farm population has also benefitted from social 
security improvements. 
In principle, it is difficult to assume, like EHRENHEIM (1984) does (see Chapter 2.4), 
that food expenditure would be a factor of so little importance that it is allowed to 
develop to the advantage of one group, i.e. agriculture, alone. Ehrenheim's argument 
may be underpinned by the traditionally strong position of the producer organization, 
and relative lowering of food expenditure. The counter-argument is based on the evolu- 
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tion in the decision making framework (e.g. BONNEN 1977). More and more interest 
groups, e.g. consumers, industry, trade, try to affect decisions conceming agricultural 
policy. 
In practice, however, the official decision making of Finnish agricultural policy has 
been quite stable and supported by strong consensus (VIHINEN 1990; AAKKULA 1991). 
Obviously, its political framework can be related to the aforementioned Ehrenheim's 
model on Swedish decision making in agriculture. Other pressure groups secure their 
vital interests through the consent that agricultural policy is pursued according to the 
interests of organizations representing agricultural population. 
Additional explanation is that agricultural policy and its goals have been widely 
accepted in different strata of society. The goals have been formulated and maintained 
during the post-war period without any major changes. In this connection it is worth 
noticing that the two opposing parties on agricultural issues, the center party of rural 
population and the social-democratic party of wage eamer-consumers, were together in 
government, almost continuously, for the past few decades. When the right-wing coali-
tion party replaced the center party in the govemment in 1987, agricultural policy 
altered hardly at ali. Historical continuity and inertia in decision making seem to be 
relevant factors explaining why policies, once in place, do not change drastically (e.g. 
LAVERGNE 1983). 
Moreover, 200 representatives, who are basically ali consumers, in the parliament 
have made and ratified agricultural laws. These laws are reflected in retail prices of food 
stuffs, e.g. through target price decisions in the farm income settlements. There have 
been ways available to affect food prices on the farm and retail level. Nevertheless, 
actions for price reductions are seldom proposed. 
Decisions of the members of parliament are hardly formulated on the basis of their 
general consumer status alone. Instead, they are interested in keeping their jobs. In this 
context of voting behavior, the political economy theory becomes relevant (see Chapter 
2.4). According to the theory of representative voting (DowNs 1957), politicians per-
form a cost-benefit analysis for potential votes when determining their position on an 
issue. 
Legislators must weigh the benefit of the campaign contribution from different 
sources. If a legislator accepts a contribution from farm lobby, which hopes that he/she 
will vote for preferential farm policies, he/she may obtain a potential gain in votes by 
voters who support the farm industry. But the legislator may face a potential loss in 
votes by other special interest groups and society as a whole. Evidently, a legislator will 
support the group providing the greatest number of potential votes (e.g. ABRAMS 1977). 
Homogenous and well. organized producer groups are usually better sources of po-
tential votes than heterogenous consumers. In Finland the situation is especially advan-
tageous because the one uniform farmers' union with a high degree of membership 
forms a fertile source for potential votes. In many developed countries several farmer 
organizations compete with each other (e.g. PETIT et al. 1987) and in developing nations 
farmers are not organized for collective action (OLsoN 1990). 
Self-interest is the comerstone of economic behavior. II seems to dominate political 
decision making as well. Achievement of a concrete individual benefit, for both the 
legislators and the participating pressure groups, appears as the most important factor. 
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Benefits, however, may be seized due to ambiguous collective consequences of the de-
cisions. 
Following the parity principle betwe,en wages of industrial workers and farm in-
come, wage rises lead to subsequent rises in farm product prices. Increase in labor and 
raw material costs, e.g. in food industry, accelerate a pressure on price raises for con-
sumer items, e.g. food stuffs. Consequently, part of a wage raise is cut by the higher 
prices. It is a vicious circle in the contradictory context of cost-push inflation and wage-
price spiral. This development is maintained by political horse trading, or logrolling. 
Evidently, agriculture has utilized its spe,cial position when it has been negotiating 
with the "anonymous" state and the pro-agriculture ministry. When the decisions are 
made, the fanners' union does not have a direct counter-power. There is no consumer 
lobby in negotiations in the same sense as there is betwe,en the employers' organization 
and the labor unions, or in the Swedish or EC agricultural negotiations. Naturally, låbor 
unions try to exert pressure on agricultural policy in Finland indirectly. They are regular 
members of agricultural policy committees. 
One of the major decisions have been the direction of marketing responsibility of 
surplus products. For this purpose, the system of production and export ceilings was 
introduce,c1 in 1977. If the alternative were the full responsibility of agriculture in sur-
plus disposal, the ceiling system has to be regarded as a negotiation victory for agricul-
ture, although producers originally opposed it (SAI= 1987, p. 229). 
In Finland, three major arguments can be identified which have acted in favor of the 
pursue,d agricultural policy and have gained quite unanimous approval beyond agricul-
tural interests only. They are 1) food security, 2) family farm structure, and 3) forests. 
To appeal to food security and neutrality has always been advantageous for agricul-
ture. National food security is an objective of wide acc,eptance. The three oil crises of 
the last two decades have revealed the shortages in the input self-sufficiency. Yet, the 
crises have not eroded the self-sufficiency argument, perhaps even strengthened it. 
The desire to maintain the family farm structure has been another important argu-
ment. The family farm structure is considered essential in maintaining rural population 
and livelihood in the countryside. Moreover, family farms represent a guaranteed conti-
nuity in agricultural output, whereas the food system base,d on large farms may become 
overly susceptible to fluctuations in the market (Ref. e.g. HENNEBERRY, TWEETEN & 
NAINGGOLAN 1991). At the moment, an argument gaining increasing importance is that 
small family farms are perceived as more sustainable environmentally and ecologically 
than large-scale industrial farms. 
In Finland forests are invaluable as a whole. The close linkage of farming and 
forestry has been used as a means to facilitate the requirements for agricultural sector of 
the present extent. In remote areas, farmers are needed to utilize raw material resources. 
Environmental aspects may become more relevant in terms of favoring lumber-jacks 
over mechanized harvesters. As a whole, as long as timber supply depends to some 
extent on forest-owner fanners, the dependence is strategically significant for farmer 
interest groups in competition for political influence. 
Nevertheless, agriculture has been forced to accept production restrictions. In addi-
tion to high costs of exports, worsening of the market situation was one reason to 
introduce production restrictions already in the late 1960s. Export markets of Finnish 
farm products, especially butter, were cut markedly when the United Kingdom joined 
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farm products, especially butter, were cut markedly when the United Kingdom joined 
the EC in 1973. Even the Soviet market, which used to be a reliable destination for our 
farm products in the past decades, is tapering off. 
Requirements for trade liberalization put pressures on agriculture with protectionism 
and high levels of production costs and support. Volatility in the intemational markets 
may seriously deteriorate surplus marketing possibilities and may lead to, or require, 
changes in domestic agricultural policy and decision making. 
Extensive application of production restrictions proper, especially in the 1980s, has 
been an inevitable result of the chosen price and support policy in Finland. However, 
the dominating voluntary basis of control measures and the relatively small share of 
producers in export costs are clear indications of producers' political power resulting in 
more favorable consequences than would otherwise be possible. 
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3. Theoretical models to evaluate the effects of control 
policy 
Control policy has numerous effects. Control measures affect the most directly the 
quantity produced. They also affect farm income, farm structure, production costs, the 
number and welfare of agricultural and rural population, input manufacturing and out-
put processing industry, foreign trade, and overall national economy with income dis-
tribution and resource allocation issues. 
It is not possible to take ali of these effects into account in one analysis. Hence, this 
study concentrates on the effects of dairy control programs on 1) production volume 
and 2) sectoral costs in the Finnish milk market. 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate methods through which production control 
policy and its effects can be usefully assessed. According to GARDNER (1987b), there are 
two main ingredients in such assessment. The first one is positive economic analysis. It 
can be presented in the following form: if a certain policy is undertaken, certain results 
for observable economic variables can be expected. The second ingredient is normative 
economics. It is based on judgements such as: a certain policy is unwise. 
In the examination of the effects of restrictions on production volume, the determi-
nants of supply have to be known. Economic theory provides an indication of the 
direction of the relationship among relevant variables affecting supply. The appropriate 
approach to analyze and test the relationships is econometrics (e.g. KENNEDY 1985). In 
the econometric approach, the aim is at understanding, describing and prescribing eco-
nomic behavior and interdependences prevailing in it (Chapter 3.1). 
Application of a well-defined theory in identification of the economic relationships 
brings positive characteristics into the econometric analysis. However, much of the 
knowledge in economics is gained by a process of abstraction. Therefore, any model of 
reality that results from these abstractions reflects an attempt to reconstruct in a simpli-
fied way the mechanism assumed to lie behind the economic phenomena (JuDGE et al. 
1988,, p. 2). The positivism is eroded as the choice under certainty is replaced by the 
choice under uncertainty (e.g. KREPS 1990, p. 119). 
The approach of welfare economics is normative (IUST, HUETH & SCHMFFZ 1982, p. 
2). According to GARDNER (1987b, p. 5), evaluation of agricultural policies is set in the 
framework of applied welfare economics. Welfare economics proposes what ought to 
be done. The difference between a normative and a positive approach is underlined in 
the concept of welfare. Welfare is not an observable variable, whereas the central 
variables of price and quantity in the econometric analysis are observable. 
The purpose of welfare economics is to help societies to make better choices (JusT et 
al. 1982, p. 2). The focus is on the optimal use of resources to facilitate the highest 
possible welfare for the individuals of the society. The analysis is based on the changes 
in the economic surpluses of the actors affected by certain policies. Welfare economics 
analysis contributes to macroeconomic planning of, say, agricultural policies and en-
hances the understanding of their consequences (Chapter 3.2). 
In addition to these major approaches, Chapter 3.3 provides a brief look at some 
supplementary approaches, which may contribute to this study, especially in terms of 
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offering useful means to gain additional information about the versatile nature of the 
effects of control programs. 
3.1. Econometric approach 
Econometrics integrates the methods of economics, mathematics and statistics to test 
hypotheses and to estimate and forecast economic causalities (KENNEDY 1985). The re-
gression analysis, in which a dependent variable is related to one or more independent 
variables, plays a central role in econometrics. 
Methodologically, econometrics is divided into three stages (Figure 3.1; following 
SALVATORE 1982, p. 4). In the first stage, the model or the hypothesis is specified to a 
deterministic, or a stochastic (including an error term), form. The model is based on 
theoretical a priori expectations about the sign and size of the parameters of the func-
tion. 1n the second stage, the data for the model variables is collecte,d. Then, the parame-
ters of the model are empirically estimated with an appropriate econometric method. 
The third stage in econometric research involves the evaluation of the estimated model 
on the basis of the a priori economic criteria, statistical and econometric criteria, and the 
forecasting ability of the model. The model, and theory behind it, are accepted, if they 
fit the observed data. 1f not, the theory is reje,cted or an attempt is made to revise it. The 
accepted theory enables us to make forecasts. 
As the examination of control measures concentrates on production quantity and the 
factors affecting it, the focus is on the supply function and economic relationships 
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Figure 3.1. Methodological stages of econometric research. 
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According to the supply theory, the product quantity producers offer (Q.) is affected, 
in a simplified form, by three basic relationships. The price of the product x and its 
quantity are positively related, which implies that the parameter > 0. The price of the 
input k and the product quantity are negatively related, B2‹ 0. The relationship between 
the price of the substitute product z and the quantity of the product x is negative, f3 3< 0. 
The relationship between the complementary product z and product x is the opposite. 
The theory of the three basic factors can be presented in an equation: 
Qx = a ±fli Px + )32Pk + )6 3Pz + e 
The form of the chosen function implies that the relationship between dependent 
variable (Q.) and the explanatory variables (P., Pk, I)) is linear. The constant term (ce) 
and the regression coefficients (B 	B n) are estimated from the data. 
The random disturbance term E is an expression for the unsystematic component of 
the variation which cannot be explained by the systematic component of explanatory 
variables. Econometricians' concern with the very disturbance term, according to 
KENNEDY (1985, p. 2), is a major distinction between economists and econometricians. 
The basic assumptions for the error term E are (e.g KmENTA 1986, p. 208): 
normality: Ei is normally distributed. 
zero mean: E(Ei) = 0 
homoscedasticity: Var(Ei) = cr2 
nonautocorrelation: Cov(Ei, Ei) = 0 (i j) 
The first two assumptions state that for each value of a variable the disturbance is 
normally distributed around zero. The third assumption of homoscedasticity means that 
every disturbance has the same variance (52, the value of which is unknown. The last 
assumption requires that the disturbances are uncorrelated. Violations of the basic as-
sumptions le,ad to distortions of the properties of the least squares estimators. 
Especially the last two assumptions are relevant in empirical estimation. Violation 
of the third assumption reflects the presence of heteroscedasticity, i.e. unequal vari-
ances. It is not usually considered a problem in time series studies, because changes in 
the dependent variable and changes in one or more of the independent variables are 
likely to be of the same order of magnitude (JuDGE et al. 1988, chp. 9.3). On the 
contrary, regression equations estimated from time series data are frequently character-
ized by autocorrelated errors (KmErrrA 1986, p. 260). The fourth assumption .is vio- 
lated. 
Autocon-elation can be corrected by several techniques, e.g. by Cochrane-Orcutt it-
erative least squares (JunGE et al. 1988, pp. 392-393). In Cochrane-Orcutt method ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) residuals are regressed on themselves lagged one period: 
Et = PEt - 	Ut (0 	
< 1). Regression provides an estimate of p, by which data is trans- 
formed and then re-estimated. 
There are two major sources for the specification error of a model: 1) incorre,ct 
variables, and 2) incorrect functional form. The latter issue mainly concems the choice 
between linear and nonlinear regression equations. The distinction has to be made 
concerning (non)linearity with respect to variables and parameters to be estimated 
(KmENTA 1986, pp. 503-526). If non-linearity with respect to parameters exists, the or- 
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dinary linear least squares (OLS) regression does not apply. For these intrinsically 
nonlinear models altemative estimation techniques have to be employed, e.g. general-
ized least squares (GLS) (JuDoE et al. 1988, chp. 9.5). 
The choice of the variables is naturally one of the major concems in causal econom-
etric estimation. The choice derives from applicable economic theory. Yet, there are 
deficiencies in the theory or the availability of data that may lead to omission of 
relevant or inclusion of irrelevant explanatory variables. In both cases, specification 
error results. 
An additional issue in selecting variables is the correlation of independent variables 
with each other, i.e. multicollinearity. It is typical for time series data. Multicollinearity 
increases the standard deviation of coefficient estimates (PiNoycK & RUBINFELD 1981, p. 
89). Coefficients can also turn illogical or vary in magnitude. The correlation matrix of 
the variables is a simple way to detect the degree of multicollinearity. A more sophisti-
cated means is e.g. the ridge regression (KmENTA 1986, p. 440). 
The econometric approach is employed here to estimate the supply function for milk 
in order to assess the effects of production control measures. In this context, there are 
two altemative ways to carry out the supply analysis: 
the period of control programs is included in the estimation and independent 
variables illustrating control measures are included in the model, or 
supply function is estimated from uncontrolled period of production and no 
variables describing control measures are included. The control effect is 
assessed when the estimated function is simulated to the controlled period. 
Given the latter choice, the analysis assumes the character of: what would have hap-
pened, if there had not been control programs. In terms of the first altemative, several 
preconditions are set on the variables describing control measures. In the following, 
some empirical applications of the two altemative approaches are examined. 
3.1.1. Supply analysis including exogenous control variables 
In order to include the control measures in the model as independent variables, they 
have to be quantifiable, of long duration, stable and extensive. There are no uniform 
boundaries or minimum limits for these characteristics, but the solution has to be made 
according to each individual situation or study objective. Even if these requirements are 
met, problems may arise, if desired variables are not measurable or observable in a 
quantitative form. 
In Finland, there have been numerous control programs. Milk production and arable 
land arca have been regulated since the end of the 1960s. However, it is difficult to 
build a model which would include variables describing Finnish production restrictions. 
For example, in the contracts to reduce milk production, which have dominated in the 
1980s, procedures of participation and compensation have varied, and duration of pro-
grams has usually been quite short. 
In the United States, control programs have a long history. Farm Commodity Pro-
grams have been used since overproduction of certain products became a problem in the 
1920s (KNuTsoN et al. 1983, p. 205). Some quantitative restrictions, e.g. marketing 
quotas and fallowing schemes, have continuously, extensively and uniformly been used 
for several years. This has facilitated supply analysis of their effects with a model 
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including an exogenous control variable or variables. Especially since the 1970s, 
several quantitative studies with this procedure have been made by e.g. HoucK & 
RYAN (1972); LIDMAN & BAWDEN (1974); MORZUCH, WEAWER & HELMBERGER (1980); 
KRAMER & POPE (1981). 
In control programs, the compensations are available for producers by joining the 
program. A common result in these studies has been the acceptance of the hypothesis 
that, when compensation payments have risen, the incentive to participate in the pro-
grams has grown (ceteris paribus). Consequently, acreage, or production, of a controlled 
product has decreased. Often, no separate functions have been estimated for the periods 
of regulated and free supply. This may have led to distorted results. 
LEE & HELMBERGER (1985) have paid attention to different supply responses in the 
examination of U.S. com supply in 1948-80. The control measure under scrutiny was 
the acreage-restricting feed grain program. Its compensation payment served as an ex-
planatory control variable. In addition, the cross-product effects of com controls on 
uncontrolled soybean supply were examined. 
The study employed an econometric supply analysis. The time series is temporally 
disaggregated, which makes it possible to distinguish between control years and normal 
years. The most important result is the more than doubled own price elasticity of com 
supply in the presence of control programs. 
The chosen control variable was a compensation payment, the quantification of 
which was easy. However, to be exact, there were three different types of payments as 
well, even if the programs were quite homogenous in other respects. Lee and Helmberger 
have constructed the different types of compensation payment to one variable, which 
has required certain generalizations. This procedure has made it possible to run the 
analysis, but, obviously, it has diminished accuracy. 
3.1.2. Supply analysis excluding exogenous control variables 
Because the use of exogenous control variables in econometric supply analysis is im-
peded by e.g. heterogeneity of control programs, alternative models have to be em- 
ployed. 
An example is MOSCHINI'S (1988) study on the effects of Canadian control policy in 
Ontario 1961-83. The study has extended the aforementioned cross-product examina-
tion of LEE & HELMBERGER (1985) to more comprehensive relationships. However, both 
studies have underlined that an approach based on a partioi equilibrium model, com- 
mon in use, is insufficient for a full-scale analysis of supply management. 
The assumptions of product jointness and impacts of restrictions on resource alloca- 
tion have played central roles in Moschini's study. The empirical multiple equation 
model has no control variables proper. Instead, explanatory variables also include'un-
controlled products (milk, poultry, tobacco). In Canada, marketing organizations man-
age these products. The hypothesis of product jointness has been strengthened by a 
uniform effect: when supply of controlled products has been forced down, supply of un- 
restricted products has grown. 
Another altemative method for a supply analysis without control variables is to esti- 
mate a supply from an uncontrolled period and simulate it to a control period. This 
provides a forecast about production development, if no control measures had been in 
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effect. The hypothesis is that the difference between forecast and actual production in 
the control period reflects the effect of control measures. 
In simulation of estimated supply functions to the control period, either uncondi-
tional or conditional simulation forecast can be employed. In a dynamic conditional 
method, a lagged dependent variable, which is an explanatory variable in a model, is 
retroactively fed for its fitted values. While doing so, it is assumed that producers can 
freely adjust their production, mainly according to economic and technical factors. In an 
unconditional simulation, observed values of the dependent variable are used. 
In the examination of control effects on tobacco production in Greece in 1948-80, 
ZANIAS & JONES (1985) used an econometric supply analysis without control variables. 
The programs were mandatory. The uncontrolled period was divided into two periods, 
and the control period was between them. 
The applied conditional simulation was realized by reconstructing the lagged inde-
pendent variable as a weighted average of an actual value and a forecast value of 
production quantity of tobacco. If, after effective restrictions in period t-/ a producer is 
faced with favorable conditions for expansion of his production in period t, he can, in 
the short run, mobilize only part of the resources pushed out of production in t-/. 
When the estimated supply function of the uncontrolled period was simulated to the 
control period 1956-73, production was annually 31 percent higher and acreage 17 
percent higher than the observed values. According to the hypothesis, Zanias and Jones 
concluded that the difference is mainly a result of restrictions. However, the statistical 
significance of the result remained low. 
The approach of estimating a non-control supply function and simulating it to a 
control period to evaluate the effects of production restrictions on produced quantity is 
regarded as the most suitable approach to study the Finnish control programs affecting 
milk production. This is because of the heterogeneity of programs. 
3.2. Welfare economics approach 
Welfare economics offers a quite useful approach to study the effects of agricultural 
policy measures. Welfare economics analysis is based on the concepts of economic 
surpluses, changes of which indicate economic gains or losses of different sectors or 
groups. The concepts of surplus are derived from producer's and consumer's welfare 
functions through demand and supply curves. 
The principles and definitions of welfare economics (cf. JUST et al. 1982, chp. 1; 
RIMA 1986, pp. 280-337) have evolved from the concept of economic rent presented by 
Ricardo in 1829 when discussing the effects of England's corn laws. Dupuit used the 
notion of consumer surplus in 1844 to analyze the effects of building a bridge. In the 
begiranng of the 20th century, Marshall developed these concepts and established the 
basis for welfare economics. 
Thereafter, the method has been developed, evaluated and judged in various ways 
(see e.g. REDER 1947; CURRIE, MURPHY & Salm= 1971). The concept of consumer sur-
plus, the partial equilibrium analysis and the principle that social gains are maximized 
by competitive markets have particularly been criticized. The chief difficulties with 
consumer surplus are, first, that it assumes individual utilities are additive, and, sec-
ondly, that it assumes the marginal utility of money is constant (RIMA 1986, p. 292). 
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Another limitation is the static nature of the method ignoring the time needed for 
adjustment. 
Ali this said about its limitations, care should be taken when using welfare econom-
ics for decision making as such. Yet, welfare economics contributes to planning as an 
indicative method to evaluate effects of different policy options, and, consequently, to 
choose between these policies. 
3.2.1. Traditional procedure 
In agricultural policy analysis, quantification of the effects of policy actions draws 
heavily on demand and supply elasticities of farm products. In Finland, elasticities are 
often a restricting factor because extensive government intervention distorts supply 
responses. Technically, the binding dependence on elasticities does not hinder analysis, 
but it is useful to bear in mind that results from welfare analysis are no better than 
results from econometric estimation. 
Application of welfare economics to agricultural policy has been infrequent in Fin-
land. AALTONEN (1982) has made a qualitative presentation of outlines of the effects due 
to agricultural policy. HASSINEN (1985) has applied quantitative analysis to examine wel-
fare impacts of alternative farm income systems. KANNIAINEN & VOLK (1982) have 
studied the effects of price regulation of farm products on consumer surplus. 
Some European welfare studies applied to agricultural policy come from, inter alia, 
the FRG by KOESTER & TANGERMANN (1976), the Netherlands by OSKAM (1986), Sweden 
by RABINOWICZ & BOLIN (1986) and Norway by AANESLAND (1987). Freer price forma- 
tion and, accordingly, more clear-cut supply and demand responses, seem to provide 
better conditions for the application of welfare economics in agricultural policy analy- 
sis. This is exemplified by numerous studies made with this approach in the United 
States, e.g. WALLACE (1962); JOHNSON (1965); SCHMITZ & SECKLER (1970); HUSHAK (1971); 
CARTER, GALLINI & SCHMITZ (1980); KAISER , STREETER & Liu (1988). 
In welfare economics analyses, society is often divided into the groups of producers 
and consumers of a certain product. This applies suitably to agriculture, too. The objec- 
tive is to measure welfare changes due to applied policy. The following definitions 
adhere to the principles JUST et al. (1982, chp. 4, 5) have applied in their extensive 
volume. 
In the framework of the neoclassical economic theory and the inherent profit maxi-
mization assumption, the most obvious welfare measure for the producer is profit (n). It 
is defined as gross receipts (TR) minus total costs (TC): ir = TR - TC. Total costs equal 
total variable costs (TVC) and total fixed costs (TFC), hence: t = TR - (TVC + TFC). 
However, profit is not suitable as such for a universal measure of producer welfare, the 
main argument being that the total benefit to the producer from remaining in business is 
given by profit plus fixed cost rather than simply profit (JusT et al. 1982, pp. 52-55). 
Thus, a better measure is the concept of quasi-rent (R). It is defined as the excess of 
gross receipts over total variable costs: R = TR -TVC, as well as R = TE TFC. The 
name quasi-rent lends to the idea that it is a rent on fixed factors employed by the 
producing firm but, unlike factor rent, may not persist over a long period of time. 
The area below the price line and above the supply curve is used to measure quasi-
rent. This geometric area is commonly called producer surplus (PS). Although in many 
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Figure 3.2. Surplus areas in welfare economics (area a = consumer surplus, area b = 
producer surplus). 
cases these two measures are assumed to coincide, the distinction between quasi-rent as 
an economic concept and producer surplus as a geometric area should be emphasized 
(se,e JUST et al. 1982, chp. 9). 
In Figure 3.2, according to the geometric definition above, producer surplus is area 
b, which is above the supply curve and below the price line jo'. 
As distinct from the producer's profit, there is no clear and easily observable yard-
stick of welfare for a consumer maximizing her utility. In spite of its disputable history, 
consumer surplus is a concept common in empirical welfare studies, to a large extent 
due to WILLIG's (1976) justification. Geometrically, consumer surplus (CS) is area a in 
Figure 3.2. It is below the demand curve and above the price line p. 
To find the surplus areas in empirical welfare analysis, demand and supply ftinctions 
have to be derived from observed data, i.e. the procedure be,comes econometric. The 
starting point is market equilibrium, in which marketed quantity is qe and price pe. 
Given specific functional forms of demand and supply curves, surpluses can be calcu-
lated by integration. 
With linearity, the estimated demand function is presented as qd=a01-a1pd (Figure 
3.2). In the function q is quantity demanded, p is price and ai are unknown parameters 
estimated from observed data assuming a0 > 0 and al < 0. Consumer surplus can be 
approximated as a geometric area by Equation (3.1). Correspondingly, the supply func-
tion can be presented as qs=b0+b1ps. Assuming 130 > 0 and bl > 0 makes it possible to 
calculate producer surplus by Equation (3.2): 
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(3.1) CS = X.(ao —pe ).q e 
(3.2) PS =-(pe —60 )-q e 
The effects of income policy and its subsidiary price and support policies have been 
central objects of most welfare studies. Examination of production control policy as 
such has been more limited or it has been only part of more extensive studies. Further-
more, the focus of control policy studies has been on price regulation, not on quantita-
tive restrictions characteristic for Finland. 
II is expedient to illustlate the welfare effects of two control measures in competitive 
markets (Figure 3.3). Output restriction and price policy can be used to maintain market 
balance while securing farmers' income level. Linear demand and supply curves of 
equal (but opposite by definition) slopes are assumed. Analysis starts from market 
equilibrium, in which marketed quantity is qo and price po. The original producer sur-
plus is area h+g+k, and consumer surplus area m+b+a. 
An output restriction in the form of quota is set at quantity q1, above which produc-
ers cannot produce. As supply is controlled, normal demand response of consumers 
raises the product price to p2. Because producers' costs are still based on the short run 
supply curve, they have, in addition to normal surplus of area h+k with price 130, area a 
(or (p2-p0)-q1). Producers lose area g due to the restriction on output. Hence, the change 
in producer surplus is area a-g. Consumers, in turn, lose area a+b due to the higher 
price p2. Thus, a quota leads to a net welfare loss (deadweight loss) of a size of area 
a+b-(a-g)=b+g. 
Price support has to be combined with consumer subsidy in order to maintain 
market balance. Producer price is guaranteed at the level of p2 (p2>p0), which produces 
output q2. This amount is consumed for a price pl . Producers gain area a+b+c, and 
consumers obtain area h+g+f+e. The price difference (p2-p1) brings in the third group, 
q1 	q0 	C12 
Figure 3.3. Welfare effects of output restriction and price policy program. 
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taxpayers, who have to provide financing for the price gap. Taxpayers lose the whole 
area a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h, or (p2-p1 )-q2. The deadweight loss for the price policy pro-
gram is area d. 
According to this graphical welfare examination, given equal slopes for the demand 
and supply curves, area b+g = area d. This leads to the conclusion that the standard 
triangles illustrating deadweight losses are equal for both programs. However, there is a 
difference between the efficiency of these programs in transferring welfare from one 
group to another. 
Quota causes an increase in producer welfare by area a-g associated with deadweight 
loss of area b+g. Price support program increases producer surplus by area a+b+c at 
the expense of deadweight loss of area d (note: d=b+g). Because the ratio of dead-
weight loss to increase in producer surplus [d/(a+b+c)] is smaller in price support 
program than with quota [d/(a-g)], the price support program is more efficient in trans-
ferring welfare to producers. 
This deadweight loss ratio, as an indicator of efficiency in welfare redistribution, 
extends the standard welfare approach to a more systematic and quantitative analysis of 
agricultural policies and their effects. According to GARDNER (1983), the main contribu-
tion of the extended analysis in the form of surplus transformation is to tie deadweight 
losses based on consumers' and producers' surpluses explicitly to surplus transfers. 
In Chapter 3.2.2, this approach is described more in detail. The leading idea is that 
efficiency in redistribution can be measured by deadweight loss generated per monetary 
unit of economic surplus transferred between consumers and producers of a commodity 
by means of government intervention in markets. 
3.2.2. Surplus transformation approach 
Agricultural policies redistribute income between producers and consumers. Gains and 
losses are generated by govemment intervention in the commodity market. Welfare 
changes of producers and consumers are measured as changes in their respective sur-
pluses as was shown in the previous chapter. The graphical presentation of welfare 
changes can he expanded by the surplus transformation approach. The approach, ac-
cording to GARDNER (1983), ties deadweight losses based on consumer and producer 
surpluses explicitly to surplus transfers. 
Through the surplus transformation method it can he examined how different farm 
programs transfer income between producers and consumers. Under perfectly efficient 
redistribution through a given program, producer surplus would increase exactly as 
much as consumer surplus falls. A common example of perfect efficiency is the so 
called lump-sum transfer. If additional costs, i.e. deadweight losses, incur in the transfer 
process, an increase by one markka in producer surplus would imply a decrease by more 
than one markka in consumer surplus; redistribution is not perfectly efficient. 
Deadweight losses may occur due to e.g. administrative costs, resource misalloca-
tion, or taxation distortions. Thus, relative efficiency in terms of required transfers and 
related deadweight losses of various agricultural policies can he studied by the surplus 
transformation approach. 
The presentation of the surplus transformation approach in the present study follows 
mainly that of GARDNER (1983, 1987b). As the pioneer of the systematic application, 
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Gardner has applied surplus transformation to illustrate the efficiency of redistribution 
in farm commodity markets due to agricultural policies and production control meas-
ures. Other applications of the surplus transformation approach are e.g. BuLLocic (1989, 
1990) and ALSTON & HURD (1990). 
Surplus transformation curve (STC) is the key analytical tool of the method. An 
important advantage of STCs is that they allow a broader view of available income 
redistribution policies and a better analytical comparison of the marginal income trade-
offs inherent in different policies (BulLocx 1990). 
The combinations of producer surplus (PS) and consumer surplus (CS) attainable by 
changing the chosen policy variable define the surplus transformation curve. STC shows 
the trade-offs between PS and CS for various policies. Consumer surplus is often com-
bined with taxpayer cost to create consumer-taxpayer surplus (CTS), which covers taxes 
to finance farm programs. The shapes of STCs are defined by the parameters of supply 
and demand and the opportunity cost of govemment spending. Given specific functional 
forms for supply and demand, a formula can be derivecl to show the exact change in PS 
which accompanies a change in CS, or CTS. 
Consequently, STC can be used to indicate the efficiency of the program under scru-
tiny in relation to other potential programs and with respect to perfect efficiency. Effi-
ciency comparison of alternative programs A and B follows the criteria that program A 
is superior to program B if under program A one party can be made better off while 
malcing other parties no worse off than under program B. 
The general surplus transformation diagram (Figure 3.4) illustrates the relation be-
tween producer and consumer-taxpayer surplus. Point E is the competitive equilibrium 
point, in which no govemment intervention takes place. Perfect efficiency without 
deadweight losses in redistribution can be expressed graphically by means of the line 
segment passing through point E (GARDNER 1987b, p. 187). Then, the marginal rate of 
transformation between PS and CS, i.e. the slope aPS/CS, is -1. Thus, on the 45°-line, 
so called lump-sum transfers are realized so that every markka from consumer-taxpay-
ers is transferred to producers at a rate of 100%. The vertical (or horizontal) distance 
between STCs and the 45°-line represents the deadweight costs of the specific program. 
In general, the extent to which the STC lies left to the efficient redistribution line 
indicates how far the program falls short of perfe,ct efficiency. 
Decisions are made according to certain political preferences in favor of either con-
sumers or producers. Often, in industrialized countries, government intervention has 
aimed at improving producers' welfare at the expense of consumers or taxpayers. It can 
be expected that the surplus transformation curves (STCs) for farm programs lie in 
general below the 45°-line. Ii means that the gain in producer surplus is smaller than the 
loss in consumer-taxpayer surplus. Then, the marginal rate of surplus transformation is 
laPS/aCTS1< 1 -11, which means that deadweight losses incur. 
In Figure 3.4, arbitrary surplus transformation curves in the competitive market for 
two common farm programs, production control in the form of quota (STCQ) and output 
subsidy in the form of target price program (STC') are sketched. For a small income 
transfer in either quota or subsidy program, the marginal rate of transformation is close 
to -1. But in case of larger transfers, both STCs are drawn to be concave to illustrate the 
growing deadweight cost at margin with regard to producer benefits as income transfers 




Figure 3.4. Possible surplus transformation curves for pro grams of quota (STC2) and 
target price (STCT)  in a competitive market. 
STCQ is arbitrarily assumed to turn below STCT to the left of point G. The shape of 
STCQ indicates that marginal producer benefits actually become negative to the left of 
point M. M is the monopoly maximum profit point, where quota Qr is chosen to maxi-
mize producers' economic rents by setting aps/aQr=o. Hence, between points E and M 
lie the economically and politically rational surplus possibilities for production control. 
Along STCT, marginal producer benefits remain positive, although they are also de-
clining according to the concavity assumption. With respect to the relative efficiency 
betwe,en quota and target price, quota is preferred within its rational application area 
from E to M, but thereafter STCT alone is to apply. Thus, if PS is politically preferred to 
be raised further than what it is at M, price support has to be used. 
The shape of STC depends on the policy. It is useful to illustrate surplus transforma-
tion by examining altemative means of production policy: 1) production control in the 
form of quota, and, 2) price policy in the form of target price and consumer subsidy. 
Both means are intended to serve the two major goals of agricultural policy: to balance 
markets and maintain farmers' income level. General equations for surplus transfor-
mation curves of quota (STCQ) and target price (STC-1) are presented. The shapes of the 
STCs are then examined through derivation of their slopes. 
First, a control program which uses the means of direct production restriction is 
examined. As the policy variable is the quantity supplied (Q`), the price-dependent 
demand and supply functions are applicable. Let demand and supply relationships be: 
(3.3) P d = D(Q) 
(3.4) P s = S(Q) 
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General assumptions of downward sloping demand and upward sloping supply, i.e. 
D'(Q) < 0 and S'(Q) > 0, are maintained. In addition, it is also assumed that both 
demand and supply cross the price-axis at positive price P. The e,quilibrium price is 
D(Q) and the quantity Q. If a quota is imposed at quantity Qr<Qe, the price is 
D(Q`)>D(Q`) (Figure 3.5). The consumer surplus (CS) and producer surplus (PS) due to 
restricted production Qr<Q` are calculated as follows: 
(3.5) CS = f
o 
(Q)dQ — D(T)Qr 
(3.6) PS = D(Q r )Qr — JO S' (Q)dQ 
These equations determine the STC for the quota: CS=f(PS). However, the form of 
the STC cannot be specified without assumptions about the functional form of the 
demand and supply curves. This is done for the Finnish dairy market in Chapter 7, 
where the assumption of linearity is employed. 
As a second example, a price policy program is examined. Let us assume, that gov-
ernment sets the producer price higher than the equilibrium price, and subsidizes retail 
price in order to balance the market. The policy variable is the politically set price 
producers face, pT. If the aim is to balance the domestic market for the product (Q'=Qd) 
while maintaining farmers' income level by price support (pT>pc), domestic consumer 
price (pd) has to be lowered below pT  to absorb excess production. Thus, demand is ulti-
mately a function of administratively set producer price, i.e. pd=f(p1). 
D (Q) 
D (Q ) 
S (Q1. ) 
Qr Qe 
Figure 3.5. The effect of output quota on producer and consumer surplus. 
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s(pe) s(pT ) 
D( pd(pT )) 
Figure 3.6. The combined effect of target price and consumer subsidy on producer and 
consumer surplus. 
Consumer subsidy, pT-pd, is financed by taxation. Demand and supply functions are 
presented in the quantity dependent form: 
(17) Qd  = D(Pd (PT )) 
(3.8) 	Qs = S(pT  ) 
A guaranteed target price pT leads to output S(pT), which is consumed at price pd 
(Figure 3.6). S(pT) equals quantity demanded D(pd(pT)). Accordingly, consumer and 
producer suipluses can be presented as in Equations (3.9) and (3.10): 
(3.9) CS = f D(pd (pT )» d  
pd 
pT
(3.10) PS = 	S(pT )dpT  
In the combined program of target price and consumer subsidy, taxes are collected 
to finance the domestic price difference pT-pd. So, the amount of taxes (TX) is: 
(3.11) 7X = (pT  — pd )•S(pT  ) 
To maintain the framework of two comparable groups of producers and non-produc-
ers, CS and TX are combined to result in consumer-taxpayer surplus (CTS): 
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(3.12) CTS=CS—TX 
Equations (3.9)-(3.12) determine the STC for the price policy program. But it is not 
possible to identify STC in the absence of the specified functional form of the demand 
and supply curves. However, the slope of surplus transformation curve, i.e. the mar-
ginal rate of surplus transformation, can be used to provide additional information. 
The slope of STC determines the macroeconomic effectiveness of the program to 
reclistribute income between producers and consumer-taxpayers. The slope is related to 
the distance because the closer to zero the slope becomes, the greater will be the accu-
mulated distance between the STC and the efficient redistribution line (GARDNER 1987b, 
p. 187). 
The final forms for slopes of surplus transformation curves are shown for both quota 
and price policy. Derivation of the slopes is performed in detail in Appendix 2. The 
slope equations are general in the sense that they hold for any functional form of supply 
and demand. 
The slope of STC Q is: 
dPS I dQ r [ 	 D(Q r )—S(Q r ) dQ r •D(Qr )\  
(3.13) 	 = 1+ 
S I dQr 	 D (Q r )(Q r ) • Q r 
The middle term in the brackets is the price distortion parameter, 	0: 
D(Qr )— S(Q r ) 
2-= 
D(Q) 
The last term is the price elasticity of demand, ed<0: 




So, the slope of STCQ can be presented compactly as follows: 
(3.13a) dPSIXS=-1— 1-(Q r )e d 
According to (3.13), if there is no intervention, i.e. S(Q) = D(Qr) implying T=0, the 
slope of STC Q is -1. This would indicate no deadweight loss, i.e. a markka given up by 
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dPS  (3.14) = 
XTS 
 —1—  —
d 
P o'(P)P  
T c	T T 
pT 	apT s pT 
consumers yields a markka gained by producers. This is valid at point E. At any other 
point on the STCQ, the slope is less than 1-11, i.e. deadweight losses incur. 
The slope for STCT is: 
Taking account of the price distortion parameter, =(PT-Pa)/PT, and the price elasticity 
of supply, es=(aS(pT)/apT).(pT/S(pT), the following equation for the slope of STCT is ob-
tained: 
(3.14a) dPSIXTS =[-1— 1-(p 	sj 
Assuming the normal slopes for demand and supply curves, Equation (3.14a) shows 
that the slope of STCT is less than unity in absolute value for any pT > pd. If there is no 
intervention implying T=0, the slope of STCT is -1. Moreover, it is easy to see that STCT 
is always negatively sloped, because T>0 and e,>0. It means that producers always gain 
from higher price pT, i.e. aPS/apT>0. Graphically, this characteristic of STCT is shown 
in Figure 3.4 as the curve is rising to the left. 
This finding of constantly negative slope of STCT is of essential significance. This is 
because the slope of STCQ (Equation 3.13a) can vary from negative to positive. This 
depends mainly on the magnitude of the price elasticity of demand (ed) in Equation 
(3.13a). In Figure 3.4, STCQ is negatively sloped until point M, but thereafter it has a 
positive slope. A positive slope indicates e,conomic and political infeasibility in terms of 
losses for both producers and consumers. 
The derived slopes for STCT and STCQ indicate that the relative effectiveness of 
quota and price support in income redistribution depends on demand and supply elas-
ticities and the amount of transfer we are willing to do. To quantify losses and gains for 
producers and consumer-taxpayers, STCs have to he traced out via calculated surpluses. 
This is done for Finnish dairy programs in Chapter 7. 
3.3. Supplementary approaches 
Existing statistics provide useful and versatile information for the examination of the 
effects of control measures. Surveys can be used to acquire new information via ques-
tionnaires and interviews. Inductive conclusions drawn from existing and acquired in-
formation can clarify the effects of and the attitudes towards control programs. 
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The efficiency of programs and their versatile effects can be estimated according to 
demographic features, geographical location and division of farm size, inter alia, of the 
participating farmers. In the examination, subjective judgments, based on descriptive 
statistics, play a key role. Hence, let us call this method descriptive-inductive approach. 
The descriptive-inductive approach comprehends an extensive assortment of imple-
ments and abundant collection of data. Yet, a shortage of empirical knowledge may 
become a problem, even if a study were plainly ex post, i.e. examination of realized 
effects. This holds good especially in the case of control measures because they have 
seldom been monitored with adequate accuracy to form a basis for an analysis on 
observations, instead of personal discretion. 
The starting point of production quantity examinations is usually to evaluate the 
production reduction effect of control measures. An estimate of the reduction in produc-
tion can be made according to the production factors, e.g. animals and hectares, in-
cluded in the contracts, and average yields. The estimation of the effects of programs 
may be impeded by the following factors: 
temporal allocation of restrictions distorts estimates made on an annual basis 
use of national average yields does not take into account the regional concentra-
tion or removal of low-productive production factors 
- the immensby of production and producers returning to the industry forms an 
uncertainty factor in temporary production reduction contracts 
contemporaneousness of several measures dims effects of a particular program 
separation of gross and net effects is ambiguous. 
The net effect, i.e. if the decision to quit or reduce production is made solely due to 
contracts, is difficult to determine. Knowledge of the net effect is decisive in terms of 
economic efficiency of control programs (Chapter 6). 
The contracting producers' own statement of whether they would have ceased or re-
duced production without contracts or not, and at which level of compensation they 
would have joined programs, is probably the most precise evaluation. 
If producers' intentions are not known, net effects can be concluded from the stan-
dard deviations of the parameters. If the contracting farms are smaller or producers 
older than the national average, a researcher is tempted to assume that the decisions to 
quit or reduce production would also have been made without the contracts. 
The best time to examine producer responses in any control measure is evidently the 
first year of its application. Reception of the program is not yet affected by earlier 
experience of producers. In addition, the first control year can be the most suitably 
compared with the uncontrolled production. Thereafter, extensive control programs have 
had remarkable impacts. Hence, in the following, the focus is on the beginning of the 
control period. 
The effects of the 1981 milk bonus system can be evaluated with the help of the 
following characteristics of participating farms (Table 3.1): distributions of age, herd 
size and farm size. The reference groups for the contracting farms are ali farms (the 
1980 population and housing census), ali dairy farms (the 1980 farm register) and the 
farms which have given up production without contracts (the farms removed from the 
farm register in 1974-80). 
The age distribution shows that the share of younger farmers has been larger in the 
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Table 3.1. Distributions of age, herd size and farm size (%) in the 1981 bonus farms and 















- 44 23.8 26.5 17.4 
45- 54 33.4 25.9 17.8 
55- 64 31.8 25.3 31.0 
65- 11.0 22.3 33.7 
Herd size, 
no. of cows 
- 	3 9.1 22.6 
4 - 	6 31.4 28.7 
7 - 	9 21.5 21.2 
10- 19 30.2 23.9 
20- 7.8 3.6 
Arable land, 
hectares 
- 	5 6.3 30.9 11.3 38.9 
5 - 10 27.7 30.8 33.6 35.0 
10- 15 25.4 16.3 23.9 14.6 
15- 20 16.3 9.0 14.3 5.5 
20- 30 15.6 7.8 11.7 3.8 
30- 8.7 5.2 5.2 2.2 
No. of farms 1532 212630 85196 10769 
Source: National Board of Agriculture 
1981 bonus system than in the reference groups. Thus, the net effect of the contracts on 
mille production was remarkable. But the structural development suffered. OLLILA (1989, 
p. 222) presents a hypothesis that young farmers are more likely to take the govern-
ment's offer than old farmers because they have more altematives outside milk produc-
tion. In 1982-84 the age distribution of the bonus farms came closer to that of the 
reference groups (ANON. 1985a, p. 10). This implies a weakened net effect on produc-
tion, but improved structural development. 
The conclusions drawn according to the age distribution are strengthened by the size 
distributions (see also OLLILA 1989, pp. 221-223). The 1981 bonus farms were markedly 
larger than ali dairy farms and ceased livestock farms. The reasonably high share of 
large farms may indicate that the bonus contracts offered a good chance to shift from 
milk production to some other product. Similar to the age distribution, the size distribu-
tions of the contracting farms have come closer to the distributions of the reference 
groups in 1982-84 (ANON. 1985a, p. 12). 
Surveys indicating farmers' own intentions clarify control efficacy. VEHMAS (1986) 
has studied farms that made bonus contracts in 1981-82. The low net effect is described 
by the fact that 1/3 of the producers would have reduced their output with the corre- 
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sponding amount and 1/2 of them at least with some amount without the contracts, too. 
The regional differences in terms of control effects are likely to occur due to differ-
ent production structures and conditions. In the province of Northern Karelia, the net 
effect of the 1981 contracts to change the production line and reduce milk production 
would have been 77 percent according to a survey study by TOIVANEN (1986). 
The most common reason to make a contract in Northern Karelia was producer's 
illness or weakened ability to work. In addition, lack of labor or a successor, age and 
poor shape of agricultural buildings were often mentioned in the answers. On the other 
hand, the producers who made the bonus contracts were younger and their farms larger 
than the national average. 
The descriptive-inductive approach can be used for a versatile evaluation of the 
effects of control measures. The weakness of the approach is that it is too much based 
on subjective estimates derived from less-than-perfect statistics. The factors causing un-
certainty could be reduced by better follow-up. In spite of the many uncertainties, which 
depend on both suppliers, collectors and estimators of information, the descriptive-
inductive method can supplement the major theoretical models presented in Chapters 
3.1 and 3.2. Effective utilization of available information may result in more precise 
assumptions that match the real world in a more accurate manner. 
3.4. Conclusions on applicability of alternative approaches 
The approaches dealt with in Chapters 3.1-3.3 represent only part of the means avail-
able. However, they rank among the most common methods used in research of agricul-
tural economics. Thus, we are on safe grounds to propose that these approaches as such 
or in different combinations are suitable for an examination of control effectiveness. 
The proposal applies especially when the focus is on quantitative analysis. 
In order to be able to evaluate the quantitative effects of control measures, the level 
of production without control measures has to be determined. Econometric analysis pro-
vides the best approach as this study aims at determining the factors affecting supply of 
farm products (Chapter 4). It fulfills the requirements of both the positive approach and 
quantification. Moreover, it is a suitable means to examine the relationship between 
price and output. The relationship is the essential component in the causal chain leading 
to control policy (Chapter 2). 
The supply analysis without exogenous control variables (Chapter 3.1.2) is suitable 
for the analysis of the Finnish production control system, which is heterogenous in 
nature. The application of the chosen method is not free of problems and shortcomings, 
either, as will be seen in Chapter 4. 
To predict the possible production development had there been no control programs, 
simulation techniques are applied (Chapter 5). Predicted production is based on the 
estimated function of the uncontrolled milk production. Because explanatory variables 
are known both in estimation and simulation periods, their values need not be forecast. 
Exogenous unconditionality applies for forecast. 
Welfare economics, and its component surplus transformation approach, is suitable 
for the study of economic efficacy of production control policies. This is especially true 
in the context of income redistribution due to the changes in policy vadables (Chapter 
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7). Again, it should be emphasized that econometric analysis is a precondition for 
welfare economics analysis as well. The same is true for the so called descriptive-
inductive approach, which is utilized in the profitability examination to conduct benefit-
cost calculations (Chapter 6). 
The chosen approaches are employed to assess the quantitative and economic effi-
ciency of dairy control policy in response to the objectives and questions set for this 
study in the beginning. Moreover, the results from the quantitative efficiency analysis 
produce further evidence to evaluate the conclusions presented in connection with the 
qualitative political economic analysis (Chapter 2.5.4) of Finnish control policy. 
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4. Empirical estimation of milk supply functions 
In Finland milk production is the most important line of production. Surplus problems 
of milk have the largest extent and longest history. Numerous attempts have been made 
to restrict milk production. Consequently, there are good reasons to concentrate on the 
effects of dairy control programs. 
In the framework of agricultural policy and supply management, it is useful and 
necessary to understand how dairy farmers make their production decisions, i.e. which 
factors are affecting the on-farm decision making process and supply response. If these 
factors are known with high accuracy and confidence, production can be directed more 
effectively in the way that is preferred. 
However, and in spite of the great importance of milk production, research in this 
field has been quite limited in Finland. In this study, an econometric supply analysis ap-
proach is employed to explore the essential relationships within the dairy sector. The 
results may contribute to better decisions in agricultural policy. 
In this chapter, the supply function for milk representing the free period is estimated 
by the causal econometric model and the non-causal time series model. The model 
without exogenous control variables is employed (see Chapter 3.1.2), because Finnish 
dairy control programs have been too heterogenous to be included in a model as exoge-
nous variables. 
The estimated supply functions form a basis for the evaluation of efficiency and 
profitability of control measures. Quantitative efficiency of dairy control programs is 
examined through the production volume comparison (Chapter 5). The estimated supply 
functions are simulated to the control period to provide a prediction of production vol-
ume in the absence of production controls. The difference between the actual and 
predicted production is considered the effect of control measures. The economic effi-
ciency examination is then based on the results of production quantity examination 
(Chapter 6). 
4.1. The determinants of milk supply 
Usually, characteristics of the market mechanism set certain a priori assumptions, or 
restrictions, for econometric models. If market forces work and supply and demand are 
determined simultaneously, single-equation methods are inap.propriate. Consequently, 
systems of equations, and moreover, simultaneous equation models are needed. In the 
case of milk, the studies by LAFRANCE & DE GORTER (1985) and KAISER et al. (1988) 
represent the simultaneous approach. 
It is almost as common not to take into account the demand for milk while estimat-
ing the supply for milk. This approach (Cuppy 1982; OSKAM & OSINGA 1984) seems to 
be reasonable in the case when the price of milk is politically determined and there is 
obviously no direct dependence between demand and supply of milk. This is especially 
true in the short Tim. The aforementioned price formation is common in Europe. Studies 
following this approach can also be found in countries with less regulated systems 
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Taking into consideration the Finnish market mechanism and conditions to produce 
milk, this study is restricted to supply as such, separately from demand for milk. A 
further choice has to he made on whether milk supply is estimated through its central 
components, e.g. yield per cow, herd size and number of dairy farms, or directly as 
aggregate supply. The latter approach is selected on the basis of the interest in the 
e,ssential economic relationships affecting milk production as a whole. This malces it 
possible to use a single-equation supply model. In Finland, earlier studies on milk 
supply are made by KANANEN (1974), and, in the context of the wider supply studies, by 
NEVALA & HAGGREN (1976) and KETTUNEN & RYOKÄS (1984). 
The quantification problem (HALLErr 1981, p. 145; TOMEK & ROBINSON 1972, p. 353; 
TOMEK 1985) has probably been the major reason that most studies have stuck to 
traditional variables, instead of search for actual reasons for unexplained variation in a 
dependent variable. 
In this study, the factors usually considered essential in the determination of milk 
supply have to meet the requirement of applicability in the Finnish conditions. The 
factors can he presented as a supply function in the general and static form: 
Qm = f (Pm ,P° ,P i ,T,W ,G,A); inwhich 
Q m = quantity of milk supplied 
	
T = technology 
Pin = price of milk 
	
W = weather 
Pa = price of alternative products 	G = government 
P 	= price of inputs 	 A = adjustment 
1. Price of milk. According to the economic theory, there is a positive relationship 
between the qnantity of a product supplied and its price. However, in the Finnish dffiry 
studies, the correlation has proved very small (KETTUNEN & RYOKÄS 1984), or even 
negative (KANTANEN 1974). These problems related to declining production (Figure 4.1) 
and possibility of inverse supply reaction are dealt with later (Chapter 4.4). 
Figure 4.1. Milk production, deliveries to dairies and consumption in 1950-1990. 
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Nevertheless, price is an essential factor. In this study, price ties the theoretical 
framework of control policy's principles to the empirical analysis of its effects. Evi-
dently, price development has increased or, at least, maintained milk production in 
excess of domestic consumption (Figure 4.1). The basic assumption is that producers 
react to relative prices between the product, alternative products and inputs. This is 
often realized through deflated prices, but nominal prices of these factors contempora-
neously in one equation can serve the same purpose. 
Another common assumption is a symmetric producer response to both falling and 
rising prices. However, in practice, the response to curtail production is probably more 
inelastic than to increase production (irreversible supply functions; see e.g. Houat 1977; 
TRAILL, COLMAN & YOUNG 1978). This is an obvious characteristic in a production line. 
with high fixed costs. 
The hypothesis of a positive correlation between price and supply of milk is main-
tained. Here, both nominal and real price of milk has been used. The deflator has been 
the producer price index. 
Price of an alternative product. In Finland, beef, pork and bread grain have been 
considered alternatives for milk production. Shifts from milk to bread grain production, 
especially in Southern Finland, took place during the extensive changes of the 1960s in 
the society and agriculture. However, e.g. wheat price does not usually con-elate logi-
cally with milk production (KETTUNEN & RYÖKÄS 1984), partly due to the very similar 
price development. The same is true for pork. Shifts to these production Iines from milk 
are restricted by the high fixed costs such as buildings and machinery in milk produc-
tion. 
Feed grain is an issue of different nature. It has been common to start feed grain 
production after giving up milk production. But this shift has often been a non-alterna-
tive decision. Farmer's choice is affected by conditions, i.e lack of alternatives or 
entrepreneurial skills, not by a substitute effect in terms of price relations. 
Beef, in turn, may prove to be a real alternative for milk production. An increase in 
beef price is assumed to lead to a decrease in milk production, ceteris paribus, mainly 
through an effect on dairy herd size. However, the relationship between beef and milk is 
not so simple. Instead of a substitute product, beef, or bovine meat, can also be regarded 
as a complementary product bound to milk production. OSKAM & OSINGA (1982) have 
argued that in the Netherlands the substitution effect is only of marginal importance 
because of the highly specialized farming. Only significant changes in prices can affect 
production decisions, and only in the long run. 
The traditional substitution effect is the working hypothesis in this study (also in e.g. 
HALVORSON 1958; PRATO 1973; CUDDY 1982). But it is worth acknowledging that a close 
linkage between dairy and beef herds in Finland may result in an opposite correlation. 
Moreover, substitution relationships are likely to vary regionally according to natural 
conditions and off-farm opportunities. Regional effects in terms of disaggregated data 
are, however, beyond the scope of this study. 
Production costs. Received prices and production costs affect supply. Often, 
instead of a separate analysis of these factors, price ratios are used to express the 
relation between a product price and a price (index) of an input or several inputs used in 
its production. The use of price ratios has limitations, however (see OSKAM 1984, p. 
















In milk production, feed cost is usually the most important input belonging to vari-
able costs. The basic hypothesis is that if feed cost rises, milk supply de,clines. This rela-
tionship is of smaller significance in Finland because dairy farms rely heavily on feed 
produced on farms. The share of purchased industrial feed of milk production costs has 
been quite low, increasing only in the 1980s (Figure 4.2; Koi A 1988, p. 42). 
In Finland, the substitution effect is usually the most transparent during the years of 
good harvest, e.g. in 1990 (KETruNEN 1991, p. 26). Farmers substitute abundant on-farm 
feed for higher cost commercial feed. In poor harvest periods of 1981 and 1987, the 
assumed opposite response has not been realized to the same extent. Use of purchased 
feed has been inadequate to offset the adverse effects of crop failure on yields per cow. 
A steady upward trend has been interrupted (Figure 4.3). 
Labor cost is another central determinant of milk production. Millc production is 
very labor intensive, especially on predominating small dairy farms in Finland. Labor 
costs are more significant in milk than in e.g. grain production, and thus wage increase 
raises marginal costs more in milk production. On the other hand, hired labor cost has a 
small weight in the total costs of milk production (Figure 4.2). 
Additional explanatory power over the primary cost effect can be found for labor in 
terms of opportunity cost for farmer's labor input. In relation to the producer price, 
labor cost describes the relation between income, or wage, development in other sectors 
of economy, and price development in agriculture. Consequently, the price-wage rela- 
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Figure 4.3. Yield per cow and average herd size in 1960-1990. 
tionship affe,cts the number of cows farmers ke,ep, i.e. how much time is spent on 
farming compared with off-farm jobs or whether additional labor is hired to manage 
larger herd size. Labor cost is included in the cost factors, but, at the same time, its 
wider implications in terms of income development are recognized in paragraph 7. 
Technology. Machines, equipment and buildings develop, animals be,come more 
productive due to bree,ding and biotechnology, production structure is rationalized as 
herd size grows and farmers' know-how increases. Technological impact is mainly 
realized via higher yields per cow (Figure 4.3) and lower cost per unit produced. The 
remarkable effect of these factors has the most often been illustrated by a simple trend 
variable fitted to time series. This procedure is also applied in this study. 
Weather effects on milk production are mainly indirect. Favorable conditions im-
prove feed crop and thereby increase milk production, whereas low quality and quantity 
feed crop due to bad weather has the opposite effect. Poor crop could be mitigated by 
intensifying commercial feed use, but, due to the heavy reliance of Finnish dairy farms 
on on-farm feed, it has not offset adverse weather effects. Because milk production as 
such is directly less sensitive to weather, instead of basic weather indices (temperature, 
precipitation), deviations of average yields and quality of feed crops from their trend 
values in normal years should be used. Because of limited availability of feed quality 
data, quantity of feed is used as an explanatory variable. 
The feed variable consisting of barley, hay and silage is constructed. The combined 
feed variable represents better feeding practices in milk production than one crop alone 
or total yield. Instead of a crop level, the variable is expressed as a deviation from the 
trend yields in feed units (Figure 4.4). The hypothesis is that good harvest has a positive 
impact on milk production through higher yields per cow. 
Government can either support or restrict production. In Finland, both actions 
have been applied extensively. In milk production, effects of the actions have been real-
ized through both yield per cow and herd size. Support is usually embodied in high 
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Figure 4.4. Actual and trend development of the combined crop of barley, hay and silage 
expressed in feed units in 1960-90. 
clude.d in products as incremental marketing fees or in inputs as levies. Administrative 
actions can also be reflected in prices individually so that certain products, e.g. not in 
surplus, are preferred to others for economic reasons. Thus price factors can include 
these effects. 
But overall effects of administrative measures are wider and more complicated to 
determine. It is especially difficult to model quantitative restrictions. JONES (1981), for 
example, has made an attempt to solve the problem by index series representing the 
policy parsued by government. Modelling of short term measures can take place through 
dummy variables, which illustrate shifts in production due to support and control meas-
ures. As explained earlier (Chapter 3.1.2), no variables are used here to describe govern-
ment measures in the supply analysis proper. But their very effect is evaluated in 
connection with the efficiency analyses. 
7. Structural change and adjustment within agriculture and between agriculture and 
other sectors of the economy have affected the development of agriculture in various 
ways. This is especially true in the case of milk production, which many farms gave up 
in turbulent times of the 1960s and early 1970s (Figure 4.5). Some producers changed 
only the line of production, but many left farming for good. This development was 
accelerated by simultaneous agricultural policy measures, e.g. the soil bank system. 
The unemployment rate and the number of agricultural labor force can be used to 
represent the adjustment factors in the society. For example, rising unemployment less-
ens emigration from agriculture to other industries. Decrease in agricultural population 
makes it more difficult to obtain additional labor to manage e.g. expanded herd size. 
Yet, the most important factor is obviously the level of income, especially in relation to 
working hours. Hired farm labor cost (see paragraph 3), as the most familiar indicator 
for farmers of income development in other sectors, proves to be a suitable multi-
purpose variable. When wages rise, farmers may acquire off-farm jobs, provided that 
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Figure 4.5. The number of milk suppliers in 1950-1990. 
they are available. Again, regional variation is considerable. 
Within agriculture, it is evident that price relations alone have not caused shifts from 
milk to other products in Finland. Other important reasons have be,en farmers' willing-
ness to lessen their work load, which is the heaviest in milk production, and high costs 
and limited availability of hired labor. Moreover, the decision to give up milk produc-
tion often leads to quitting ali agricultural production. This is particularly true in the 
case of old farmers, the large share of whom is reflected through the serious distortion 
of age structure among milk producers in Finland. 
Changes in the aptitude to quit farming may also reflect general attitudes towards 
agriculture in the society. These kinds of factors have contributed to the declining trend 
in the number of dairy farms independently, regardless of the effect of economic fac-
tors, but they are difficult to include in a supply model due to lack of the,oretical 
consistency and quantitative measures. 
4.2. Data 
The production and yield quantity figures are based on the statistics compiled by the 
National Board of Agriculture. The producer prices are calculated at the Agricultural 
Economics Research Institute (AERI). The prices include all support, additional prices 
and retroactive payments. The price indices have also been calculated at the AERI. Ac-
cording to revised calculations, their base year is 1985. The Central Statistical Office of 
Finland supplies wage and employment statistics. Annual data is used. The important 
questions related to the choice of the estimation period are dealt with in Chapter 4.3. 
Data are presented. in Appendix 3. 
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4.3. Choice of the estimation period 
Usually the choice of the estimation period is affected by the availability of data. 
Moreover, an adequately long time series has been preferred. The time series should 
represent a reasonably homogenous period without drastic fundamental changes. The 
significance of the supply determinants should remain equal throughout the whole esti-
mation period, i.e. variables and relationships should he independent of time. An addi-
tional requirement for the estimation period in this study is that it has to represent a 
period when production has developed without any major impact of control measures. 
From the possible time sphere from 1950 to today, the period of 1961-80 is selected 
to represent the uncontrolled or free era. The supply model, estimated from this period, 
is simulated to the control period of 1981-89 in Chapter 5. 
The 1950s were still a period of the strong post-war reconstruction and as such 
inappropriate for the estimation purposes. The estimation period is chosen to begin in 
1961, when the continuous post-war increase in the number of milk suppliers stopped 
and turned to a steady decline thereafter (Figure 4.5). Hence, there was a decisive and 
permanent change in development. However, milk production increased until 1964 
(Figure 4.1). The end point of the estimation period is determined by the more extensive 
introduction of dairy restrictions, e.g. the contracts to reduce production, especially the 
so called bonus agreements, in 1981. 
The selected free period includes some control measures: the soil bank system in 
1969-74 with dairy cow slaughterings in 1970, marketing fees in 1971-74 and in 1977-
80, the agreements to change the production line in 1977-80 and the regulation of 
establishment of animal production units in 1979-80. However, the effect of these 
measures, although considerable on the number of dairy producers, has been relatively 
small on production volume. Thus, it does not distort the analysis. 
4.4. Implications of declining production for estimation 
The declining trend of milk production confuses to some extent the key relationships 
traditionally valid in supply estimation. Socio- and politico-economic, not purely eco-
nomic, factors have had a significant impact on the long run development. Producers' 
expectations on the future of their own industry and on possibilities in other sectors 
have modified milk production in a way that is difficult to quantify. 
The basic relationship between real milk price and milk output is problematic (Fig-
ure 4.6). The real price of milk has increased but production has decreased steeply. As a 
result, instead of a positive price-quantity relation according to the hypothesis, a threat 
of a negative correlation emerges. Similarly, technological development may receive a 
negative correlation contrary to the hypothesis. In terms of the crop variable, use of the 
deviation instead of level should mitigate the problem of an absurd correlation. Visu-
ally, the 1970s seem to follow better the hypotheses. 
In addition to the possible correlations contrary to assumptions, declining production 
leads to problems in finding a correct lag structure. Lag structures have usually been 
fitted to increasing production. A period of several years is required if marked produc-
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Figure 4.6. Real milk price and milk production in 1960-1990 as an index, 1960=100. 
entrants in the industry. In empirical estimation of milk supply, three years has often 
be,en considered a sufficient lag (Ryti 1975; LEVINS 1982; CUDDY 1982). During thre,e 
years at least existing producers are able to adjust to price changes. This reflects mainly 
the biological regeneration cycle of a cow. The short-run production changes can be 
made by culling herds and/or altering feeding practices. 
Distributed lag structure can be specified through either separate lagge,d price vari-
ables or a combined distributed lag variable. In the simplest distributed lag structure, a 
dependent variable is assumed to be a function of an independent variable, which is 
lagged one, two or more periods: 
= a+,60 X 1 + f31 X,_1 +f32 X 1 _2 + ...+e, = 
Theoretically, the number of lags is infinite, but, in practice, it is usually limited 
(Pnvnycx & RUBINFELD 1981, p. 231). As the number of distributed lags grows, estima-
tion is impeded due to, first, loss of degre,es of freedom, and second, multicollinearity. 
To avoid the loss of degrees of fre,edom, it is possible to construct one variable with 
weighted lags to substitute for several lag terms. Given a priori knowledge about the 
form of distributed lags, a geometric lag can be used (PirrnYck & RUBINFELD 1981, p. 
232). Because the geometric lag model is restricted by its dependence on declining lag 
weights, a more flexible method is a polynomial distributed lag. CH:EN, COURTNEY & 
SCHMITZ (1972) have used it in their quarterly model of the highly specialized dairy 
industry in California. 
In Finland the very price system makes it possible to predict the price development 
quite well. Thus it seems reasonable to assume that the price effect on milk supply 
within a year is significant, too. This is especially true in declining production because 
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cow slaughterings do not require as long a lag as herd rebuilding to increase production. 
On the other hand, production can also be raised in the short run by intensifying 
feeding. Price variables of the same year have been used by e.g. CUDDY (1982) and 
KETTUNEN & RYÖKÅS (1984). 
4.5. Supply estimation 
Supply models for milk production are estimated by two structurally different approaches 
to take advantage of ali available information in order to provide the' best possible 
predictions, which will be made in Chapter 5. First, in Chapter 4.5.1, a causal econom-
etric single-equation multivariate model without control variables is estimated. Sec-
ondly, in Chapter 4.5.2, a non-causal univariate Box-Jenkins -type time series model is 
estimated. 
4.5.1. Econometric model 
Even though the development in the 1960s is different from the 1970s, estimation 
results for the whole period only are presented to keep econometric consistency and 
sufficient degrees of freedom. NeVertheless, the objective is maintained to find the very 
factors explaining milk supply in the 1960s and 1970s, and affecting milk supply also in 
the 1980s. In that case, simulation would address the development in production the 
most prbcisely, had no restrictions on production been in -force. - 
The following explanatory variables are used to explain the variation in the depend-
ent variable, Qrn = milk production in million liters: 
Prn 	= producer price of milk, FIM/1 
Pb 	= producer price of beef, FIM/kg 
pL 	= average pay of hired labor, FIM/h 
Feed = price index of industrial feed 
Crop = deviation from the combined trend yield (=100) of barley, 
hay and silage expressed in feed units 
Tech = linearly growing trend variable 
Following the discussion in Chapter 4.4 about various alternative lag'structures, an 
attempt was made to introduce explicit dynamics into the model. An emffirical search 
for different lag specifications indicated very limited .applicability of lagged indepen-
dent variables as such. The two-year moving averages with various weights proved 
appropriate. Due to ambiguo-us interpretation, the specification of combined lag para-
meters was rejected in favor of variables with no lags. 
Supply funciions of- different variable combinations are estimated by the method of 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and by applying multiple regression analysis to time 
series data for the years 1961 through 1980. Estimations of both nominal and teal 
prices, producer price index as a deflåtor, are performed. Empirical estimation supports 
the use of teal prices: 
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To determine the functional form, interdependences between dependent and ex-
planatory variables are visually examined by scatter plots. No support for any other 
functional form apart from linear is gained. 
If autocorrelation in error terms was detected according to the Durbin-Watson (d) 
statistic obtained from OLS, the data were transformed by the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative 
least squares procedure (JuDGE et al. 1988, pp. 392-393) and re-estimated. Estimations 
with statistically significant autocorrelation corre,ction factors (p) only were accepted. 
SHAZAM computer software (WurrE et al. 1990) was used in estimation. 
The prefen-ed characteristics of the estimated models can be based on three main 
criteria: 1) logical regression coefficients (correct signs), 2) estimation accuracy in the 
last years of the period (small residuals and overall low s.e.e.), and 3) high coefficient 
of determination (high R2). The model that meets these requirements best will be chosen 
for forecast purposes. 
In connection with estimation results, below each parameter estimate are their t-
ratios. In addition, coefficient of determination R2 and adjusted for the number of 
explanatory variables adjR2; standard error of the estimate s.e.e.; the F-statistic; Durbin-
Watson statistic d, or the runs test statistic (GIDARATI 1978, p. 246) in connection with 
estimated autocorrelation con-ection factor p; and applicable own price elasticities of 
milk supply EpQ are specified.. 
First, the model with thre,e basic variables using real prices is estimated by the Co-
chrane-Orcutt iterative procedure: 
(4.1) 	Q't n = 3502 + 279.8P,m —19.38P,b — 28.59P,L 
4.63 	1.06 	-1.61 	-2.18 
R 2 = 0.949; adjR2 = 0.939; s.e.e.= 55.6;F= 98.63; 
p= 0.672; Runs statistic = —0.288; E pQ = 0.22 
Ali parameter estimates of equation 4.1 have correct signs. The model has a reasona-
bly good fit, R2 being 0.95. But it suffers from a quite high standard error, s.e.e.=56 
million liters. Moreover, residuals are large in the last years of the estimation period, 
when accuracy is especially preferred to improve the reliability of the model for predic-
tion purposes. The F-statistic indicates the existence of an overall relationship betwe,en 
dependent and independent variables. The runs test statistic shows no evidence for 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
A clear positive relation prevails betwe,en the price and supply of milk on the basis 
of the regression. The price elasticity of supply for milk (calculated at means) is EpQ=0.22. 
The hypothesis on the substitution effect is confirmed by the correct sign of the parame-
ter estimate for Pb. However, the parameter estimateS for Prn and Pb are of low signifi-
cance. The other variables, i.e. feed price, crop deviation and technological develop-
ment, if included in the model, obtain illogical or insignificant parameter estimates. 
Because of the failure to iricorporate explicit dynamics into the model, a structural 
adjustment factor in' the form of a lagged dependent variable is eMployed. The inclu- 
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sion of a lagged dependent variable is a response to the tendency of economic theory to 
lead to specifications in which the desired rather than the actual value of the dependent 
variable is determined by the independent variables (KENNEDY 1985, p. 117). 
In the partial adjustment model the actual value of the dependent variable adjusts by 
some constant fraction of the difference between the actual and desired values. This can 
be justified by citing technological, institutional or psychological inertia, inter alia. In 
Finland, adjustment inertia can be related to unfavorable production structure and heavy 
external regulation. 
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables has 
several advantages. First, it makes it possible to derive short and long run price elastici-
ties of supply for milk (Pirvoycx & RUBINFH,D 1981, p. 269). Secondly, it contributes to 
the efficiency examination by introducing dynamics to the prediction phase of the 
analysis (ZANias & JONES 1985). Thirdly, it provides the partial adjustment coefficient 
(NERLovE 1958). The coefficient reflects the limited ability of producers to adjust in 
contrast to the preferred full adjustment induced by changes in e.g. economic factors. 
This model specification of partial adjustment produces the following results: 
(4.2) Qtm = 2936 + 331.3Pim —38.47P,b —13.59PiL +0.188Q 1  
4.32 	1.33 	-4.47 	-1.14 	1.45 
R 2 = 0.970; adjR2 = 0.962; s.e.e.= 43.6; F = 112.5; 
Durbin h = 0.570; EjrQ = 0.26; E l;Q = 0.33 
Since equation 4.2 contains a lagged dependent variable, instead of the Durbin-Wat-
son test, the Durbin h test has to be used to detect autocorrelation (e.g. KMEINFIA 1986, p. 
333). If the Durbin h statistic indicates no autocorrelation, estimates are consistent, 
since the error term and the lagged dependent variable are contemporaneously uncorre-
lated. If otherwise, no statistical properties exist. Here, the value of the test statistic, 
h=0.570, is well below the critical value of normal distribution (1.645 at the 5% level): 
the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected. 
Ali parameter estimates of the independent variables have expected signs, but their 
significance is low, except in the case of beef price. The inclusion of the lagged depend-
ent variable increased the adjusted R2, which implies that the new variable brought 
additional explanatory power. The short run price elasticity of supply for milk, 0.26, 
does not differ much from the elasticity in Equation 4.1. The slightly larger value of the 
long run price elasticity, 0.33, indicates the prevailing rigidity in adjustment process 
regardless of the length of run. 
Structural adjustment variable improves responsiveness of the model to the actual 
practices on dairy farms. Nevertheless, in the 1970s milk production became more 
specialized and production techniques changed. This development should be forwarded 
to the 1980s in order to provide reliable predictions. The impact of beef price as a 
substitute is very strong in Equation 4.2. The impact is obviously beyond its actual 
effect on Finnish livestock farms and driving milk production lower than the real rela-
tionship implies. The distortion is reflected in the last residuals of the estimation. Fur- 
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thermore, if this model is used for simulation, the predicted uncontrolled production 
falls below the actual one in some years. Consequently, there is sufficient evidence to 
omit the Pb-variable. Its exclusion may also mitigate the possible multicollinearity prob-
lem reflected in low t-statistics. 
In terms of the aforementioned changes and development in milk production, te,ch-
nological development should be taken into account. Its effect is the opposite of that of 
beef price. The problem with technological advancement (see Chapter 4.4) is the con-
tinuously declining production, which makes it difficult to fit technological develop-
ment or the upward trend of yields to the data. The problem is overcome by a combina-
tion of time and dummy variables creating an interactiondummy (T71), which is zero in 
1960s and grows linearly from 1971 onwards. 
A model which suits, and also confirms, the recent development in milk production 
better than the previous equations is presented below: 
(4.3) 	Q[n = 1270 + 493.3Pim - 59.14 Pg1-' +43.997'71 + 0.464Q t 
3.07 3.63 	-8.12 	4.48 	5.03 
R2 = 0.976; adjR 2 = 0.970; s.e.e.= 38.9; F =155.0; 
Durbin h= 0.055; E;7Q = 0.39;E I;Q = 0.73 
Replacing beef price by technology variable increases remarkably the significance 
of parameter estimates. Again, ali parameter estimates have correct signs. The very low 
value of the Durbin's h test statistic, h=0.055, leads to the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
The standard error of the estimate (s.e.e.=39) shrank about 5 million liters below 
that of Equation 4.2. Moreover, indicating model's good applicability for prediction 
purposes, the residuals between observed and estimated values are very small in the last 
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Figure 4.7. Actual and estimated milk production according to Equation 4.3 in 1961-80. 
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Table 4.1. Model validation measures. 
MODEL 	AIC MAE RMSE 
4.1 8.21 39.77 49.88 
4.2 7.85 33.46 39.41 
4.3 7.54 28.67 33.72 
ing characteristics in milk production. The short and long run price elasticities of supply 
for milk are 0.39 and 0.73, respectively. They ase higher ihan in the previous models. 
This was anticipated due to the omission of beef price. 
Equation 4.3 me,ets the requirements set for the models better than the other equa-
tions. In order to obtain additional evidence to validate the estimated models, an ex post 
simulation (within the sample) is made. Among the several model selection tests and 
validation measures available (e.g. JUDGE et al. 1988, chp. 20.4), the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) in a logarithmic form, mean absolute error (MAE) and root mean squared 
error (RMSE) ase employed (Table 4.1). 
For ali of the validation measures the same criterion applies, i.e. the lower the value, 
the better the model. The RMSE, as a quadratic loss function, penalizes large errors 
more ihan the MAE as a linear loss function. Model 4.3 has the lowest values uniformly 
for ali measures. Consequently, it is chosen for forecast purposes. 
4.5.2. Time series model 
Instead of making an attempt to specify causal relationships between dep-endent and 
independent variables, time series analysis, also known as Box-Jenkins analysis, can be 
employed (Box & JENKINS 1970). The application of this approach is encouraged by 
problems in specifying appropriate lag structure or relationships between the key vari-
ables, emerged mainly due to the declining trend in milk production. 
Especially for forecasting purposes, time series analysis represents an alternative 
worth considering (e.g. TERÄSVIRTA 1977). In fact, however, time series analysis should 
not solely be regarded as an alternative to building regression models for forecasting. 
Rather, time series techniques should be incorporated into the model building in order 
to obtain the most efficient forecasts possible (NEwBow 1983). 
Time series analysis concentrates on construction of a model of the historical evolu-
tion through time of the phenomenon to be predicted. The data ase allowed to advice us 
how to specify the model, i.e. an attempt is made to construct a model that fits the data. 
Hence, time series models rely only on the current and past behavior of the variable 
under scrutiny. The emphasis on the role of data in determining an appropriate model 
arose from the recognition that theory turns out to be vague on the question of timing of 
relationships, which is at least as important as their qualitative nature (NEwBoLD 1983). 
Time series approach may prove useful when econometric models ase rendered im-
practical due to e.g. specification error, which may result from excluded relevant ex- 
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planatory variables or incorrect functional form. Applicability of time series models can 
further be supported by an argument that the estimation of endogenous variables in the 
econometric model may change to the estimation of exogenous variables included in a 
model. GRANGER & NEWBOLD (1977) have stated that the strength and form of dynamic 
interdependences between variables is often incorrectly interpreted by e,conometric mod-
els. On the contrary, time series models illustrate only the information which is included 
in the observed data. 
The commitment of time series models to data only can be regarded as a shortcom-
ing as well, because interdependences are not analyzed at ali. However, in transfer func-
tion-noise models (Box & JENKINS 1970) or vector autoregressive processes (JunGE et al. 
1988, chp. 18) multiple time series are used in order to explain, say, consumption by 
price and income. The structure of these models is more complicated than that of au-
toprojective univariate models. 
Structurally, a time series model consists of autoregressive process of order p, AR(p), 
and moving average process of order q, MA(q). The processes are presented in the fol-
lowing equations, in which 4>  and 0 are the unknown parameters and e are independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal en-ors: 
AR(P): Yr = SkYt-i+ 0217/-2±•• .+OpYt-p +et 
MA(q): Y = ei + 014_1 + 02ei_2+...+Bgei_q 
If both components are involved in one process, the process is called autoregressive 
moving average, or ARMA (p,q). The use of ARMA-models has certain preconditions. 
First, plenty of observations are needed. Secondly, the technique restricts us to stationary 
time series. Thirdly, the models are linear in the sense that predictions of future values 
are constrained to be linear functions of the observations. 
Given the assumptions of stationarity and linearity, the ARMA models have the ad-
vantage of parsimony of parameterization, i.e. models with relatively few parameters 
are often sufficient. 
Even if linearity often applies to reality, many economic time series are non-station-
ary due to e.g. growth trends. Stochastic processes are said to be stationary, if the co-
variance betwe,en two members depends only on their distance in time, and the proc-
esses have constant mean and finite variance (JuDGE et al. 1988, p. 678). This means that 
the stochastic properties of time series Y are time invariant. Formally presented, a sto-
chastic process Y  is stationary, provided that: 
a) E(Y,)= it for all t 
Var(Y,)<cc for all t 
c) Cov(li ,Yt+k)= ERYt it) • (Yt+k /2 )1 = rk for ali t and k 
If the original time series do not possess the virtue of stationarity, it can be trans-
formed to it by differencing, i.e. AY,=y,=Y,-Y,.1= (1-B)Y, (B is the lag, or backshift, 
operator: 13Y, = 	Differencing once or twice is usually adequate. 
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Differencing creates an ARIMA (p,d,q) process (autoregressive integrated moving 
average), which can be written in a general form as follows: 
Yt = 	02Yt-2 -E• • • -1- OpYt-p +e,  + 91et-1+ 02e1-2 -E• • • + eget-q 
<=> (1- (b1B - 02B2 	.-0 pBP ))), = (1+ 01 B+ 02B2 +  
Now, y is expressed in terms of its own past values and with current and past errors. 
In the ARIMA (p,d,q) model, p is the number of lagged values of y, representing the 
order of the autoregressive (AR) dimension of the model; d is the number of times Y is 
differenced to produce y; and q is the number of lagged values of the error term, 
representing the order of the moving average (MA) dimension of the model. Again, 
and 0 are the unknown parameters and e are 	normal errors. 
Building ARIMA models involves three phases: 1) model selection, 2) parameter es-
timation and 3) diagnostic model checking. In the first phase, the model has to be iden- 
tified, or selected. The decision is based on the examination of the statistics calculated 
from the data. The sample autocorrelations (ACF) and partial autocorrelations (PACF) 
of the original data (or its low order differences) are compared to the patterns of 
theoretical autocorrelation functions (e.g. PAN1CRATZ 1983). The choice itself to deter-
mine which model the data suggest as the appropriate one is mainly based on personal 
judgement and experience. In the second phase, the parameters (11), 0) of the selected 
model are estimated. 
In the third phase, the estimated model is checked in terms of whether it sufficiently 
represents the behavior of the data. This diagnostic checking is more exact in its nature 
than that of the model selection stage. One common way of checking is to fit to the data 
a more elaborate model, and assess whether the addition of further parameters improved 
the fit. Another way is to examine the autocorrelations of the residuals from the esti- 
mated model. The portmanteau test statistic, which follows the asymptotic chi-square 
distribution, is commonly used for this purpose (JuDGE, et al. 1988, p. 705). If the model 
is correctly specified, the residual autocorrelations should be relatively small. If the 
search for an appropriate model succeeds, it can be projected forward to obtain forecasts 
of future values of the time series. If it fails, the three stage cycle has to be iterated. 
In this study, a univariate model is employed. The analysis consists of estimation 
and forecasting of time series through the fitting of autoregressive integrated moving 
average (ARIMA) models to historical data of annual milk production (Qm) from 1931 
to 1989. The estimation uses the first 50 observations, which is barely a sufficient 
number of observations in a time series analysis. The remaining observations are re-
served for forecasting purposes. SHAZAM computer software (WHITE et al. 1990) is 
used. 
In the case of 50 years of milk production, autocorrelation function tails off in the 
course of time but far too slowly. Still after 12 lags, autocorrelations do not cut off. It 
shows that the time series is non-stationary. Hence, the first differences of the series 
(Qm) have to be taken to malce it stationary: 
(4.4) AT = Q;" - 1 = (1 - B)T 
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As a result, a new series AQm  is obtained, autocorrelation of which cuts off to zero 
sooner than that of the original data series. The form of the ACF is a sine-wave, which 
is close to the theoretical ACF of AR(2)-process (PANKRATZ 1983, p. 126). However, 
because there is only one clear spike in the PACF at lag k=1, reasonable evidence exists 
to choose an AR(1)-process. Thus, the selected model is ARIMA (1,1,0). There is no 
support to include an MA-term. This practice also follows the idea of parsimony. 
In the second phase, the selected ARIMA (1,1,0)-model is estimated to obtain the 
unknown AR(1)-parameter estimate, 0)1=0.542. The estimate is highly significant (t-sta-
tistic is 4.42). The estimated model is: 
(4.5) (1— 0.542B)- 	= 9.03 
Q(11)=15.2; AIC = 9.78 
In the third phase, the fitted model is diagnostically checked as to whether it suffi-
ciently represents the behavior of the data. To assess the adequacy of this model, a less 
parsimonious ARIMA (2,1,0)-model was estimated. The (1)2 was statistically insignifi-
cant. The model selection tests, e.g. Akaike information criteria (AIC), gave no evi-
dence of AR(2)-superiority over AR(1)-specification. Moreover, the chi-squared Ljung-
Box (Q) statistic (NEwsom 1983) did not detect any autocorrelation in the residuals of 
the estimated AR(1)-process. The null hypothesis of white noise error process was 
accepted. The estimated ARIMA (1,1,0) model represents an adequate specification. 
4.6. Conclusions 
In order to be able to assess the quantitative effect of dairy control programs, estimation 
of supply functions for milk from the uncontrolled period was performed. When 
proceeding to assess the efficiency of control policy on the basis of the estimation 
results, the characteristics inherent in the supply analysis have to be taken into account. 
The need to obtain an adequate number of observations for an annual time series 
could lead to inclusion of irrelevant phenomena with respect to the current situation. In 
the econometric supply analysis, problems emerged due to difficulty to include pre-
sumed relevant variables because of the declining trend in milk production. 
Equation 4.3 met the requirements set for the econometric models (p. 69) the most 
suitably. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory variable 
generated a partial adjustment model. 
Among the non-causal univariate time series models, a parsimonious ARIMA (1,1,0) 
model (Equation 4.5) was regarded as an adequate specification. The model confirmed 
the specification of the econometric model with lagged dependent variable. Autoregres-
sive processes seem to predominate. The chosen models are applied for forecasting in 
Chapter 5. 
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5. Quantitative efficiency of dairy restrictions 
The quantitative efficiency of dairy restrictions is examined by comparing the actual 
controlled production to the predicted uncontrolled production. The period under scru-
tiny is 1981-89, when restrictions on milk production were applied to the largest extent 
in Finland. The prediction on production volume, had there been no restrictions, is 
obtained, when the estimated supply functions (Chapter 4) are simulated to the control 
period. 
The time horizon of simulation (Figure 5.1) depends on the objective of the study. 
For example, model validation claims for ex post simulation in the estimation period. 
Forecasting takes place in the horizon after the estimation period. Ex post forecasting 
corresponds to ex post simulation in terms of known observations (unconditional proce-
dure). Instead, in ex ante forecasting, values of independent variables are usually un-
known, and they are predicted along with a dependent variable (conditional procedure). 
Yet, explanatory variables can also be known for ex ante forecasts depending on the 
characteristics of the data or the length of the lags in relation to the simulation period 
(PINDycK & RUBINFELD 1981, p. 204). 
In this study, simulation is based on the e,quations estimated from the uncontrolled 
period. In principle, the unconditional ex post forecast is obtained by simulating the 
estimated models to the period 1981-89, in which ali variables are known with certainty. 
However, the production volume without restrictions is not known. Accordingly, the 
simulation of the estimated supply function for milk to the control period is uncondi-
tional ex ante forecast by its nature. 
In order to mitigate possible disadvantages of the quite long simulation period (espe-
cially in relation to the estimation period), the models are updated and re-estimated each 
year before new forecasts are made. The simulation is performed and predictions gener-
ated as a one-step-ahead procedure. 
5.1. Econometric prediction 
The econometric prediction is based on the simulation of Equation 4.3 to the control 
period. If the factors affecting milk production in the 1960s and 1970s had remained 
similar in the 1980s and there had be,en no restrictions, milk production would have 
Backcasting Ex post-simulation Ex post-forecast Ex ante-forecast 
Estimation period Time 
Ti T2 T3=now 
Figure 5.1. Time horizons of simulation. 
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been 134-577 million liters, or 4-22 percent larger than the observed production annu-
ally in the control period 1981-89 (Table 5.1). 
The good feed crop in 1983 boosted milk production. But, in the absence of a crop 
variable, the variables of the supply function lead to a similar development in the 
predicted production in 1983 and 1984. The increased actual production in 1983 and 
1984 involves factors beyond the determinants of milk supply used in the estimation. In 
addition to good harvest, the growth includes reservations in terms of farmers' evident 
actions in advance to prepare for and affect the milk production quotas. Quotas came 
into force in 1985. The observed growth may thus have been affected by factors differ-
ent from those used in simulation. 
In 1980, the last year of the estimation period, the residual between observed and 
estimated production volume was only 7 million liters. But in 1981, the first year of the 
simulation period, the gap was already 134 million liters. Another steep threshold oc-
curs in 1985. The conclusion can be drawn that simultaneous new extensive dairy 
restrictions explain the increase in difference between observed and predicted milk 
production in 1981 and 1985. 
The great difference in 1987 is caused to a large extent by the crop failure, which is 
not taken into account in the model. This is due to the absence of the crop variable. 
Moreover, mille production was reduced and farmers' retirement was fostered by the 
remarkable change in the pension system for farmers giving up production (see Chapter 
2.5.3). The difference remained large in the last two years as actual production was 
considerably cut by the 1988 milk bonus contracts. Yet, predicted production declined, 
too. 
The difference between the predicted and the actual production is regarded as the 
effect of production control measures, either curbing the growth potential or cutting 
production. For example, in 1985 both actual and predicted production decreased, but 
the former drastically more. This is a clear indication of restriction effects as the quota 
Table 5.1. Actual controlled and predicted uncontrolled milk production in the control 
period 1981-89. Econometric model, Equation 4.3. 




1981 3073 3207 134 4.4 
1982 3068 3278 210 6.8 
1983 3136 3360 224 7.1 
1984 3124 3348 224 7.2 
1985 2988 3345 357 11.9 
1986 2976 3306 330 11.1 
1987 2847 3278 431 15.1 
1988 2668 3245 577 21.6 
1989 2668 3185 517 19.4 
77 
system was introduced that year and bonus agreements of the previous year came into 
full effect. 
5.2. Time series prediction 
Time series prediction of the free development in milk production is generated in the 
same way as the econometric one. The estimated ARIMA (1,1,0)-model is simulated to 
the control period 1981-89. 
When there are only 50 years in the estimation period, the nine years' forecast 
interval is relatively long. This is particularly true for time series models, which are 
primarily intended to the short term forecast. However, in order to maintain comparabil-
ity with the econometric forecast, the same forecast period is employed. 
The validity of a long term forecast is improved by applying a one-step-ahead fore-
casting procedure, explained above. In addition, as we have an AR-process, the longer 
term forecast is on slightly better grounds. This is because in pure MA-models informa-
tion about past estimated values is soon lost as the forecast proceeds further into the 
future (PANICRA'FZ 1983, chp. 10). An MA-process has a more limited memory than an 
AR-process and converges at a faster pace towards the mean of the series. 
The time series model produces a very steady series of gradually growing produc-
tion. Hence, variation in difference between actual and predicted production, from 126 
to 695 million liters, reflects mainly changes in the level of actual milk production 
(Table 5.2). 
In the absence of restrictions, milk production would have risen above the level 
which was observed in the presence of restrictions. Particularly in the last three years, 
the forecast production is markedly bigger than the actual one. The outcome of the 
ARIMA-model forecast follows the results of the econometric forecast. Additional evi-
dence is gained for our hypothesis about dairy control effects. 
Table 5.2. Actual controlled and predicted uncontrolled milk production in the control 
period 1981-89. Time series model, Equation 4.5. 




1981 3073 3200 126 4.1 
1982 3068 3222 154 5.0 
1983 3136 3244 107 3.4 
1984 3124 3263 139 4.5 
1985 2988 3283 295 9.9 
1986 2976 3303 327 11.0 
1987 2847 3323 476 16.7 
1988 2668 3343 675 25.3 
1989 2668 3363 695 26.1 
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5.3. Composite forecast 
Two structurally different methods have been applied to estimate milk supply in Fin-
land. The forecasts generated by the estimated multivariate econometric model and the 
univariate Box-Jenkins time series model are quite similar. They produce results that are 
consistent with our hypothesis about the effects of dairy restrictions. 
Which forecast is better is difficult to verify. Accuracy of the forecasts cannot be 
comparecl with actual uncontrolled milk production. Accordingly, the common forecast 
validation methods (e.g. KOST 1980) are not applicable for measuring forecasting accu-
racy and thereby comparing one model with another. However, this does not impede the 
analysis. The objective was to see how milk production would have developed without 
production restrictions. 
To take advantage of the information incorporated in both models, the predictions 
are combined (e.g. BESSLER & BRANDT 1981; JOHNSON & RAUSSER 1982). The results of 
this simple average composite forecast are presented in Table 5.3. 
As expected on the basis of the quite similar econometric and time series predic-
tions, the difference betwe,en the actual production and the predicted production is the 
largest in the latter part of the forecast. The first striking widening of the gap takes place 
in 1985, when the actual production decline,d due to new restrictions, i.e. the 1985 quota 
and the 1984 bonus contracts. Until the introduction of quotas in 1985, deviations are 
quite small, around 4-6 percent. 
The second drastic change occurs in 1987, when the difference between actual and 
predicted production grew to 454 million liters, or 16 percent. This was mainly due to 
adverse effects of crop failure on milk production. The next increase in the gap immedi-
ately in 1988 was still influenced by the limited feed supply, and accelerated by the new 
bonus contracts. 
Ali available information from different models has been taken into consideration 
in the composite forecast. The implied conclusions are quite clear. 
Table 5.3. Actual controlled and predicted uncontrolled milk production in the control 
period 1981-89. Composite forecast. 




1981 3073 3203 130 4.2 
1982 3068 3250 182 5.9 
1983 3136 3302 166 5.3 
1984 3124 3306 182 5.8 
1985 2989 3314 326 10.9 
1986 2976 3305 329 11.0 
1987 2847 3301 454 15.9 
1988 2668 3294 626 23.5 
1989 2668 3274 606 22.7 
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5.4. Conclusions 
Since 1985, dairy control programs resulted in large annual reductions of 326-626 
million liters, or 11-24 percent, in milk production. Until 1985, the differences between 
the actual restricted and the predicted unrestricted production were smaller. 
The introduction of the quota system in 1985 constitutes a watershed in the quantita-
tive efficacy of dairy control programs. This change also represents a shift from volun-
tary restrictions to a major mandatory program. 
These quantitative results of control effectiveness are used when the economic effi-
ciency of the control programs is assessed. However, some indication is already ob-
tained through this quantitative effectiveness on the expected scale and timing of the 
profitability of control programs. 
The quantitative effect on production has been considered the result of both volun-
tary and compulsory control measures. However, only the costs of voluntary programs 
are taken into account in the following examination of profitability, e.g. administrative 
costs of compulsory programs are excluded. A similar procedure is applied to adminis-
trative costs related to surplus disposal. 
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6. Economic efficiency of dairy restrictions 
The central task of this study is to examine whether it has been efficient to restrict milk 
production. The examination in terms of production volume (Chapter 5) showed the 
difference between the actual controlled and predicted free development in milk produc-
tion. 
The quantitative efficacy assessment serves as a starting point for the economic effi-
cacy examination in terms of the assumption that the difference between actual and 
predicted milk production is caused by the curbing effect of administrative control 
programs. 
6.1. Control policy costs 
The data needed in the economic efficacy examination of dairy control policy is divided 
into three parts: 1) costs of production control programs, 2) costs of milk surplus 
disposal by subsidized exports, and 3) costs of increased feed grain output due to dairy 
control programs. 
Control costs account for the annual compensations paid in various dairy control 
programs. They are available in the statistics compiled by the National Board of Agri-
culture. The statistics also provide the basis for the implied increase in feed grain 
production due to the effects of dairy restrictions. Surplus disposal or export costs of 
milk products and feed grain consist of export subsidies, which are based on the statis-
tics of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. 
For each cost category, actual annual cash payments, instead of budget appropria-
tions, are used because of their better suitability for annual cost comparisons. The 
procedure of cash payments is especially convenient for control costs, because it has 
been possible to make contracts almost continuously and new contracts simultaneously 
with earlier ones and their schedule of compensation payments. 
6.1.1. Costs of control programs 
The voluntary contracts to reduce or quit milk production are here included in control 
measures of milk production. In voluntary programs, the state has paid compensations 
to contracting farmers. 
In the 1980s the contracts 1) to change the production line (4§ and 4a§), 2) to reduce 
milk production, 3) to reduce agricultural production and 4) to reduce animal produc-
tion have been this kind of programs. They have exclusively or partially affected milk 
production (see Chapter 2.5.3). 
The contracts to reduce milk production, the so called milk bonuses, have been di-
rected to milk production proper. The same is largely true for the contracts to change 
the production line (4a§) in 1980-82. Thus, the total costs of these contracts are in-
cluded in the control costs of milk production (Table 6.1). 
The 4§ contracts to change production line in 1977-82 and the contracts to reduce 
agricultural production in 1983-84 and 1986-89 were more general. Nevertheless, they 
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Table 6.1. The costs of voluntary control programs affecting milk production in 1981-89, 
FIM million. 
Program 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Reduce agr. prod. and 
change prod. line 4§ 35.6 56.0 49.3 49.6 49.2 45.1 79.7 97.5 97.5 
Change prod. line 4a§ 20.5 48.7 66.1 69.4 65.1 44.8 16.5 - 
Reduce animal prod. - 1.7 10.9 10.9 12.0 10.6 8.9 
Reduce milk production 8.6 24.1 49.5 88.8 157.2 129.6 74.1 142.8 144.5 
Total costs, FIM mill. 64.7 128.8 164.9 209.5 282.4 230.4 182.3 250.9 250.9 
Source: National Board of Agriculture 
also affected mainly milk production. According to the value of removed production, 
100 percent in 1981-82 and 90 percent in 1983-89 of total payments in these programs 
is included (Table 6.1). 
Since the contracts to reduce animal production made in 1984 concentrated on pig 
and poultry farms, the number of dairy cows abolished remained low (Table 6.2). Based 
on the value of the reduced output, one third of the costs of this program is included in 
the dairy restriction costs. The beef production contracts, mainly made already in 1980, 
are excluded due to their minor impact during the control period 1981-89. 
The costs of the mandatory programs, e.g. administration or supervising, are not 
included. Dairy restrictions have been dealt with in more detail in Chapter 2.5.3 and 
they have been listed in Appendix 1. 
Table 6.2. The number of dairy cows withdrawnfi-om milk production in voluntary control 
programs in 1981-89. 
Program 	 1981 	1982 1983 1984 1985 	1986 1987 1988 1989 
Reduce agr. prod. and 
change prod. line 4§ 	4977 	2350 859 1394 - 	6524 3335 1620 1003 
Change prod. line 4a§13108 13261 
Reduce animal prod. - 	3570 
Reduce milk prod. 	6700 	5500 10600 25500 - 	22000 
Annual, heads 	24785 21111 11459 30464 - 	6524 3335 23620 1003 
Accumulative, heads 	45896 57355 87819 87819 94349 97684 121304 122307 





6.1.2. Costs of dairy surplus disposal 
Export subsidies, stipulated in the Farm Income Act, belong to the surplus disposal 
costs. Subsidies are paid for the so called first stage dairy processing products, i.e. 
butter, cheese and milk powders. 
In the wider sense, surplus disposal costs also include support on advertising of farm 
products, on butter sold to milk producers (expired in 1986) and industry, on storing and 
on milk used as feed. The profitability of the altemative channels to dispose of sur-
pluses has been discussed in other connections (e.g. ANON. 1985b). The importance of 
the other forms decreased and that of export support increased in the examination 
period 1981-89. 
Consequently, export support as an individual and distinct item appropriately illus-
trates the costs incurred due to overproduction of milk. The development of export 
quantities of dairy products is illustrated in Figure 6.1. 
The appropriation in the state budget has been reserved for the surplus marketing of 
those farm products which have the stipulated target prices. The support, or subsidy, for 
exports is called the price difference compensation. It is the difference betwe,en the 
domestic price and received export price. 
The government confirms the guaranteed export price for milk products (Table 6.3). 
Until the processing stage, the procedure mainly follows that of price formation of 
domestic prices. Thereafter, it is different. Compensation related to sales taxes on pri-
mary products, possible compensations for price reductions and the value of side prod-
ucts are subtracte,d from the target price of the liquid milk quantity used for dairy 
products. This sum equals to the raw material cost. Then, ali costs caused by processing 
and marketing are added to the raw material cost, e.g. capital costs, estimated entrepre-
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Figure 6.1. Export quantities of dairy products in 1970-90. 
















Whole milk 42.55 17.43 13.52 
Skim milk for feed - + 3.07 + 	1.81 
Tax reduction (1.9 .16%) - 12.93 - 	6.23 - 	4.66 
Side product value - 10.68 - 	0.41 
Price reduction compensation - 	0.95 
Raw material cost 17.98 13.86 10.67 
Processing & wholesale + 8.14 + 9.62 + 	5.62 
Guaranteed export price 26.12 23.48 16.29 
WMP = whole milk powder. Source: ANON. 1985b. 
The guaranteed export price, as the computational domestic price, is compared with 
the export price to determine how big export subsidies ase required. When the domestic 
price level is changed in the farm income settlements, the new guaranteed export prices 
are also confirmed. In 1991, the system of fixed price difference compensations was 
introduced. This system should promote a search for the best available export prices. 
Export cost of milk is calculated as an average for the exported liter of milk This 
procedure has been valid since the introduction of the production ceiling system in 
1979. The calculation procedure is based on the coefficients, which express the quantity 
of milk used in processing of one product kilo according to the fat content of each 
product. The coefficient is 18.91 for butter (fat content 81.3 %), 6.73 for cheese (29 %), 
6.15 for whole milk powder (26.4 %) and 0.14 for skim milk powder (0.5 %). 
Table 6.4. Quantities and costs of dairy product exports in 1981-89. 
Dairy exports 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Quantity1 , mill. kg 79.5 64.7 98.0 94.7 91.9 81.4 88.3 69.3 53.8 
- converted2 mill.1 714.6 542.7 891.2 845.4 824.5 721.6 806.6 674.6 586.6 
Cost2, FIM mill. 956.8 828.9 1518.7 1588.41686.1 1481.3 1740.5 1521.4 1276.7 
- per unit, FIM/1 1.34 1.53 1.70 1.88 2.05 2.05 2.16 2.26 2.18 
Price difference4, FIM/1 1.32 1.52 1.69 1.90 2.23 2.37 2.35 2.28 2.38 
1> includes butter oil; 2>conversion according to the fat content of dairy products; 3) includes sales tax 
support; difference between the domestic producer price and the world market price for milk 
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With the help of the coefficients, the unit export cost of a milk liter is derived (Table 
6.4). The calculation is based on the statistics of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. For 
comparison, the difference between the domestic producer price of milk and the hypo-
thetical world market price is also presented. The world market price is expressed as a 
so called reference price used in the PSE-calculations (OECD 1989). 
The sales tax legislation was revised in 1982 along with the new Farm Income Act. 
The revision meant that the tax related to the sales tax support of primary products like 
milk was no longer returned to the state in connection with exports of these products. In 
the calculation of the guaranteed export price (see Table 6.3), the sales tax support 
reduced the raw material cost with its full weight. As a result, the guaranteed export 
prices as well as actual export support decreased. However, in the new arrangement part 
of export support is paid through the subsection of sales tax income (ANON. 1985b, p. 
103). The sales tax support is additive to the export support appropriation. In this study, 
export costs uniformly include the sales tax support. 
6.1.3. Costs of increased feed grain surplus 
Production capacity of the restricted product often shifts to another product. In Finland, 
dairy restrictions are usually followed by expanded feed grain production. At least, the 
balance between domestic supply and demand for feed grain is deteriorated. 
In particular, the production shift is realized in the milk bonus contracts and in the 
4a§ contracts to change the production line. In these programs only cows need be re-
moved, not arable land. Consequently, feed grain surpluses increase as demand for feed 
decreases due to cow slaughterings. The question is whether the savings due to the 
reduced dairy product surplus and export costs are adequate to offset the costs incurred 
due to the increased feed grain output. 
As a rule of procedure, one slaughtered cow releases one hectare field. Due to the 
limited choice for production alternatives in Finland, the released hectare is usually 
transferred to feed grain production. However, this rule does not uniformly apply to all 
control programs affecting milk production. No reliable estimates of the ,released field 
area are available. A quite conservative approximation is made that half of the number 
of withdrawn dairy cows (see Table 6.2) corresponds to the increased feed grain area (in 
hectares). Output of this area is not consumed domestically. 
The costs of the surplus feed grain output are determined according to the annual 
average yield and the difference between domestic and world market prices per kilo-
gram of barley (Table 6.5). The variation in the unit export cost of barley is mainly 
caused by the volatility of world market prices, whereas the domestic price has in-
creased steadily. 
The inclusion of increased feed grain costs in the dairy control program costs is not 
free of speculation. Giving up milk production can lead to an increase in feed grain 
production, regardless of whether a farmer signs a contract to stop producing milk or 
not. To contribute to the examination of net effects of dairy programs, however, the 
inclusion of these indirect costs can be done without major inconsistencies. 
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Table 6.5. Effect of production capacity shift from milk to barley production due to the dairy 
restrictions. 
Program effect 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Cows under contract 
in programs, headsl 24800 45900 57400 87800 78890 59200 39500 37700 44900 
Acreage released, ha 12400 22950 28700 43900 3944 29600 19750 18850 22450 
Barley yield, kg/hal 1900 2960 3210 3050 2870 2910 1870 2360 3150 
Export cost, FIM/kg2 0.44 0.56 0.77 0.81 1.07 1.31 1.46 1.41 1.18 
Export cost, FIM mill. 10.4 38.0 70.9 108.5 121.1 112.8 53.9 62.7 83.5 
1) Source: National Board of Agriculture; 2) Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry 
6.2. Economic efficiency of a single voluntary dairy control program: 
the milk bonus contract 
Because the contracts to reduce milk production (milk bonuses) are indisputably di-
rected towards milk production alone, the efficacy assessment is made the most pre-
cisely for this very program. Moreover, the applicability of the fixed compensation 
payment used in the bonuses is better in the comparison than the percentage income 
compensation used in other programs. 
The effect on production is obtained when the annual cash payment of the program 
is divided by the per liter compensation for the reduced milk production in the corre-
sponding year. This computational procedure to derive the effect on production consis-
tently acknowledges the overall program coverage in each year. Nevertheless, some 
ambiguity remains in assessing production reductions accurately for each year. This is 
because cows are abolished in different times during a year within the limits of the 
program. At the annual level, the effect on production is considered the same independ-
ent of the removal date. The total export cost corresponding to the reduced milk produc-
tion due to the bonus program is calculated by multiplying the unit export cost (from 
Table 6.4) by the reduced production quantity. 
The economic efficiency of the milk bonus program is indicated by the cost ratio of 
the program to surplus disposal, if the withdrawn milk output were exported (Table 
6.6). The bonus program cost includes the implied increase in feed grain surplus. In 
addition to the cost ratio, the absolute cost difference is also presented. 
There are several components affecting the efficiency of the milk bonus system. In 
the first place, variations in the economic efficiency depend on the level of administra-
tively set compensation payment. The other component, export cost, is affected by the 
changes in the difference between the guaranteed export price and the received export 
price. When world market prices have dropped, export subsidies have increased. Conse-
quently, relative profitability of production control programs has improved compared 
with surplus exports. Thirdly, a good harvest results in a heavier export cost burden 
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Table 6.6. Economic efficiency of the milk bonus system in 1981-89. 
Bonus effects 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Program costs 
Compensation payments 
- unit, FIM/1 0.50 0.65 0.65 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.20 1.20 
- total, FIM mill. 8.6 24.1 49.5 88.8 157.2 129.6 74.1 142.8 144.5 
Withdrawn from production 
- milk, mill. liters 17.2 43.8 74.3 98.7 174.7 144.0 82.3 119.0 120.4 
- cows, 1000 heads 3.9 9.7 15.6 20.6 36.3 29.2 16.8 23.8 23.0 
Implied feed grain 
cost, FIM mill. _surplus 1.6 8.0 19.3 25.4 55.8 55.7 22.9 39.6 42.7 
Total, FIM million 10.2 32.1 68.8 114.2 213.0 185.3 97.0 182.4 187.2 
Export costs 
Subsidy, FIM/1 1.34 1.53 1.70 1.88 2.05 2.05 2.16 2.26 2.18 
Cost if withdrawn prod. 
exported, FIM mill. 23.6 68.3 128.5 189.5 365.1 302.4 181.1 268.9 262.5 
Cost comparison 
Savings (6.-4.) FIM mill. 13.4 36.2 59.7 75.3 152.1 117.1 84.1 86.5 75.3 
Ratiol (4./6.) % 43 47 54 60 58 61 54 68 71 
1) the lower the ratio, the better the economic efficiency 
through increased feed grain output. The fourth reason is the change in the structure of 
dairy product exports (see Figure 6.1). E.g. the export subsidy for a kilogram of butter 
was, on the average, double compared with that of cheese in the 1980s. 
The costs (compensation payments) of the bonus contracts as such were clearly 
lower than the export costs corresponding to the same production quantity annually in 
1981-89. On the average, the unit compensation in the bonus program was 40 percent of 
the unit export subsidy including sales tax support. As the increased feed grain surplus 
is added, the relative efficiency deteriorates to 57 percent. 
The cost ratio indicates the minimum requirement for the net effect of the bonus 
program. If the program leads to a reduction in milk production of higher percentage 
than the ratio, control program is profitable for the state. For example, in 1989 the cost 
ratio indicated the lowest efficiency of 71 percent. It means that 71 percent of the 
reduced production should have been created by the very program to make it profitable 
for the state. The so called normal exits, only taking advantage of offered compensa-
tions, should have been rare. 
The examination above is not adequate to determine the net effect. It ignores some 
important implications. Estimates on how many farmers actually quit because of the 
program alone and how many would have given up milk production in any case or how 
soon they would have done so are inadequate. Administration has estimated that the net 
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effect of the voluntary control programs on milk production in 1981-84 was a reduction 
of only 10-20 percent (ANON. 1985a, p. 15). The estimation is based on the assumptions 
that the programs affected production with the full weight (net=gross=100 %) or not at 
ali (net=0 %). The estimate means that 80-90 percent of the contracting farmers would 
also have given up production without contract opportunities. 
The aforementioned estimation did not include the effect of contracts on temporal 
adjustment in terms of speeding up the decisions to quit production. If this is included, 
the degree of efficiency would increase. Instead of a one-year cross-section study based 
on approximations, a longer period and reliable statistics would be required to conduct a 
thorough study on the speeding-up effects. 
6.3. Economic efficiency of the overall dairy control policy 
The comparison of total costs is made between the observed production and predicted 
unrestricted production in the control period 1981-89. The actual program and export 
costs were already dealt with in Chapter 6.1. 
Freely developed milk production is based on the composite forecast (Chapter 5.3). 
The cost of the predicted production consists of the export cost for that part of milk 
production which exceeds domestic consumption. It is calculated in the same relation as 
in the case of actual surplus. Thus, regardless of larger surpluses of uncontrolled pro-
duction, it is assumed that 1) milk consumption does not alter, 2) the product structure 
of dairy exports remains stable, 3) expanding Finnish dairy exports do not affect world 
market prices and 4) legislation, e.g. in terms of the surplus marketing responsibility, is 
not revised. The cost comparison, ceteris paribus, is presented in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7 .Costs causedby the actual controlled and predicted uncontrolledmilk production 
in 1981-89. 
Costs, FIM million 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Controlled production 
Program cost 65 129 165 210 282 230 182 251 251 
Export cost, milk 957 829 1519 1588 1686 1481 1741 1521 1277 
Export cost, feed grain 10 38 71 109 121 113 54 63 84 
Total cost 1032 996 1755 1906 2090 1825 1977 1835 1611 
Free production 
Export cost, milk 1211 1059 2043 2006 2706 2261 3145 3805 3076 
Cost comparison 
Difference (5.-4.) 179 63 289 159 616 437 1168 1970 1465 
Ratiol 	(4./5.) % 85 94 86 92 77 81 63 48 52 
1) the lower the ratio, the better the economic efficiency 
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The costs of the pursued agricultural policy affecting milk production were annually 
48-94 percent of the costs of the predicted uncontrolled production, which is based on 
the composite forecast. On the average in 1981-89, the aggregated observed costs were 
70 percent of the costs incurred by the predicted production. In other words, pursued 
policy with its production control measures was 30 percent more profitable, or less 
expensive, than if production had developed freely in the 1980s. In absolute terms, the 
difference varied between FIM 63 million in 1982 and FIM 1,970 million in 1988. 
Temporal allocation of exports impedes the comparison to some extent and is a signifi-
cant source for the high variability in cost differences. 
6.4. Conclusions 
The profitability examinations made above are clear and their results are .easy to inter-
pret. They showed that dairy control policy has been profitable if compared to surplus 
disposal of the predicted uncontrolled production. In relation to costs incurred due to the 
predicted free milk production, the advantage of the overall dairy control policy in force 
improved continuously in the examination period 1981-89. 
However, the advantage deteriorates, when the analysis is extended to take into con-
sideration some often neglected factors impeding control effectiveness. Consequently, 
an attempt was made to examine the following aspects: 1) net effects of a particular 
measure, 2) shifts to and expanding surpluses of other products when one product is re-
stricted, and 3) effects of simultaneous compulsory measures. However, in order to 
study thoroughly the factors, more accurate data are needed. Moreover, the social costs 
of control programs and surplus production should be taken into account in an eco-
nomic efficiency analysis of farm programs. Taxes are collected to finance control 
programs or surplus exports. Taxation causes distortions elsewhere in the economy 
(BRowNING 1987; ALSTON & HURD 1990). If deadweight costs of taxation are ignored, 
misleading conclusions may result. 
The examinations of a single voluntary dairy control program and the dairy control 
policy as a whole have been performed above. They are based on the supply analysis. In 
the next chapter, the welfare econornics analysis is employed to assess the relative ef-
fectiveness of alternative compulsory control programs in the form of quantitative re-
strictions and price regulations. 
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7. Welfare effects of dairy control programs 
The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the relative effectiveness of different produc-
tion control alternatives. The alternative programs are assessed according to their ability 
to achieve the politically set objectives for production control policy in particular and 
agricultural policy as a whole. 
In order to show the welfare effects of different control programs, the approach of 
surplus transformation is employed (see Chapter 3.2.2). The central element of the 
approach is the stirplus transformation curve (STC). Curves will be derived for each 
alternative program. 
7.1. Empirical surplus transformation model 
In the following, surplus transformation under linear supply and demand curves is 
examined. To quantify losses and gains for producers and consumer-taxpayers from 
alternative production control measures in Finland, demand D(Q) and supply S(Q) for 
milk are assumed to take the following linear functional forms with an assumption that 
a >b >0 and a <0<b • 0 	0 i• 
(7.1) D(Q)=P d = ao aiQd 
(7.2) S(Q)= 	= bo + bi Qs 
The small country assumption is employed. Finland is only a small exporter/im-
porter and is not able to affect world prices of any agricultural commodity. Thus, rest-
of-world excess demand and excess supply functions are excluded in the model. But, 
were the object a large country, these functions should be included. This is because the 
slope of a surplus transformation curve depends on prices and elasticities in both do-
mestic and foreign markets. 
The major change in applied production policy and related control programs in the 
Finnish dairy se,ctor was the introduction of the quota system in 1985 (see Chapter 2.5.3 
and the efficacy analyses in the previous chapters). Hence, it is worth investigating how 
the quota system compares with other possible control measures in terms of welfare 
changes between producers and consumer-taxpayers. 
In the following, welfare changes due to the quota system and two alternative meas-
ures are shown quantitatively. The alternative programs are producer price reduction 
and consumer subsidy. They can be considered means to achieve the politically set goal 
of improved balance between domestic production and consumption of milk. However, 
the measures result in different welfare changes of affected groups, as shown in the 
following examination. 
In the general examination in Chapter 3.2.2, the starting point was the non-interven-
tion situation. This is not valid in practice due to the entlingled skein of extensive 
regulation. Consequently, an applicable starting point is the actual situation in milk pro-
duction in 1985, the year when the quota system was launched in Finland. 
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First, demand and supply functions are determined. This can be done when price 
elasticities and any point in demand and supply schedule are known. In 1985, milk 
quantity supplied was Q'=2,808 million liters, quantity demanded was Qd=2,374 million 
liters, p=2.739 FIM/1 was the price paid to suppliers (P') and paid by demanders of milk 
(Pd), i.e. Ps=Pd. These prices and quantities determine the actual situation, which is 
denoted by point A in Figure 7.1. In the analysis, price is in FIM per thousand liters and 
quantity in thousand liters. 
The price elasticity of milk supply is the weighted mean of the short and long run 
elasticities from the estimated Equation 4.3 (p. 71): es=(2/3).0.39+(1/3)-0.73=0.50. The 
stronger weight is placed on the short run response corresponding to the length of run of 
this welfare analysis. 
The price elasticity of demand for milk, ed=-0.1, is from ROUITIAINEN (1979). There 
are some ambiguities in selecting an aggregate price elasticity of demand for ali milk 
consumed. For example, LAURILA' S (1990) study indicates more price-elastic demand 
for individual dairy products than that of Rouhiainen. Because milk is processed to 
several different dairy products, the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) would be a 
more consistent technique to estimate the price elasticity of demand (theory of the AIDS 
by DEATON & MUELLBAUER 1980; applications by EALES & UNNEVEHR 1988; MOSCHINI & 
ME1LKE 1989). The AID-system applies data disaggregated by different products within 
a product group and their expenditure shares. But this estimation is a task for another 
study due to its high requirements for availability of data and time. 
The parameter vector of the linear model includes four parameters: ao, al, b0, b1. 
They can be estimated using the quantities, prices and elasticities indicated above. 
Through the price elasticity of demand, ed=(aQd/aPd)-(Pd/Qd)=(1/a1)- (F'd/Qd),  the slope of 
the linear demand curve (a1) is obtained: ai,-(1/ed).(Pd/Qd). Using this result, it is noted 
that the demand curve intersects the vertical axis at a0=Pd-a1Qd. In a similar manner, the 
parameters for the supply curve (bo, b1) are obtained. Hence, the demand and supply 
equations in the numeric form are, respectively: 
(7.1a) P d = 30129— 0.01154•Qd 
(7.2a) P= —2739+ 0.00195.Qs 
Figure 7.1 shows this situation. Due to the relatively low price elasticity of supply, 
es=0.5, and the assumption of the linear supply function, the constant term 1)0 is nega-
tive. This would mean that producers would be willing to produce a positive quantity of 
milk even if price were zero, P'=0. An elasticity greater than unity would produce 
positive constantbo. It is rational to operate only in the positive area betwe,en p- and q-
axis, and thus the appropriate approximated producer surplus is area dcba in Figure 7.1. 
Point E (Figure 7.1) is the equilibrium point. The non-intervention (equilibrium) 
price Pc can be derived under the linear demand and supply curves, when D(Pc) is set to 
equal S(Pe): 
—a0 /a1 +60 / 
(7.3) 	P e = 	 = 2.015 FIMIliter 
11 bl —11 al 
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Figure 7.1. Milk market situation in 1985 in Finland. 
This nön-intervention price implies that_domestic supply and demand of milk would 
have been in balance in 1985 at 2,437 million liters (Q°). Moreover, according to the 
supply function, the approximated linear supply curve crosses the horizontal axis at Q°, 
corresponding to 1,404 million liters. 
To compare the effectiveness of production control measures, surpluses (CSA and 
PSA) for the actual situation in 1985 have to be calculated first. In principle, the areas 
for surpluses can be obtained through integration with respect to the estimated demand 
and supply e,quations regardless of the functional form. In the case of linear demand and 
supply curves, surpluses can be calculated through geometric areas. Consumer surplus, 
the triangle aokd above the price line and below the estimated demand curve, calculated 
in this way and realizing that Qd=0 for Pd a0=30129 and Qd=(Pd-ad/bi for Pd<ao, is: 
„ 
(7..4) 	CS A = (,ao 
	
d ) • Q d -= 32,512 million FIM 
In Finland, taxes are raised to finance the subsidized exports of the production in 
excess of domestic consumption. According to equation (3.12), taxes are subtracted 
from consumer surplus tö result in .combined consumer-taxpayer surplus, CTS=CS-TX. 
The unit tax is determined by the difference between the prevailing domestic price and 
the world market price, Ps-Pw. Pw is the reference price for milk used in the PSE-
calculations (OECD 1989). The price difference is multiplied by excess supply, Q'-Q', 
to get the total amount of taxes. The multiplication in 1985 results in TXA, or area kcvn, 
and, consequently, CTSA: 
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(7.5) Tx-A = (pS pW ) . (QS _Qad ) 962 million FIM 
(7.6) CTS A = CS A  — TX A = 31,550 million FIM 
CTSA is the combined consumer-taxpayer surplus for the milk market situation in 
1985. According to the production and export ceilings, Finnish producers pay the export 
costs of the amount in excess of the ceilings. This amount should lower producer 
surplus, but due to the negligible nature of the ,excesses from 1985 onwards, taxes are 
included in CTS only. Hence, we assume non-producer taxpayers. When this procedure 
is applied consistently to each alternative measure, it does not distort the analysis. This 
is because the primary interest is in relative effectiveness of production control- measz 
ures, not the absolute levels of surpluses. 
In the case of estimated supply curve, the assumption b0>0 is violated, and the 
approximated producer surplus is the area abcd in Figure 7.1. Consequently, producer 
surplus will be calculated through the areas ofrectangular drba and triangle rcb: 
(7.7) ps A _ pS .Q0 + 1/2 (QS Q0 r 	5, 768 million FIM 
• 
These two surpluses, CTSA and PSA, determine the actual market situation as point A 
in a surplus transformation framework in Figure 7.1. 
In addition, using the equilibrium price 13`  and quantity Q`, the surpluses for the 
equilibrium point E (Figure 7.1) Can be calculated. At E, PSE is FIM 3,870 million (area 
feba), and CTSE is FIM 68,514 million (area aoef). These surpluses are shown in the 
context of income reclistribution efficiency in Figure 7.2. The 45°_surplus transformation 
curve (STC) originating from point E (slope is PS/aCTS = -1) represents the income 
redistribution and welfare changes without deadweight losses as explained in Chapter 
3.2. 
Now, with the specific functional form of demand and supply curves, the surplus 
transformation curves can be obtained for each program. The conceptual framework of 
general surplus equations derived in Chapter 3.2 is utilized. However, the equations 
have to be modified to meet the special characteristics of the Finnish dairy market. 
7.2. Quota program 
The surplus equations for the prevailing quota program are derived. The policy variable 
is the amount of milk output (q) which producers are allowed to produce for the 
administratively set price (Ps). Quota is set 	QS. 
Departing from the general approach (Chapter 3.2.2), in Finland the market price 
does not react to restrictions on supply. Hence, given Q f 5. -4, CSQ as such remains con-
, stant. But taxes affect the combined consumer-taxpayer surplus, CTSQ. Taxes have to be 
included in the Finnish quota effect analysis due to excess supply situation. The sur-
pluses are: 
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(7.8) CTSQ =CSQ-TXQ =X,(ao -Pa )-Qd -(Pd -Pw)-Ct f-Q (i ) 
(7.9) 	PSQ =Ps •-Y2 S(7)•( -41-Q° ) 
In (7.8), when?i = Qd, there are no taxes and CTSQ equals solely CSQ. This amount is 
also the maximum attainable CTSQ. If production quota were lowered below the domes-
tic consumption level, CSQ would begin to decline due to restricted consumption possi-
bilities. This occurs provided that the excess demand is not fulfilled by imports. In the 
case of producer surplus, the stricter the quota becomes, the faster PSQ declines. This 
happens according to the second degree polynomial of (7.9). 
The surpluses with known parameter values and expresseel in monetary units are: 
(7.8a) CTSQ = 37772.71.106 -2216-4 
(7.9a) PSQ = -1922.78.106 +5477.964.-9754-10-7 47 2 
The surplus transformation curve for the quota program, STCQ, can be determined 
by solving equation (7.8a) for 4, and substituting it in equation (7.9a) to yield the STCQ 
as PSQ= f(CTSQ): 
(7.10) PSQ = -1919.47-108 +12.53.CTSQ -198.63.10-12 .(CTSQ )2 
The larger CTSQ becomes, the faster PSQ falls. In other words, the more consumer-
taxpayers gain as the quota is tightened and excess production cut, the more producers 
lose, given constant price. 
Next, the surplus transformation curve of the quota program, STCQ, is traced out 
empirically for the examination of redistribution efficiency. In doing so, the quota is 
allowed to vary between the actual deliveries to the dairies (Qs=2,808 mill. 1.) and con-
sumption (Qd = 2,374 mill. 1.) in 1985. The corresponding producer and consumer-tax-
payer surpluses are calculated. The STCQ is shown in Figure 7.2. The points A and E 
represent the corresponding points in Figure 7.1. 
According to the estimated supply function, milk output equalling consumption of 
2,374 million liters would have been produced for the price 1.892 FIM/1. This is 31 
percent lower than the actual 1985 price. When quota is reduced in order to balance 
milk markets from the level of Q'=2,808 million liters to the consumption level of 
Qd=2,374 million liters, producer surplus de,creases by area kch (APS) in Figure 7.1. 
Consumer surplus remains the same. But taxes are eliminated due to the abolition of 
excess supply and subsequent export subsidies. The change in consumer-taxpayer sur-
plus (ACTS) is area kcvn in Figure 7.1. 
It is possible to use price as a means to achieve the market balance instead of direct 
output restriction in the form of quotas. Welfare effects of price regulation are assessed 
in Chapter 7.3. 
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7.3. Price regulation program 
Price regulation is an alternative program for a quantitative means of a quota system in 
an attempt to balance the milk market. Now, price is the policy variable @). The price is 
set below the current producer price, but above the equilibrium price, i.e. PC 	PS. At 
any price quantities demanded and supplied are determined along the demand and 
supply curves, respectively. The surpluses in the price regulation program are: 
(7.11) CTS P =CS P —7X P =Y2(ao  
(7.12) PS P =P•Q cH- 75.(S(T3 ) — Q° ) 
The surpluses, with known parameter values, are: 
(7.11a) CTS P =38708.106 —1090614 T3-555.95./32 
(7.12a) PS P =1404040T3+256.305T32 
According to the surplus equations of se,cond degree polynomial above, it is clear 
that a decline in price () results in a consumer-taxpayer gain and producer loss. 
In order to determine STCP, the surplus transformation curve for price regulation 
program, (7.12a) is solved for the policy variable ii. Then, the solved variable is substi-
tuted into equation (7.11a) to yield CTSP as a function of PSP: 
(7.13) CTS P = 33353.58.106 + 1954858.97.47502121+ 0.0039.PSP —2.17.PS P 
If producer surplus is lowered, the result according to equation (7.8) will be growing 
consumer-taxpayer surplus, but at a decreasing pace. 
To trace out the STCP  empirically, f• is allowed to vary between the non-interven-
tion price Pc and the actual price Ps=Pd. Surpluses for producers and consumer-taxpayers 
are calculated at each price. Consumer price Pd is assumed to decline in direct propor-
tion to producer price Ps. 
The effect of the price drop is two-fold: production declines and consumption in-
creases, given the elasticities e,=0.5 and ed=-0.1. STCP is shown in Figure 7.2. When 
price drops from the 1985 support level to the calculated non-intervention price, the 
change in producer surplus (APS) is negative of area dcef (Figure 7.1). The change in 
consumer surplus (ACS) is area dkef. Taxes decrease from area kcvn at Ps=2.739 FIM/1 
in the actual 1985 situation to nil at equilibrium with Pc=2.015 FIM/1, given D(13` )=S(Pe). 
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Figure 7.2. Surplus transformation curves of quota (STCQ), price regulation (STCP), and 
consumer subsidy (STCc) in Finnish milk market in 1985. 
7.4. Consumer subsidy program 
Another alternative policy to balance the milk market is the consumer subsidy program. 
II is a modification of price regulation. The policy variable is again price, 13, but affect-
ing consumers only. Producer price, produced quantity, and, conse,quently, producer 
surplus (PSc) remain constant at the actual (A) level. As retail prices decline, consump-
tion is enhanced and consumer surplus (CS9 increased. 
In terms of applicability, the basic problem in this program is the very inelastic 
demand (ed=-0.1) for dairy products. Even though the domestic consumer price is low-
ered, demand does not respond adequately to absorb the prevailing excess supply. 
Taxpayers have to provide financing for subsidization of both domestic consumption 
and foreign exports. Consequently, consumer-taxpayer surplus starts stagnating as the 
gain in consumer surplus is offset by rapidly increasing taxes. 
By letting consumer prices fall below the actual price Pd=2.739 FIM/1, i.e. 5 Pd, the 
surpluses can be calculated according to the following equations (note: producer surplus 
is constanO: 
(7.14) CTS c = (ao -:(3) • D(T")—{(P s — 11- D(P)+{(P s — 	)• (Q s — D(T3))]] 
(7.15) PS c = pS . Q0 + 1/2• . (QS Q0 ). pS 	 pS . (QS + Q0 ) 
The surpluses, with known parameter values and expressed in FIM, are: 
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Figure 7.2a. Surplus transformation curves in the immediate vicinity of point A (different 
scaling in x- and y-axis). 
(7.14a) CTS c =31750•106 +45330»4443.34 2 
(7.15a) PS c = 5768.33.106 
If the consumer price is lowered from the 1985 level to the calculated non-interven-
tion price, the gain in consumer surplus (ACS) is area dkef (Figure 7.1). Taxes change 
from area kcvn in the original 1985 situation to area dcvuef. 
With equations (7.14) and (7.15), the surplus transformation curve for the consumer 
subsidy program, STCc, can be traced out. It is shown along with other STCs in Figure 
7.2 and its enlargement Figure 7.2a. 
7.5. Conclusions 
Consumer subsidy program is basically superior to the other programs: STCc is constantly 
above the other STCs (Figure 7.2a). However, the increase in CTSc is quickly tapering 
off as taxes increase. The stagnation in CTSc can be verified by the first order condition 
aCTSc/aD=0. The result is that CTSc reaches its maximum FIM 31,762 million at 
ri=0.523 FIM/1. Thereafter, it starts to decrease. The maximum increase in CTSc is only 
FIM 210 million. 
The realistic area for operation for the consumer subsidy program is evidently close 
to point A. Beyond that point the program easily becomes an economically and pohti-
cally infeasible solution because of high taxes and budget pressures. Were the price 
elasticity of demand higher, this program would produce considerable gains for con-
sumer-taxpayers and maintain producers' welfare, thus possessing very attractive char-
acteristics for agricultural policy. 
The two other programs are more realistic. Quota (STCQ) is more efficient than price 
regulation (STC") in income redistribution near the actual point A. This is because by a 
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small reduction, if any, in producer surplus, a remarkably bigger gain is obtained in 
consumer-taxpayer surplus in the quota program. This is shown in Figure 7.2, in which 
STCQ is above STCP and closer to the 45°-curve of efficient redistribution. 
However, as the distance extends further southeast from A to the point when —q=Qd, 
STCQ discontinues. This occurs because the gains for consumer-taxpayers diminish 
relatively as the balance between domestic production and consumption of milk is 
approached. The tax burden decreases along with diminishing export subsidies. 
If a large decrease in PS and a considerable improvement in CTS is preferred, price 
reduction (STCP) is a more suitable program than quota (STCQ). 
Hypothetically, if quota were set at 100 percent self-sufficiency in 1985, producer 
surplus would have decreased by FIM 184 million from the actual situation. However, 
consumer-taxpayer surplus would have increased by FIM 962 million due to the elimi- 
nation of excess supply and subsidized exports. To achieve an improvement of the same 
magnitude in CTS in the price reduction program, PS has to decrease by FIM 660 
million, i.e. 3.6 times more than in the quota program. In consumer subsidy program, 
such an improvement in CTS is never reached, because the growth rate of taxes is 
higher than that of CS (Chapter 7.3). 
With respect to Finnish agricultural policy and its major goals, the quota system can 
evidently serve its purpose quite sufficiently. The quota program maintains producers' 
welfare at a higher level than the alternative price reduction program. Quantitative 
efficiency is improved if the aggregate quota is set appropriately to contribute to achiev-
ing the domestic milk market balance. 
The performed surplus transformation analysis is intended to show the welfare changes 
and relative efficacy of alternative programs in income redistribution. The analysis does 
not take into account some important characteristics of quota systems, e.g. capitalization 
of quota rights and delimitations on structural development (OLLILA 1989; OECD 1990a). 
To incorporate these factors to the quantitative analysis is an obvious task for future 
research in this field. 
With respect to farmers income goal, the quota system in particular represents a 
favorable political choice. Although expansion is constrained, production can be ar- 
ranged the most efficient way within the allowed quota. In the case of overall price re-
duction, producers would have been worse off and consumers better off than in the 
quota system. Thus, additional evidence is gained of farmers' strong influence in the 
political decision malcing. 
In general, the producer group is bound to lose some of its welfare due to any 
alteration of present agricultural policies. Accordingly, producers prefer the program of 
the least losses to programs of larger losses. Loss minimization was also the profound 
motivation in the adoption of milk quotas in the EC (Chapter 2.4 and PETIT et al. 1987). 
At the moment, the pressure is on cutting agricultural expenses. Finding and pro-
moting the programs of minor negative effects is an applicable strategy for producers in 
the current situation. The choice of increased producer surplus through larger output or 
higher prices is non-existing. However, there are other channels to maintain producers' 
welfare and redistribute income effectively. Direct (income) support is a relevant alter- 
native to current farm programs. Unlike price support linked to output, direct support 
removes the incentive to increase output. Direct support also represents the most effi-
cient income redistribution as a lump-sum type transaction (see Chapter 3.2.2). 
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8. Conclusions and synthesis of the results 
The detailed assessment of the results obtained in the previous chapters is performed 
and applicable conclusions are drawn in this final chapter of the study. 
First, adjustment of agriculture to control policy of various degrees of stringency is 
examined. Special attention is paid to the drawbacks and benefits of alternative forms of 
control programs in conjuncture with Finnish conditions. Secondly, potential alterna-
tives are explored in order to alleviate the identified problems of emerging inflexibility 
and excessive expenses of the applied control measures and surplus disposal channels. 
Thirdly, the assessment of the correspondence of the general principles and realization 
of agricultural control programs to the control policy practiced in Finland complements 
the examination of adjustment and alternatives to control policy. Furthermore, the po-
litical economic analysis is applied to identify some of the central determinants of the 
pursued agricultural policy as a whole and its central component, control policy, in 
particular. 
The quantitative evaluation of efficiency of dairy control programs in surplus man-
agement follows the aforementioned qualitative assessment. Efficacy of the prevailing 
quota system in income redistribution is compared to alternative measures of price 
reduction and consumer subsidy. In order to efficiently incorporate ali information 
obtained in this study, a synthesis between the qualitative and quantitative approach is 
formed. Finally, the implications for further research are identified. 
8.1. Adjustment of agriculture to control policy 
Control policy is primarily intended to cut surpluses. However, the effects of control 
policy are much broader (Chapters 2 & 3). The adjustment process due to restrictions 
does not take place in milk production alone, but also in various groups related to it. 
Yet, the most direct effect has been that milk producers have had to change their 
production decisions. If there had been no restrictions, more milk would have been 
produced, ceteris paribus. 
The nature of the pursued control policy determines to a large extent how the adjust-
ment process in the restricted line of production takes place. In Finnish control policy, 
the voluntary nature and versatile means have been dominating (Chapter 2.5). It has 
been up to a farmer to decide whether to participate in control programs or not. 
It has been possible for producers to take advantage of control programs. Temporary 
contracts could have been utilized to facilitate the necessary changes in rationalization 
of farms. Farmers who have been planning to quit or reduce production have received 
an economic incentive to make the decision. The social policy nature of voluntary 
control programs (e.g. ANON. 1985a, p. 41) has offered flexibility to decision making at 
the farm level. 
The assumption of the utilization of the social policy nature of the control policy is 
supported by the change made in the retirement pension system in 1986 (Chapter 2.5.3). 
The change increased considerably the popularity of the system. In this case, the pen-
sion system obtained the characteristics of control policy. The situation has usually been 
the opposite, i.e. voluntary control programs have served the objectives of social policy. 
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Compulsory restrictions lead to more severe adjustment problems than voluntary 
ones. Mandatory programs limit freedom for producers' decisions. However, the degree 
of strictness is decisive. 
The establishment permit system prevented development in milk production only in 
the case of the largest farms. The herd size subject to license was high compared with 
the average herd size. In 1980, 96 percent of dairy farms and 88 percent of cows were 
below the license limit (KoLA 1987, p. 41). The limits were made stricter only in the 
1984 revision. However, the establishment regulation was substituted by the milk quota 
system already the next year. 
The quota system did not force actual reductions in production, either. Primarily it 
prevented expansion. Producers were able to affect their quota quantity by producing 
high output during the years selected for the basic period. This opportunity was very 
likely to he utilized. 
However, after the determination of the quota, the maximum output level for which 
a farmer receives a full price is fixed. The prevailing quotas prevent farmers from 
enlarging the herd size. In order to take economic advantage of technological develop-
ment, the minimum requirement would he that the quota is adjusted to the annual 
increase in the milk yield per cow. The longer the quota system is in effect without any 
applicable flexibility, the more difficult adjustment problems become (also OLLILA 1989; 
OECD 1990a). 
The major distinction between the mandatory programs of quotas and license system 
was that the latter allowed yield growth with the existing herd size. Quotas did not. 
The adjustment of Finnish milk production to control policy has had two different 
aspects. Producers could have taken advantage of voluntary programs, whereas compul-
sory programs have restricted the sphere for producers choices. However, severe ad-
justment problems have still been rare. Mandatory programs have been applied in an 
efficient way only since the 1985 quota system, and not very strictly even then. 
1n principle, the decision to shift from dominating voluntary programs to mandatory 
quotas in the mid-1980s represents as such a proof of perceived inefficiency of control 
policy mainly based on volunteering farmers. Economic efficiency of voluntary control 
programs to manage overproduction has suffered from the low net effect (Chapter 6). 
The output reduction brought about by voluntary programs has been offset by possibili-
ties of non-participating producers to enlarge production and utilize productivity growth. 
Mandatory programs are less expensive for the state. But they hinder rationalization 
process on farms. As the technological and structural development and the subsequent 
productivity improvement remain unobtainable, the overall economic efficiency of the 
pursued control policy deteriorates. It is difficult to quantify this trade-off between 
export cost savings and implied inefficacy in production. 
The macroeconomic profitability of control programs improves if resources are re-
leased to more productive industries or additional resources are not tied to agricultural 
production (see Chapter 2). In terms of the national economy, production restrictions 
would work best if they prevent new investments to agriculture (KETTUNEN 1985, p. 63). 
In a search to mitigate the evident problems and redirect effects of the applied 
control policy, the approaches applied and results obtained in this study are employed in 
the following evaluation of possible altematives to control policy. 
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8.2. Alternatives to control policy and export subsidies 
Control policy is used to curb surpluses of agricultural products. Surpluses are exported 
with the help of subsidies. Control policy and export subsidies have certain drawbacks 
presented in this study. Hence, it is expedient to seek altematives for them. 
The causal chain formulated in Chapter 2 indicated that prices above market equilib-
rium are fundamental reasons to surpluses. Accordingly, the prevention of surpluses 
could be realized by price reduction. However, this way has not been chosen. The 
reasons for rejection of price reduction mainly originate from the political economic 
characteristics of decision making process. Because of the income goal, the producer 
price of milk has not been lowered to contribute to a more balanced milk market. 
Direct income support could be substituted for the prevailing price support. Direct 
support represents the decoupling approach, which aims at removing the incentive to 
increase retums through higher output. Financing of direct support programs occurs 
through taxation, whereas price support is financed by consumers in consumer prices of 
food. Taxation of a progressive nature may be perceived as a more just means than high 
prices for food. Consumers experience higher prices as a regressive tax. 
Transparency of farm program costs increases in direct support. Taxpayers carry the 
costs of direct support and money flows through the state budget. It may result in more 
difficult decision making. Dependence on annual political decisions creates instability. 
Farmers' attitudes towards larger direct support have mainly been negative. 
Although output linked price support has been the main form of agricultural support 
in Finland, programs corresponding to the concept of direct income support have also 
been practiced. The support paid according to the farm size represents closely the output 
neutral characteristics of direct income support (KETruNEN 1991, p. 43). 
In the framework of the agricultural policy reform, direct income support has been 
promoted as a favored means in future agricultural policy. Four main objectives of ac-
ceptable direct income support have been identified (OECD 1990a): 
structural adjustment 
income stabilization 
minimum income level for farm families 
provision of public goods (e.g. environmental benefits) 
These objectives have been of great relevance in Finnish agricultural policy. How-
ever, the means to achieve the objectives should be revised into the direction of direct 
support not linked to output in order to meet the current requirements for policy reform. 
The pres‘ ent price support could be modified to contribute to an attempt to achieve a 
more balanced milk market (see also OLLILA 1989). Through steeper stages in the 
seasonal pricing of milk, supply could be more evenly distributed throughout the year 
to meet demand in a better balance. Consequently, the need for a self-sufficiency clearly 
above 100 percent at an annual level would be reduced. In spite of the change in the 
seasonal pricing of milk, producers would receive the same average price at the annual 
level. To shift peak production to the indoor feeding season would raise production 
costs. Increased costs could be compensated during the transition period to farmers 
through income transfers from the saved export costs. 
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Another pricing technique is the stronger price differentiation of fat and protein 
content. This technique has already been used for the past couple of years. In the short 
run, the effects of the price differentiation are negligible. However, in the longer run, 
milk production can also be adjusted through this method to better correspond to con-
sumption. 
The overproduction of milk is subject to the declining trend in milk consumption. In 
Finland milk consumption has been and still is intemationally at a high level. Therefore, 
the decline in consumption is expected to continue. The reduction in consumer price is 
commonly assumed to be an ineffective way to increase consumption considerably 
because demand for milk is very price inelastic. This hypothesis has been verified 
empirically in this study by the surplus transformation approach (Chapter 7). 
Milk fat surpluses are especially problematic due to the changing consumer prefer-
ences towards low-fat products. Instead, fluid and protein intake has better prospects. 
MAUBOIS (1986, p. 77) has concluded that mille protein consumption will grow globally 
due to its price advantage compared with meat and eggs, nutritional value and broad 
product ass ortment. 
In addition to traditional food consumption, milk does not have cdternative uses in 
the same way as, for example, grain has in non-food uses (see e.g. BUCHHOLZ 1985; 
QUADFLIEG 1986). 
Investment in product research and development can contribute to introduction of 
new products which meet consumer preferences better. New products may also be more 
profitable in terms of exports. Yet, prospects for any considerable relief through con-
sumption in fat surplus problem remain weak. 
Restrictions on milk as well as other animal production has led to worse feed grain 
balance. Increased feed grain surpluses have deteriorated the profitability of control 
measures. Decrease in arable land area do not proceed at the same pace as the reduc-
tions in animal production would require. To respond to this phenomenon, the emphasis 
has recently been on intensifying fallow schemes. 
Alternative crops not in surplus and also more profitable otherwise should be found 
to substitute for feed grains. The problem is that production alternatives are limited in 
the major milk producing areas in Finland. However, progressive research and develop-
ment of altemative forms of production, processing and use could result in permanent 
and extensive new solutions. 
Extensive production is an alternative solution to surplus problems. Surpluses could 
be reduced by lowering intensity of production with respect to chemical inputs in par-
ticular. An advantage of increasing importance of less intensive production is under-
lined in preverition of environmental problems. The choice has to be made between the 
ecological and economic direction (WEINSCHENCK 1987; NEVALA 1990). Extensive pro-
duction can be a means to disentangle the skein of numerous regulations affecting agri-
culture at the moment. This approach would alleviate adjustment distortions caused by 
restrictions. Extensive production would contribute to favorable regional and social de-
velopment in the countryside and secure operation possibilities of farming in the remote 
rural areas. Especially in Finland these issues have been stressed in agricultural policy. 
Contract production represents a modification of supply management by govern-
ment in an attempt to direct production towards more balanced markets. However, ex-
perience of the applicability of contract production as a real restrictive measure on pro- 
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duction is limited. Contract production has primarily been applied to guarantee suffi-
cient quality and quantity of products. 
Basically, contract production only moves the responsibility of supply management 
from govemment to contracting parties themselves, i.e. producers and processors. Re-
markable annual variation due to natural conditions impedes the applicability of con-
tract production in Finland. However, in milk production variation is smaller. The 
smooth shift to contract production would be facilitated by the prevailing quota system. 
The role of farmers' marketing cooperatives in supply management would increase con-
siderably (e.g. OwLA 1989). 
Only some altematives which could substitute for control =sures and surplus ex-
ports and reduce their drawbacks and costs have been evaluated here. The purpose of 
this chapter has not been a thorough analysis of ali available altematives. Rather, it has 
been an indicative suggestion to new possibilities. 
8.3. Quantitative efficiency of dairy restrictions 
The hypothesis for the quantitative examination of dairy control policy was that freely 
developed milk production would have been larger ihan the actual restricted production 
in the control period 1981-89. This was also the case. The free production would have 
been annually 130-626 million liters (4-24 percent) higher than the actual restricted 
production in the control period 1981-89 (Figure 8.1; se,e also Table 5.3). 
It is worth noting that the free production would also have declined in the last years 
of the period. The uncontrolled production would have reached its tuming point in 
1985, i.e. two years later than the actual production. Milk production would have 
increased from 3,203 million liters in 1981 to 3,274 million liters in 1989, if there had 
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Figure 8.1. Actual controlled and predicted free milk production in 1981-89. 
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The predicted steady development in free production reflects the absence of incen-
tives for further expansion. However, the difference between the actual controlled and 
the predicted uncontrolled production has grown considerably (Figure 8.1). According 
to the econometric model (Equation 4.3), the free milk production would have declined 
to the level of the actual production in 1989, if the real milk price had been lowered 
annually by 3 percent since 1980, ceteris paribus. 
The effect of the restrictions on production was the most distinct in 1985 and 1988. 
Then the difference between the predicted free and actual restricted production ex-
panded markedly. In 1985, the actual production was curtailed by the introduction of 
quotas in 1985 and the bonus contracts made in 1984. In 1988, the new contracts to 
reduce milk production contributed to a steep decline in the actual production. In 1987 
the difference grew as the actual production suffered from the crop failure. 
The inclusion of the variable describing technological development has contributed 
to the growth of the predicted free production. Restrictions have inevitably created tech-
nological inefficiency in the actual situation. According to the simulation, it is possible 
to conclude that the opportunity to rationalize free milk production would have facili-
tated larger increase in production than the declining real price of milk (see Figure 4.6) 
would have reduced it in 1981-89. In practice, this would have meant that expanding 
producers would have fulfilled and exceeded the reduction in production caused by the 
normal exits of e.g. old milk producers. 
The results show that the quantitative efficiency of dairy control programs has 
improved significantly when approaching the 1990s. Compared to the uncontrolled 
production, the efficiency is especially good since 1985. The expensive disposal of 
dairy product surpluses has remained considerably smaller. Next, the question is asked 
whether the reduction in production has been reached with sufficient economic effi-
ciency. 
8.4. Economic efficiency of dairy restrictions 
The combined control and export costs created by the overall dairy control policy were 
48-94 percent of the export costs due to estimated free development in milk production 
in 1981-89 (Table 6.7). In the first years of the extensive application of voluntary 
control programs the economic efficiency was negligible. The cost advantage was only 
6-15 percent in 1981-1984. However, the ratio improved continuously in the control 
period. In the last two years the costs of the pursued policy were half of the costs which 
would have incurred in the case of the predicted free production. On the average in the 
1980s, the actual costs were 70 percent of the costs that would have been required to 
export the surpluses due to freely developed milk production. 
In absolute terms (Figure 8.2), the cost difference was low until 1985 (FIM 63-289 
million), moderate in 1985-86 (FIM 437-616 million), and large in the last three years 
(FIM 1,168-1,970 million). 
Unlike the overall control policy, the profitability of milk bonuses as a single volun-
tary program has been in decline. The costs of the bonus contracts and increased feed 
grain surplus were annually 43-71 percent of the export costs of the milk quantity corre-
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Figure 8.2. Costs incurred due to the actual controlled and predictedfree milk production 
in 1981-89. 
savings due to the milk bonuses were FIM 13-152 million. The peak was reached in 
1985. 
The major determinant of the economic efficiency of the bonus system has been the 
level at which the compensation payment is administratively set. The profitability of the 
program is the better, the lower the payrnent for a reduce,d milk liter has been set in 
relation to the unit export cost. Profitability would deteriorate if feed grain costs were 
assumed higher than was implied by the conservative approximation of the released 
field area after removal of dairy cows (Chapter 6.2). 
The economic efficiency examination has shown in principle the gross effect of re- 
strictions. The profitability is bound to deteriorate if the net effect is strictly considere,d. 
To perform this analysis more accurate data on farmers' intentions would have been 
required. Exact determination of the net effect is among the greatest problems in the 
estimation of the efficiency of control measures. It remains a potential object for future 
studies. 
The free development would have led to higher export costs due to larger surpluses 
of dairy products. Production ceilings for milk would have been clearly exceeded. Pro-
vided that the Farm Income Act .had been followed, however, farmers' responsibility of 
surplus marketing could only have been raised to the amount corresponding to the 
maximum limit stipulated in th'e Act. The threshold was 10 percent of the farm income 
in 1983-87 and '13 percent in 1988-89. In 1983-86 the export costs of the products 
exceeding the ceilings were already as high as 8.3-9.8 percent of the farm income (see 
Table 2.3). 
Consequently, farmers' responsibility would have incre,ased markedly only in 1987- 
89. Farmers would have had to påy FIM 300, 930 and 980 million in 1987, 1988 and 
1989, respectively, more for larger milk surpluses. 
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Accordingly, the marketing responsibility of the state would also have increased in 
the absence of dairy restrictions. About half of the significantly larger export costs in 
1987-89 would have devolved upon the govemment. A minor relief in cost burden 
would have been realized through lower feed grain surpluses due to higher feed needs 
of the uncontrolled larger milk production. 
The 1982 Farm Income Act also stated that the appropriation amounting to 20 
percent of the appropriations reserved for the export costs of agricultural products has to 
be reserved for the purposes of production control measures. Thus, larger production 
would have led to legislative problems along with various other consequences. 
8.5. Efficiency of alternative control measures in income redistribution 
The prevailing production quota system has been compared with the price regulation 
program and consumer subsidy program. The emphasis has been on evaluation of the 
capability of the alternative programs to achieve effectively a better balance between 
domestic consumption and production of milk. 
The surplus transformation analysis has shown that the chosen mandatory quota sys-
tem has resulted in more efficient income redistribution than the applicable alternative 
of price reduction program. Quota has caused smaller cuts than price regulation in 
farmers' welfare in relation to equal improvements in consumer-taxpayer welfare. 
These results are in line with the findings of DE GORTER & MEILKE (1989) in the EC 
wheat market: a production quota (given the current support price) is considered as su- 
perior to a price reduction policy. The inelastic demand is the major factor behind the 
results. However, Butioac (1990) has questioned de Gorter's and Meilke's assertion and 
emphasized the need to account for existing distortions in related markets and the size 
of the income transfer. 
If milk production quota had been set at 100 percent self-sufficiency in 1985, pro-
ducer surplus would have decreased by FIM 184 million and consumer-taxpayer surplus 
would have increased by FIM 962 million. To reach an equal increase in consumer-
taxpayer surplus in the price reduction program, producer surplus should have de-
creased by FIM 660 million, i.e. 3.6 times more than in the quota program. 
The analysis indicated that consumer subsidy is not a very realistic alternative to 
reach a considerably better milk market balance. This is because the growing tax burden 
of remaining surpluses and consumer price subsidies quickly offsets the potential gains 
in the consumer surplus. The effects of the consumer subsidy program are particularly 
sensitive to the magnitude of the price elasticity of demand. More price responsive 
demand implies better applicability of the alternative. 
The results of the surplus transformation analysis support the common argument that 
the producer interest has a strong weight in political decision making. Conceming this 
study in particular, producers have had enough influence to reach a favorable resolution 
in selection of control means in Finnish agricultural policy. As producer surplus in 
general was bound to decrease, the quota program with less adverse effects was pre-
ferred to programs resulting in drastic welfare losses to farmers. 
The results also support the hypothesis (e.g. GARDNER 1983) of fundamental rational-
ity of decision making. After ali, decision makers may end up with efficient choices, 
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given the political influence position of various pressure groups. The program is to be 
chosen which results in lower reductions in producer surplus but equal increases in 
consumer-taxpayer surplus than any available program. 
8.6. Synthesis of the results and implications for future research 
The major accomplishment of this study has been to incorporate a versatile and compre-
hensive assortment of methods to deal with the very central but little studied problem of 
production control efficacy. An attempt has been made to reach and utilize a synthesis 
between methods of different nature. Normative (welfare) and positive (econometrics) 
approach, qualitative (political economic analysis) and quantitative (efficiency analysis) 
approach, and volume (quantitative efficiency) and value (economic efficiency) exami-
nation have been applied. These approaches have contributed to a comprehensive as-
sessment of the control policy as a whole and, in particular, in Finnish milk production. 
Hence, this study has provided important additional information to the calculations and 
approximations of control measures made in other connections. 
The analyses performed through the chosen approaches and methods have made it 
possible to answer the questions set for the study in the following compact form: 
the background and principles of the control policy are bound to the historical 
development and thereby implied fundamental goals of self-sufficiency, farm-
ers' income level and rural population in Finnish agricultural policy and the 
wider context of social policy. This result has been achieved through the ex-
amination of the derived causal chain and decision making process. 
the efficiency of the dairy control policy in curbing output and surpluses in-
creased remarkably towards the end of the control period. Both quantitative and 
economic efficacy were low until 1985, but considerably higher in the last three 
years in particular. The introduction of the mandatory quota system in 1985 
constituted a threshold after which expansion possibilities of future-oriented 
and efficient producers were eliminated. These results are based on the com-
parison between the actual milk production and the predicted uncontrolled milk 
production in 1981-89. 
The qualitative political economic analysis has made it possible to conclude that 
producers have had political influence of sufficient strength to avoid the most unfavo-
rable altematives in surplus management, e.g. drastic price reduction or strict mandatory 
controls. The conclusion supports the argument (e.g. BECKER 1983) that govemments try 
to correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically powerful. This 
means that politicians secure their job continuity by favoring the strongest groups. 
Strong groups are usually homogenous and well-organized, but not necessarily the most 
numerous in society. They are relatively the best potential sources of votes in elections. 
In Finland agricultural producers as members of the only one and uniform farmers' 
union have formed this kind of source of votes. Due to these characteristics farmers 
have been able to obtain favorable political decisions. The historically unique position 
of agriculture as the supplier of essential consumer goods has helped in this pursuit. 
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Historical continuity and inertia in decision making evidently strengthen the ten-
dency not to strain farmers more than necessary to prevent other interest groups from 
opposing the pursued agricultural policy too strongly. However, this procedure may in-
validate the means that are intended to restrict production and cut surplus costs. 
Although the examination of a single voluntary program (milk bonus in Chapter 6.2) 
indicated clear profitability, economic efficiency of voluntary control programs as a 
whole has remained ambiguous. Efficiency has suffered from the very dominant volun-
tary nature combined with relatively high compensation payments. The presumably low 
net effect due to direction of control programs to old small-scale farmers with insignifi-
cant impact on output has also eroded efficiency. In addition, the increase in feed graitz 
surpluses and subsequent export costs have deteriorated efficiency. 
Results are always subject to assumptions made and limitations faced in the evolu-
tion of research. The results of this study have to be interpreted with caution because of 
the following characteristics inherent in the analyses. First, there have been problems in 
variable selection in the estimation phase due to e.g. homogenous price development of 
agricultural products and declining trend in milk production. Secondly, economic wel- 
fare analysis is heavily dependent on the elasticities obtained from econometric supply 
and demand estimations. Thus, errors may have accumulated. Thirdly, potential changes 
in agricultural policy and legislation have not been taken into account. E.g. production 
ceilings and division of surplus marketing responsibility have been assumed unaltered, 
although milk production has been predicted to reach a remarkably higher level in the 
absence of control measures. Finally, instead of only qualitative examination of the 
decision making process in agricultural policy, the aim should be at quantitative empiri-
cal analysis. 
Consequently, the need for further study is crucial in this very field of political 
economic analysis in terms of endogenizing government behavior, i.e. identifying vari-
ables which influence policy makers' decisions and quantifying their effects. It would 
enhance our understanding of agricultural policy and its very special nature. 
Furthermore, the surplus transformation analysis applied in this study should be ex-
tended to include ali market participants in addition to producers, consumers and tax-
payers. E.g. manufacturers of inputs and processors of output need to be taken into 
consideration as well. Taxation required to finance farm programs causes distortions 
elsewhere in the economy. This aspect should also be included in the analysis of mac-
roeconomic efficiency of income redistribution due to agricultural control programs. 
Only after these factors are incorporated in the analysis, a comprehensive quantitative 
analysis of the effects of the practiced control programs and their alternatives can be 
performed. But the shift from the partial equilibrium analysis to general equilibrium 
models is a complicated task to accomplish, indeed. 
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Summary 
During the past few decades, agricultural products have been produced in excess of 
domestic consumption in Finland. As a result, production control programs have domi-
nated in agricultural policy. However, the number of studies concerning control pro-
grams and their effects has been quite limited. This is especially true in the case of 
quantitative examination. One reason for this deficiency is the difficulty in carrying out 
the research, because the duration and form of control programs have varied greatly. 
Moreover, the availability of necessary data has often been impeded by the inadequate 
monitoring of programs. 
In order to provide additional information about the effects of control policy the 
objective of this study has been the following: 
to identify the principles and background of general control policy in 
agriculture. 
to assess the quantitative efficiency of control policy in terms of 
production volume, and 
to evaluate the economic efficiency of control policy in terms of 
the policy costs and income redistribution. 
The first part is a qualitative general examination of control policy. The latter parts 
aim at quantifying the effects of control policy in Finland, and are confined to milk 
production, which is the main line of production in Finnish agriculture. 
The pursued agricultural policy is a partial reason for overproduction. The central 
goals of agricultural policy in most countries have been self-sufficiency in food and 
adequate income for farmers. In order to achieve the goals, prices of agricultural prod-
ucts have been set above the equilibrium price determined by demand and supply. The 
high price level has been safeguarded through border protection and trade restrictions. 
Overproduction has led to ever-increasing costs due to expensive surplus disposal. 
Because there has been no willingness or possibility to abandon price support the 
inevitable consequence has been extensive control policy. The nature of market compe-
tition and price formation has determined the background according to which the over-
production problem can be divided into two broad categories: 1) a price and income 
problem due to surpluses in free price formation, and 2) a budgetary cost problem due 
to surpluses in an administered market mechanism. 
In Finland the expansion of government expenses due to overproduction has been 
the most essential reason for the pursued control policy. Numerous and versatile means 
to restrict production have been applied. Nevertheless, surpluses have persisted. 
Control policy has been introduced to correct the emerging distortions, i.e. sur-
pluses, caused by the pursued agricultural policy. A causal chain has been formulated to 
describe the objectives and means of agricultural policy leading to the application of 
control policy. The decision malcing process and the factors affecting the process have 
been evaluated in terms of the decisions made between price and supply management 
and between voluntary and mandatory control programs. 
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In the evaluation of the choices made, the historical background of Finnish agricul-
tural policy and the fundamental goals determined through it have to be taken into 
account. Evolution of overall Finnish agricultural policy has also tied control policy to a 
context wider in scope than only agriculture. Control policy of predominating voluntary 
nature has had characteristics of social policy when it has offered a smooth means to 
withdraw from active agricultural production. 
According to the qualitative political economic analysis, the conclusion can be 
drawn that producers have had political influence of sufficient strength to avoid the 
most unfavorable alternatives in surplus management. The marketing responsibility of 
surpluses has been divided between producers and the state. Cost increases have been 
fully compensated to agriculture according to the Farm Income Act and, accordingly, 
price development has been steady. Voluntary nature has dominated control programs. 
The aforementioned characteristics of control policy support the argument that gov-
ernments try to correct market failures with the view that they favor the politically 
powerful. Farmers as a homogenous and well-organized group have possessed consider-
able political influence in relation to other pressure groups, e.g. consumers. An attempt 
has been made to correct the market failure of over-supply of dairy products by quanti-
tative restrictions of mainly voluntary nature, instead of price reductions. 
Uniqueness of agriculture, historical continuity and inertia in decision making evi-
dently strengthen the tendency not to strain farmers more than necessary to prevent 
other interest groups from opposing the pursued agricultural policy too strongly. The 
objective of maintaining food security, family farm structure and efficient utilization of 
forest resources has been accepted widely in the society. However, the decisions made 
in favor of producers may invalidate the means that are e.g. intended to restrict produc-
tion and cut surplus disposal costs. 
Control policy has had diverse effects. Directly, it has affected the volume and struc-
ture of production. Farm income, production costs, the number of agricultural popula-
tion, processing and input manufacturing industries, foreign trade, budget outlays for 
agriculture and the national economy as a whole have been indirect objects of control 
policy. In this study, the quantitative examination has concentrated on the effects of 
dairy restrictions on production volume, surplus disposal costs and income redistribu-
tion. 
In order to be able to examine the quantitative effect of control programs, the actual 
controlled development had to be compared with the hypothetical development without 
control measures. Hence, the estimation of the supply function for milk from the uncon-
trolled period has been the central part of the study. The estimation has formed the basis 
for the analysis of the efficacy of control programs. 
A clear distinction between the free period and the controlled period had to be made 
for estimation of supply functions. The time period prior to 1981 has been chosen to 
represent the uncontrolled era in milk production. Accordingly, the time period 1981-89 
has been the control period. 
The econometric supply functions have been estimated from 1961-80. The best 
estimated function has included as explanatory variables the producer price of milk, 
labor cost, technological development and lagged milk production. The inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable creates a partial adjustment model. The concept of partial 
adjustment indicates the inability of producers to reach a desired level of output. 
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In addition to a causal econometric supply model, a non-causal autoregressive inte-
grated moving average (ARIMA) model has been estimated. In the estimation of the 
univariate time series model the annual data from 1931 through 1980 has been em-
ployed. A parsimonious ARIMA (1,1,0) model has been regarded as an adequate speci-
fication. The adopted model has confirmed the specification of the econometric model 
with lagged dependent variable. 
The estimated supply functions have formed the basis for the analysis of the effects 
of control programs. In the quantitative efficiency examination the actual production of 
the controlled period 1981-89 has been compared with the predicted free production. 
The composite prediction of milk production has been formulated as a simple average 
of predictions provided by the separate econometric and ARIMA models. The predic-
tions have been obtained when the estimated supply functions have been simulated to 
the control period 1981-89. The difference between the actual controlled and predicted 
uncontrolled production has been considered the effect of control measures. 
In 1989, the predicted uncontrolled production would have been 600 million liters 
(23 %) larger than the actual restricted milk production. The difference varied annually 
from 4 to 24 percent (130-626 million liters). It is worth noting that milk production 
would have remained quite stable in the 1980s, if there had been no restrictions in force. 
According to the composite forecast, production would have been 3,203 million liters in 
1981 and 3,274 million liters in 1989. The incentive to continuous expansion has obvi-
ously disappeared. However, the difference between the actual controlled and predicted 
free production has enlarged considerably as restrictions have curtailed the actual pro-
duction. 
The free production could have taken advantage of the technological development, 
whereas utilization of technology in the actual production has been restricted by manda-
tory control measures, i.e. quotas and establislunent regulation. 
The effect of the restrictions on production was the most distinct in 1985 and 1988. 
In 1985, the actual production was curtailed by the introduction of the mandatory quotas 
in 1985 and the voluntary bonus contracts made in 1984. In 1988, the contracts to 
reduce milk production contributed to a steep decline in the actual production, which 
was still affected by the crop failure in 1987. 
The results indicate that, in comparison to the free production, the quantitative effi-
ciency of dairy control programs has been especially significant since 1985. The expen-
sive disposal of dairy product surpluses has remained considerably smaller as quotas 
have eliminated expansion possibilities. 
The results of the production quantity examination, in turn, have formed the basis 
for the evaluation of the economic efficacy of overall control policy. In the economic 
efficiency assessment the costs incurred due to the dairy control policy have been 
compared with the cost of free development in milk production. The control policy 
costs have included program compensations, surplus exports and increased feed grain 
surplus due to dairy control programs. In addition to control policy as a whole, the 
economic efficacy assessment has also been made for an individual voluntary control 
measure. 
The economic efficiency of the pursued overall control policy improved continu-
ously in the control period 1981-89. In 1988 and 1989 the costs of the pursued policy 
were half of the export costs which would have incurred in the case of the free produc- 
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tion. In the entire 1980s, the combined control and export costs created by the pursued 
policy were, on the average, 70 percent of the costs of the larger free production. The 
cost savings of surplus disposal were low until 1985 (FIM 63-289 million), moderate in 
1985-86 (FIM 437-616 million), and large in the last three years (FIM 1,168-1,970 
million). 
The contracts to reduce milk production (so called milk bonus contracts) were cho-
sen to represent a single voluntmy measure.The achieved reduction in milk production 
has led to expenses in the form of compensation payments and increased feed grain 
surplus. These costs have been compared with the export costs of the amount of milk 
corresponding to the achieved reduction. 
The costs of the bonus contracts and increased feed grain surplus were annually 43-
71 percent of the export costs of the milk quantity corresponding to the quantity reduced 
by the bonuses in 1981-89. 
Unlike the overall control policy, the profitability of bonuses was in decline. In 
absolute terms, the cost savings due to the milk bonuses were FIM 13-152 million. The 
peak was reached in 1985. 
One of the greatest problems in the assessment of the exact efficiency of control 
measures has been the determination of the net effect. The full net effect is realized if 
the decision to reduce or give up production is solely made due to the contract offered 
by the state. The exact assessment of the net effect remains a topic for future studies 
particularly due to insufficient data. 
The surplus transformation analysis has been applied to compare welfare and in-
come redistribution effects of alternative control measures. The prevailing production 
quota system has been compared with the price regulation program and consumer 
subsidy program. 
The surplus transformation analysis has shown that the chosen mandatory quota 
system has resulted in more efficient income redistribution than the applicable alterna- 
tive of price reduction program. Quota has caused smaller cuts in farmers' welfare in 
relation to equal improvements in consumer-taxpayer welfare than price regulation. The 
analysis indicated that consumer subsidy is not a very realistic alternative to reach a 
significantly better milk market balance due to the price inelastic demand for milk. 
The adjustment process of milk production to control policy has had two different 
aspects. On the one hand, producers could have taken advantage of voluntary programs. 
On the other hand, compulsory restrictions have weakened the possibilities to develop 
production and its structure. 
During the examination period of this study, adjustment problems have not yet been 
severe. Compulsory restrictions have been applied in an efficient way only since the 
1985 quota system. Yet, the longer the quota system is in effect without any flexibility, 
the more difficult adjustment problems become. As the technological development and 
the subsequent productivity improvement remain unobtainable, the overall economic ef-
ficiency of the pursued control policy deteriorates. It is difficult to quantify this trade-
off between export cost savings and inefficacy in production due to the practiced con-
trol policy. 
In this study some alternative practices to contribute towards a more balanced milk 
market have also been explored. The altematives are intended to reduce the presented 
drawbacks of restrictions and excessive costs of surplus exports. The purpose of the 
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examination has not been a comprehensive analysis of ali available alternatives. Rather, 
it has been an indicative suggestion to new possibilities. The following potential solu-
tions have been identified: 1) stronger price differentiation according to seasons and 
quality, 2) investment in research and development of dairy products, 3) contract pro-
duction, 4) extensive production, and 5) direct income support. 
The analyses performed in this study have made it possible to draw the following 
conclusions: 
the background and principles of the control policy are bound to the historical 
development and thereby implied fundamental goals of self-sufficiency, farmers' 
income level and rural population in Finnish agricultural policy and the wider 
context of social policy, and 
the efficiency of the dairy control policy in curbing output and surpluses in-
creased remarkably towards the end of the control period. Both quantitative and 
economic efficacy were low until 1985, but considerably higher in the last three 
years. The introduction of the quota system in 1985 was an important factor in 
contributing to better efficiency and represented a decisive change from volun-
tary programs to a major mandatory control measure. 
In this study, an attempt has been made to incorporate several approaches and 
methods to contribute to a comprehensive assessment of Finnish control policy in milk 
production. The quantitative assessment has provided further information about the 
efficacy of dairy control policy. The qualitative political economic analysis has offered 
a possible explanation of the behavior of the government and decision makers in pursu-
ing agricultural policy. 
The need for further study is evident in the political economic analysis and welfare 
analysis in the framework of surplus transformation. These novel approaches are quite 
unexplored in the agricultural economics research in Finland and they can be further ex-
tended from the application made in this study. The analyses of political economy and 
surplus transformation enhance general understanding of the conditions under which ag-
ricultural policies in practice are formulated and potential changes introduced, and con-
tribute to more comprehensive assessment of the effects of agricultural policies. 
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APPENDIX 1. PRODUCTION CONTROL MEASURES APPLIED 
IN 1969-1990 IN FINLAND. 
Voluntary programs are listed in certain year according to their realization, i.e. if new 
contracts were made in that year. The measures which have affected milk production are 
printed in bold letters. Source: National Board of Agriculture. 
Year Control measure 
1969 Soil bank 
Afforestation premiums 
1970 Soil bank 
Afforestation premiums 
Slaughter premiums for dairy cows 
1971 Soil bank 
Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, wheat 
1972 Soil bank 
Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, wheat 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
1973 Soil bank 
Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, wheat 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
1974 Soil bank 
Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, wheat 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
1975 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, wheat, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Establishment permits: pigs, hens 
1976 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: not collected 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, hens 
Slaughter premiums for hens 
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1977 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork, wheat 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, hens 
Fallowing contracts 
Contracts to change the production line (4§) 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
1978 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork, wheat 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, hens, dairy and beef cattle 
Fallowing contracts 
Contracts to change the production line (4§) 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
1979 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, hens, dairy and beef cattle 
Fallowing contracts 
Contracts to change the production line (4§) 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production premiums for bread grain: wheat, rye 
1980 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, hens, dairy and beef cattle 
Fallowing contracts 
Contracts to change the production line (4§) 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Slaughter premiums for dairy cows (suffering from mastitis) 
Production contracts for beef 
Contracts to change the production line (4a§) 
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1981 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, hens, dairy and beef cattle 
Contracts to change the production line (4§) 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production contracts for beef 
Contracts to change the production line (4a§) 
Contracts to reduce milk production (milk bonus) 
Contracts to reduce egg production 
1982 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, dairy and beef cattle 
Contracts to change the production line (4§) 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production contracts for beef 
Contracts to change the production line (4a§) 
Contracts to reduce milk production (milk bonus) 
Contracts to reduce egg production 
Production premiums for bread grain 
1983 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, dairy and beef cattle 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production contracts for beef: two-year terms 
Contracts to reduce milk production (milk bonus) 
Contracts to reduce egg production 
Contracts to reduce pork production 
Contracts to reduce agricultural production 
Production premiums for rye 
1984 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, dairy and beef cattle 
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Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Contracts to reduce milk production (milk bonus) 
Contracts to reduce egg production: four-year terms 
Contracts to reduce agricultural production 
Contracts to reduce animal production 
Fallowing contracts: three-year terms 
1985 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, beef cattle 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production contracts for beef: term extensions only 
Production quota system for milk 
1986 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production: revised markedly 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, beef cattle 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production quota system for milk 
Contracts to reduce agricultural production 
Fallowing contracts 
Production quota system for eggs 
1987 Afforestation premiums: raised markedly 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, beef cattle 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production quota system for milk 
Contracts to reduce agricultural production: old and young farmers 
Fallowing contracts 
Production quota system for eggs 
Contracts to reduce egg production: five-year terms 
Production contracts for beef 
Land clearing charge 
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1988 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, beef cattle 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production quota system for milk 
Contracts to reduce agricultural production: old and young farmers 
Fallowing contracts 
Production quota system for eggs 
Land clearing charge 
Contracts to reduce milk production: five-year terms 
1989 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, beef cattle 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production quota system for milk 
Contracts to reduce agricultural production: young farmers 
Fallowing contracts: considerable expansion 
Production quota system for eggs 
Land clearing charge 
Contracts to reduce egg production 
1990 Afforestation premiums 
Marketing fees: milk, pork 
Pension system for farmers giving up production 
Additional marketing fees for large enterprises in pork and egg production 
Establishment permits: pigs, poultry, beef cattle 
Restrictions on hatching 
Licence system for poultry breeding animals 
Production quota system for milk: temporary alleviations 
Contracts to reduce agricultural production: young farmers 
Fallowing contracts 
Production quota system for eggs 
Land clearing charge 
Contracts to reduce egg production 
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APPENDIX 2. MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX TO COMPLEMENT 
THE SURPLUS TRANSFORMATION APPROACH. 
Appendix 2a. 
Derivation of marginal rate of surplus transformation: general functions. 
The following presentation complements the framework developed in Chapter 3.2.2. 
First, marginal rate of surplus transformation for quota program, i.e. the slope of STCQ, 
is derived. Consumer (CS) and producer (PS) surpluses due to restricted production Qr<Q0 
are: 
Q' 
CS= D (Q)dQ — D (Qr )Q r  
Q' 
P S = D (Qr  )Qr — 0 S (Q)dQ 
To find out the slope of STCQ, (A.1) and (A.2) are differentiated by the policy variable Qr: 
	
dD(Qr ) nr D (Qr 	dD(Qr  ) nr  
dQr 	 ) 	dQ r  
SdD (Qr  )  
— D (Qr ) 	Qr S (Qr  ) 
dQr 	dQr  
The slope of STC is the relation between the change in PS and CS as CS changes due to 
policy variable. Consequently, (A.4) is divided by (A.3): 
(A.5) dP S I dQr Dffi
r (d D (Qr  ) I dQr  ). Qr S(Qr  
dC S I dQr 	—(aD (Qr  ) I dQr  )• Qr  
To simplify this form, both numerator and denominator are multiplied, first, by 1/D(Q), 
and, second, by ed. First, (A.5a) is obtained: 
dp(Qr 	Qr 	D (Qr ) s (Qr ) 
dP S 	dQr D(Qr ) 	D (Qr )  
dD (Qr ) Qr  







dPS 	aPS I aPT 	 S pT  
dCTS dC'TS dpT _S( pT)_(( pT 	 d). aS(PT  )1 aP7 
The second multiplication results in (A.5b): 
dP S = —[1+ D(Qr )— S(Q r )  (A.5b)   ed dCS 	D(Qr) 
The middle term in the brackets provides the price distortion parameter T. Finally, the 
slope of STCQ can be written as follows: 
(A.6) dPS I dCS = —1— z(Q r )-ed 
According to (A.6), if there is no intervention (T=0), the slope of STCQ is -1. This would 
indicate no deadweight loss, i.e., a markka given up by consumers yields a markka gained 
by producers. In addition, STCQ can be positively or negatively sloped depending on the 
magnitude of price distortion T(Q) and the price elasticity of demand ed. 
Secondly, to find out the slope of STCT in the target price program, the surplus equations 





d( pd (pT ).) 
diaT apT 
dP S T  = S(pr  ), where S(pT _ 	[loP s(p T )dpT apT 
/ 	 2ef pT )  
v111 = s(pT )±(pT pd ) 'mk  
apT 	 apT 
The differentiated Equation (3.12), acTs/apT = aCSMpT-aTXMpT, provides the follow-
ing relationship to show the change in CTS due to the change in pT: 
(A.10) XTSapT ={ D( pd (pT ))± s( pT 	(pT pd aS(PT 	T )• 	S(P .  ) apT 
The first term in the brackets yields z,ero, because D(pd(pT)) = S(pT). So, the slope of the 
surplus transformation curve (STCT) for the price policy program is the change in producer 





Equation (A.11) can be simplified further as it is multiplied by 1/S (pT), and the latter part 
of the denominator is multiplied by pT/pT=1: 
(A.11a) 
dps = [_1 pT pd [a s( pT 	pT ji 
TS 	pT 	pT S(PT  
These modifications produced the so called price distortion parameter, T=(pT-pd)/pT, and 
the price elasticity of supply, e.=(dS(pT)/apT).(pT/S(pT), which can he used to express the 
formula for the slope of STCT in its final form: 
dP S  (A.12) 
XTS 
=[ 1— l(pr )•esr 
STCT is always negatively sloped ()PS/aCTS<O), because >0 and e.>0. This means that 
producers always gain from higher price pT, i.e. apsiapT=s(pi)>o. 
Appendix 2b. 
Derivation of surplus transformation curves: linear functions 
The slopes of surplus transformation curves derived above are generally applicable, i.e. 
they hold for any functional form. However, with the specific functional form of demand 
and supply curves, the actual surplus transformation curves can he obtained for each 
program. The conceptual framework of general surplus equations derived in Chapter 3.2 is 
utilized, but the assumption of linearity is employed for demand and supply functions: 
(B.1) Pd = a0 + a1Q
d 
(B.2) Ps = bo + blQ s 
First, the surplus equations for the quota program are derived in the conditions of 
competitive market. In general, the surpluses resulting from production restriction are 
obtained by substituting the linear demand and supply equations for the general form 
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) in Chapter 3.2.2. Hence, the surpluses are: 
(B.3) CS = fo (ao +al Q r )dQ—(a0 +a
i Q r )•Q r 
_ ao .Qr ± y2ai .(Q r )2. _ ao .Qr 	(Qr )2 _ 	(Qr )2 
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Q' 
PS = (a0 + aiQr)-Qr .{ 0  (b 0 + biQ)dQ 
= a0 • Qr ao • (Qr )2— b0   Qr 	(Qr )2 
= (a0 — b0 )• Qr (ai — i,i)•(Qr )2 
STCQ for the quota program is determined as a function PS=f(CS) by solving (B.3) for Qr. 
It produces Qr=(-2CS/ai)u /2. Now, Qr is substituted in (B.4) to yield an equation for STCQ: 
PS = (ao — bo )- 4-2CS I ai +[(a1 — Y2 b1 )-(-2CS I ai )] 
Secondly, surplus transformation curve for the price policy program can he derived the 
same way as STCQ above. STCT will be expressed as a function CTS=f(PS). The surplus 
equations in the price policy program are: 
CTS = (ao — bo ) • Q r + (Y2 ai  —bi ).(Qr )2 
PS = 	• (Q r )2 
Equation (B.7) is solved for Qr, which produces Qr=(2PS/b1)1/2.  Now, Qr is substituted in 
(B.6) to yield the surplus transformation curve for the price policy program, STCT: 
CTS = (ao  — bo)• -‘12PS 1 bi +[(Y2a1 — 	(2PS 1 bi)] 
Appendix 2c. 
Derivation of empirical surplus equations 
In the following, the surplus equations are algebraically derived and they are also shown 
in a numeric form, given the known parameters estimated in Chapter 7. 
First, the producer surplus (PSQ) and the combined consumer-taxpayer surplus (CTSQ) for 
the quota program are presented (Er is the policy variable): 
(c.1) cTsQ = csQ -TxQ = 2 (a0 -p)•Qd —(p—pw)-(,V—Q d ) 
=( 2 a0 + 2 p — pw )• Q d —(p— 	)•.7 = 37772.71.106 —2216 
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PSQ = p,--Y2 S( - )•@-Q° )= p•(bo +b1 ..7)-( - -Q° ) 
=b0 Q° ±(P±Abi .Q°  
= _1922.78.106  + 5477.96- - 9754.10-7 2  
The surplus transformation curve, STCQ, for the quota program can he determined as a 
function PS=f(CTS) by solving equation (C.1) for,  and substituting itin Equation (C.2). 
From (C.1)?i. is: 
CTSQ - (ao +p-pw )• Qd 	 CTS Q  
= 	 = 17045448.56 
PP 	 2216 
Now, let us substitute it for ?i in PSQ-equation (C.2) to yield the STC2 as PSQ=f(CTSQ): 
PS2 = _1919.47.108  +12.53-CTSQ -198.6310 -12 .(CTSQ ) 2  
Secondly, the surpluses in the price regulation program are is the policy variable): 
CTS P = CS P -TX P = (ao - "T")• D(T3)-[(T, - pw )•(S(T3)- D(T).))1 
=Yz(ao -T3)•(T3-ao)lai - [(T3- P w ) .((ii -bo)lbi -(.15 -a0)/a1))] 
= ,(2cioT3-ciö -fi2 )/ai 




pw pw Pw a o 
-E




bl a1  2a i 
=38707.95.10' _1090613.78_555.952 
PS P =T3 •Q° -FAT3 •(S(T3 ) -Q° )=75 •Q° Y2T3 •[ P bib 	Q
°\  
=T)'Qci +(y2C-132 - T) .b0)1 b1)-Y2T3 •Q°  
=(( 1/2 Q° - bc, 1 b1) .T,)+(112b1)•Tj 2  
-= 1404000+256.312 
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1 _2 pw _ 
P -- p+ 
a 2a1 	1 
2pw ao -ao2 (pw _ p s ).Q s 
2a1  
To determine STCP, the surplus transformation curve for the price regulation program, 
Equation (C.6) is solved for the policy variable to yield: 
(C.7) 	= 	 - bo) -1.11(bi-Q° -60 )2 +861 -PS P  
= -2739 ± -N/7502121+ 0.0039PSP 
When-15 is replaced in Equation (C.5) by its numeric expression above (assuming 
CTSP is obtained as a function of PSP. This is the STCP : 
CTSP = 33353.58.106  +1954858.97.-k/7502121+0.0039- PS P —2 .17 •PS P  
Finally, the surplus equations for the thirdalternative program, consumer subsidy (15 is the 
policy variable), are presented: 
CTSc = CSc -TX c -=-(a0 -15) •D(P) 
-{(Ps - T3 )•D(75 )+((Ps- Pw )•(Qs - D(T3 )))] 
=(ao - 73 )•D(T3 )- Ps 'D(To)+To'D(T3 )- Ps •Qs  
Ps 'D(1-3 )± Pw •Qs Pw . D(T)) 
= (Y2ao 1-1/2 T3 P w ) . D( 3 )- (Pw P s )• Qs  
=(ao+Y2T3-Pw)•[_ 
	- 
P - ao 
a l  
1 2 —2 	1 	_ = 2a1 	 a1
Ta0)- (Pw P Pw ao )- (P w P s )•Q s  
1 
(Pw 	P s )•Qs  
= 31750.106 + 45330.447, -43.34 T)2  
(C.10) PSc = ps •Q° + (Qs Q0). Ps = Ps " (Qs +Q0) - 5768.33.106 
2 	 2 
In the consumer subsidy program, PSc remains constant. Hence, CTSc as such represents 
the surplus transformation curve of the consumer subsidy program, STCc. 
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APPENDIX 3. DATA USED TO ESTIMATE SUPPLY FUNCTIONS 
Year Qm pm pb 
pL Feed Crop PPindex 
1960 3384.0 33.91 2.54 1.17 12.66 18.95 13.80 
1961 3519.9 33.81 2.76 1.22 12.57 17.81 13.70 
1962 3537.5 34.15 2.66 1.25 12.96 16.85 13.90 
1963 3648.5 36.51 2.63 1.41 13.99 17.68 14.50 
1964 3714.6 41.77 2.55 1.60 15.12 16.17 15.70 
1965 3655.7 45.35 3.14 1.84 15.98 18.81 17.40 
1966 3581.8 45.88 3.81 2.05 16.54 18.38 17.90 
1967 3455.7 48.51 3.98 2.24 17.98 19.23 18.70 
1968 3491.4 56.78 4.63 2.43 19.43 20.30 21.10 
1969 3494.6 57.34 4.89 2.63 19.73 19.34 21.90 
1970 3313.7 56.02 5.56 2.94 19.76 22.21 22.30 
1971 3197.5 59.08 5.99 3.43 20.26 23.25 23.10 
1972 3189.9 66.44 7.04 4.15 20.91 24.16 25.60 
1973 3107.3 73.22 8.28 5.27 23.96 22.44 28.90 
1974 3055.9 90.17 8.87 6.60 29.43 22.41 33.50 
1975 3065.7 114.95 11.15 8.40 35.46 22.90 42.00 
1976 3176.0 137.09 11.51 9.90 41.57 25.60 47.60 
1977 3130.4 144.79 14.27 11.06 50.64 22.18 51.20 
1978 3124.9 155.15 14.66 12.29 49.57 23.36 54.00 
1979 3141.1 167.65 15.54 13.83 49.38 24.37 57.30 
1980 3173.6 184.23 17.69 15.39 53.72 24.51 64.30 
1981 3072.9 203.06 19.59 17.19 65.55 20.47 72.40 
1982 3064.4 229.59 22.22 19.27 74.21 24.58 82.60 
1983 3135.8 248.21 24.01 20.76 84.76 27.65 88.00 
1984 3123.7 261.74 25.84 23.38 95.27 26.85 93.60 
1985 2987.5 273.91 27.62 25.29 100.00 26.31 100.00 
1986 2975.6 277.48 28.28 26.95 98.00 26.80 101.80 
1987 2846.9 284.18 28.77 28.50 102.10 19.92 103.40 
1988 2667.5 293.67 30.62 30.64 105.00 23.35 107.20 
1989 2667.6 313.58 32.86 34.21 109.40 27.00 111.50 
Qm = milk production, million liters 
pb = producer price of beef, FIM/kg 
Feed = industrial feed price index, 1985=100 
Crop = combined yield of barley, hay and silage, 
= producer price of milk, p/1 
PL = average pay of hired labor, FIM/h 
PPindex = producer price index, 1985=100 
hundred feed units per hectare 
in 1931-1960: 
1931 2194 1936 2437 1941 1699 1946 1573 1951 2583 1956 2917 
1932 2194 1937 2544 1942 1578 1947 1573 1952 2709 1957 3024 
1933 2282 1938 2592 1943 1602 1948 1748 1953 2777 1958 3038 
1934 2291 1939 2573 1944 1608 1949 2262 1954 2786 1959 3194 
1935 2350 1940 2039 1945 1578 1950 2524 1955 2689 1960 3384 
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